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Introduction
Anja van Heelsum and Blanca Garcés-Mascareñas
Rinus Penninx has made great efforts to systematise and classify the 
existing research in the field of migration and ethnic studies. One of 
the objectives of his PhD thesis (1988) was to evaluate social science 
research in this area and to contribute to the accumulation of knowl-
edge and the formation of theory. Many years later, his valedictory lec-
ture (2013) re-evaluated research on migration and integration again, 
this time at the European level.
The analysis of achievements has always been accompanied by the 
identification of the challenges to pursue. In his inaugural lecture upon 
his appointment as director of the Institute for Migration and Ethnic 
Studies (imes) at the University of Amsterdam (1994), Penninx for-
mulated a number of conditions for the development of a fruitful pro-
gramme of research. imes, and later the International Migration, Inte-
gration and Social Cohesion network (imiscoe), represent in fact the 
practical materialisation of this research agenda.
The analysis of the existing literature and the setting up of a research 
programme have structured – but also have been structured by – a sys-
tematic classification of relevant themes. First, Penninx distinguished 
between migration and integration research. This dividing line was used 
in the clustering of the different imes research teams. While migration 
research relates to the actual border crossing of people and to the laws 
and regulations that apply to them, integration research relates to the 
way in which immigrants find a position in the new context and how 
they are treated by the receiving society.
Second, within the realm of integration research, Penninx (1988) 
distinguished between the socio-economic and ethno-cultural dimen-
sions. While the former includes employment/income, education and 
housing, the latter includes identity, culture, religion, language as well 
as image formation in the media and discrimination. Twenty-five years 
later, Penninx (2013) added a third dimension, this time on the legal/
political aspects.
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If we look at the 25 PhD theses supervised by Penninx, the wide 
variety of subjects he has been involved with becomes clear. The theses 
are diverse with regard to their topics, levels of analysis, approaches 
and methodologies. A more detailed analysis of the content of these 
theses reveals that most fields of Penninx’s heuristic model of migration 
and integration research have actually been covered. In other words, his 
model – which worked both as an analytical tool and as a roadmap – 
has partially been filled by his PhD candidates.
This evidence has led us to cluster the chapters of this book accord-
ing to the above-mentioned scheme. The first section deals with the 
legal/political dimension. Blanca Garcés-Mascareñas analyses Spain’s 
immigration policies so as to re-examine to what extent, when and 
where liberal democracies are constrained by rights. Again for the case 
of Spain, María Bruquetas-Callejo looks at the gap between immi-
grants’ rights and effective access with regard to unemployment ben-
efits and pensions, social services and healthcare. In these two chapters, 
the distinction between the law on the books and the law in practice is 
crucial in the analysis of immigration policies.
The second section is on the socio-economic dimension. In the cur-
rent context of economic crisis and deteriorating industrial relations, 
Judith Roosblad re-examines her work on trade unions by consider-
ing what current changes mean for the Dutch trade unions and what 
their impact is on the promotion of immigrants’ interests. In a similar 
vein, Stefania Marino revisits the old dilemmas articulated by Penninx 
and Roosblad (2000) with the objective of creating a heuristic model 
(à la Penninx) for the comparative analysis of trade union strategies 
towards migrant workers. Shifting from trade unions to immigrant 
entrepreneurship, Surrendra Santokhi considers the case of The Hague 
to identify and assess the factors that determine the chances for the 
development of multicultural tourism in ethnically concentrated areas. 
Focusing on education, Philipp Schnell looks at the factors that explain 
the variations in the educational mobility of second-generation Turks 
across different eu countries.
The third section of this books deals with the ethno-cultural dimen-
sion. On the basis of data on Moroccans, Anja van Heelsum reconsid-
ers the concept of ethno-cultural position as introduced by Rinus Pen-
ninx, which she used earlier with regard to second-generation Suri-
namese. From an ethnographic perspective, Simone de Bruin analyses 
the ‘ethno-party scene’ by considering how growing ethnic diversity 
influences their organisation and programming and how and why peo-
ple choose the Turkish, Moroccan or Asian party scenes. Shifting the 
focus to policies, Eltje Bos considers recent developments in Dutch 
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policy on art and theatre and how the culture of immigrants is incor-
porated both in policy documents and with regard to implementation 
arrangements. By analysing files on royal decorations (1974-2009), Jan-
neke Jansen examines society’s valuation of virtues and whether and to 
what extent immigrants have been incorporated. Finally, very differ-
ent both in topic and approach, Lina Pochet observes the parallelisms 
between Anancy stories and drumming, both afrocultural manifesta-
tions spread by the African diaspora in America.
The fourth section includes two articles that deal with interrelations 
between the socio-economic and ethno-cultural dimensions. Though 
Fridus Steijlen’s focus on the housing of Moluccans seems to point to 
their socio-economic position, his article shows how the wijk (ward) 
became a symbol of their identity anchored in the Netherlands. Using 
quantitative data, Aslan Zorlu analyses interethnic differences in nest-
leaving behaviour by considering both socio-economic and cultural 
factors. Interestingly, these two articles show that the socio-economic 
and ethno-cultural dimensions cannot be completely disentangled.
Finally, science is never complete without methodological concerns. 
Given Rinus Penninx’s insistence on methodological issues – proba-
bly acquired during his period in the Department of Social Research 
Methodology at the Free University – we end with two chapters on 
research methodology. Given his training as an anthropologist, it is no 
coincidence that both articles deal with ethnographic challenges in the 
field. Liza Mügge discusses the use of the diary as a method and how it 
remains a source of data long after the research project is concluded. On 
a similar topic but using a different approach, Ilse van Liempt observes 
how thick descriptions, while being intimately connected with empiri-
cal data, allow for the development of valid and relevant theory.
Altogether, this selection of articles shows the great variety of topics 
tackled by Rinus Penninx and his flexibility in accompanying PhD can-
didates in such diverse fields. This book leaves out what all this research 
has meant in terms of dedication and discussion but above all in terms 
of loyalty, warmth and friendship.
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1 Time and spaces without rights
The case of Spain
Blanca Garcés-Mascareñas
1.1 Introduction
In 2003 I started a master’s in migration studies coordinated by the 
Institute for Migration and Ethnic Studies (imes) of the University of 
Amsterdam. At that time, the Netherlands had just embarked upon a 
heated political debate on the limits of integration policies or, as many 
would call it in a dramatically biased way, on the failure of immigrant 
integration. Pim Fortuyn had been assassinated two years before, as 
was Theo van Gogh a couple of months after my arrival in Amsterdam. 
Though I could hardly understand Dutch at the time, it was clear that 
immigrant integration was at the centre of many interesting debates. 
imes had an active role here and so did Rinus Penninx, as a scholar di-
rectly involved in the development of Dutch integration policies from 
the beginning. In the following years, Penninx himself wrote on this 
particular topic, not only describing the development of immigrant 
policies and related debates but also trying to explain what still remains 
inexplicable for many: what happened in the Netherlands?
My years in the Netherlands and in particular at imes should be 
understood in this context. However, my ‘context of origin’ was com-
pletely different. I came from a country that at that moment was wit-
nessing significant immigration flows. The debate was therefore of 
a very different nature. It was not about integration; it was instead 
about borders, about the life and work conditions of undocumented 
immigrants or about the legalisation and subsequent illegalisation of 
many foreign residents. With this context in my ‘backpack’, the liter-
ature on immigration policies soon attracted my attention. Scholars 
such as Freeman (1995), Hollifield (1992, 2005), Joppke (1998, 2005) 
and Guiraudon (1998, 2000, 2002) indicated that liberal democracies 
were self-constrained by rights. As pointed out by Joppke (1998: 290): 
‘accepting immigration is inherent in the liberalness of liberal states’. 
However, having the Spanish case in mind, these conclusions aroused 
many questions: could we simply conclude that liberal democracies 
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face difficulties when it comes to excluding migrants? How could we 
then explain important and persistent forms of exclusion within liberal 
democracies?
Divided between these two different contexts and therefore between 
different debates and research questions, I was struggling until Pen-
ninx gave me the opportunity of not having to choose. On the one 
hand, while waiting for a scholarship to start my PhD, he invited me 
to work with him on a couple of articles (written in the context of 
imiscoe) on immigration and integration policymaking in the Neth-
erlands. Written together with María Bruquetas and Peter Scholten, 
these articles took us several years (the most recent one being Bru-
quetas-Callejo, Garcés-Mascareñas, Penninx & Scholten 2011). Thanks 
to this shared adventure, which was for me a kind of B-side to my 
PhD, I learned all that I now know about immigration in the Neth-
erlands. Several articles and papers for conferences followed. On the 
other hand, Rinus Penninx accepted my invitation to accompany me 
in trying to give a response to a second set of questions. This second 
path, which was shared with Kees Groenendijk as co-director of my 
PhD thesis, led us into unexplored terrain. Since the final question was 
‘what is unique in liberal democracies’, we decided to make a com-
parison (between Spain and Malaysia), which allowed me to explore 
to what extent different political contexts lead to different immigrant 
policies or, put more directly, to what extent liberal democracies are 
substantially different when compared with non-liberal democracies 
(see Garcés-Mascareñas 2012).
When thinking about what I learned from Rinus Penninx, it is 
impossible not to refer to both paths, as they turned out to be equally 
important in the end. Here, however, for the sake of a coherent article, 
I did have to make a choice. Since I was more a companion on the first 
collaboration, let me go for the second. On the question of whether 
and to what extent liberal democracies are self-constrained by rights, 
the answer – on the basis of my analysis of the Spanish case – is that 
rights do indeed play a role but not at all times and not everywhere. 
Liberal democracies do exclude migrants both in the first years of fac-
tual residence and in particular spaces such as detention camps and at 
the national borders and beyond. In this article I will briefly describe 
these time and spaces of exclusion. The final claim I make is that only 
by including them in the picture is it possible to understand the speci-
ficity of liberal democracies when regulating immigration flows.
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1.2 Time of exclusion
Over the years, the majority of long-term immigrants to Spain have 
managed to obtain permanent resident status and, in the end, Span-
ish citizenship. In this regard, the Spanish case is a good illustration of 
a liberal democracy that has no choice but to fully include those im-
migrants already in the country. However, as I will show, this is only 
true in the long run. During the first years in Spain, immigrants’ rights 
were curtailed in two ways: first as irregular immigrants and secondly 
as temporary residents.
Migrants’ illegality
Despite an ‘insatiable hunger’ for immigrant workers (throughout the 
1990s and particularly from 2000 to 2007), the Spanish state responded 
with an entry policy that was highly restrictive. This was how it ap-
peared on paper, which was the result of keeping with guidelines im-
posed by the European Union (eu). But the policy was also restrictive 
in actual practice, as entry into Spain was long subject to a very strict 
evaluation of the job market. Moreover, entry has always been contin-
gent on a prior job offer, which was often difficult to ascertain without 
already being in Spain. Finally, the administrative machinery, unable to 
handle the situation made legal entry an excessively long and compli-
cated process.
This restrictive entry policy did not mean, however, that low num-
bers of immigrants were entering Spain. Due to the high demand for 
foreign workers, immigrants were coming into the country and stay-
ing. The difference was that since they could not enter legally, they did 
so illegally. Until 2005, the most common tactic was to come in on a 
tourist visa, remain, look for a job and then, with the very necessary 
job offer now in hand, become regularised, either through the frequent 
regularisation drives or through official channels for gaining entry to 
the country that would then be used as though the immigrant worker 
were still in his or her country of origin. In fact, this is not so differ-
ent from what occurred in most of Western Europe during the 1960s. 
Although at the time, many of these countries had opened up legal 
channels for entry (via the well-tried guest worker programmes), many 
immigrants arrived separately from the scheme, found work and sub-
sequently legalised their situation (Groenendijk & Hampsink 1995: 1).
This mismatch between legality and reality – between a particularly 
restrictive policy and a reality notable for large numbers of people enter-
ing the country – made it possible for Spain to comply simultaneously 
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with two sets of demands. There were demands for restrictive immigra-
tion policies by the eu as well as the trade unions, which did not look 
kindly on the entry of new workers into a job market characterised by 
high unemployment, and there were the insatiable demands of employ-
ers for foreign workers. This mismatch brought about a veritable model 
of illegal immigration. In the long term, however, this model was not 
sustainable. Illegal immigration could not continue in an unlimited, 
indefinite fashion without calling into question the legitimacy of the 
state in its role of controlling migration flows. Moreover, illegal work-
ers have frequently been perceived as a threat to the wages and work-
ing conditions of legally employed workers. Hence, the very same rea-
sons compelling the unions to limit entry simultaneously led them to 
demand legal recognition for those immigrants already working.
So this model of illegal immigration gave rise to the need to carry 
out periodical regularisation drives and attempts to direct immigra-
tion through legal channels. The former response has frequently been 
interpreted (especially by politicians) as the best illustration of the ‘fail-
ure’ of immigration policies and, more generally, the state’s loss of con-
trol. Nevertheless, as I showed in my thesis (2012), regularisation in 
the Spanish case should be understood primarily as a de facto entry 
policy. Seen from this perspective, the regularisation drives then appear 
as a measure that sought to reconcile contradictory demands. The end 
result has been deferred ‘entry’ – since the condition for every regu-
larisation is a period of illegal status – of as many immigrant workers 
as required by the employers. In specific terms, it makes feasible the 
aforementioned situation whereby immigrants enter the country, look 
for work and, once they have a job, stay.
As González-Enríquez (2009) has noted, this is nothing more than 
a cheap recruitment model in the place of destination. It is cheap in two 
ways. First, the costs and risks of the migratory process are shouldered 
by the immigrant. Second, in political terms it is possible to have an 
open entry policy without putting it in writing and thus without need-
ing to justify it. In terms of rights, a policy that produces irregularity 
means that immigrants enjoy very limited rights in their first years 
of residence. It is true that irregular immigrants in Spain, in contrast 
to other eu countries, have had access until very recently to health 
care and education in the same conditions as citizens. So they do have 
some rights. But they do not have labour rights, their social rights are 
limited, and their presence in the country does not help them to build 
residence rights.
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Temporary residence
Spain’s first Foreigners Law in 1985 only envisaged short-term visas and 
did not recognise the right to family reunification. Later, though, this 
started to change. The increasing inflow of immigrants and consequent 
pressure coming from civil society and opposition parties forced the 
Spanish government to regulate the right to family reunification (1994 
and 1996), to extend the duration of permits and to introduce the per-
manent residence permit for the first time (1996). The new Foreigners 
Law of 2000 introduced the right to family reunification in terms that 
were coherent with the laws of the European Court of Human Rights 
and that tended towards equality of rights between legal residents and 
citizens (freedom of circulation, assembly, association, etc.).
Immigrants’ rights were thus relatively limited but expanded as the 
burgeoning presence of immigrants in the country made it necessary 
to make their rights equal to those of Spanish nationals. Civil society 
and the opposition parties have played a highly significant role in the 
legal inclusion of immigrants. Their demands for equality could not be 
opposed by the government before the law, for otherwise its own dem-
ocratic credentials would be jeopardised. As the Catalan government 
argued when an employers’ association proposed that newly arrived 
immigrants be contractually bound to their employers, such discrimi-
nation is illegal and anti-constitutional. This explains why Spain did 
not opt for a policy that drastically restricted access to membership. As 
a liberal democracy, it simply could not do so.
However, two basic constraints remained: the restriction of work per-
mits to a certain sector and province during the first year and depend-
ence on a formally recognised job for legal residence during the first 
five years. These two constraints make clear the extent to which immi-
grants are initially perceived and accepted only as workers: as workers 
in a specific sector and province during the first year and as workers 
with a formally recognised job in the first five years. In practice, this 
has meant that those temporary residents unable to demonstrate their 
integration as workers run the risk of losing their legal status and, in 
most cases, fall back into illegality. This loss of legality has been far from 
infrequent due to the extremely high numbers of temporary immigrant 
workers and the instability that characterises the Spanish job market. 
The relapse into illegality is in fact a decisive feature that explains much 
about the Spanish model of illegal immigration.
Making the residence permit dependent on formal integration into 
the labour market means turning labour precariousness into legal pre-
cariousness. Immigrants’ residence – and therefore immigrants’ rights 
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– are conditional on their performance as workers. Not performing as 
expected – that is, as a formal worker – means losing your legal status 
and thus an important part of your rights, and having to (re-)start (in 
many cases, again) the legalisation process. In contrast to what the lit-
erature seems to suggest, the path towards citizenship is therefore not a 
secured and linear one but is instead characterised by a back-and-forth 
process that becomes long and uncertain.
1.3 Spaces of exclusion
Though immigration policies and discourses in contemporary Europe 
emphasise the need to deport any irregular immigrant, in practice most 
immigrants – even those with deportation warrants – are not actually 
deported (Chauvin & Garcés-Mascareñas 2012). Greater immigrant 
control thus does not necessarily mean more deportations. First, this 
can be explained by the limitations imposed by the rule of law. In Spain, 
different constitutional rulings have limited the capacity of the state to 
deport irregular immigrants already present in the country (Garcés-
Mascareñas 2012: 162). Second, just as important as rights constraints 
are the difficulties entailed in every process of expulsion: i.e. the high 
costs involved, the identification of irregular immigrants’ place of ori-
gin and cooperation on the part of the authorities in the countries of 
origin. These limitations, however, apply in particular to deportations 
from within the national territory. At the border and beyond, where 
(not by coincidence) most deportations take place, these constraints 
are partially overcome.
At the national border
While deportation from inside the country’s territory is convoluted 
to the point of producing the figure of the legally deported immigrant 
(that is, with a deportation warrant) who is actually non-deportable, 
rejection at the border is another story. It is much easier because it 
does not require another government’s willingness to return the per-
son to the country of departure. Accordingly, while only one in every 
five immigrants within the territory with an expulsion order is in fact 
deported, the ratio of those turned back at the border soars up to nine 
out of ten.
Most of them are turned back at airports when deemed inadmissi-
ble by immigration officers. The rest are rejected when trying to cross 
the physical borders illegally. While illegal entry is almost invariably 
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associated with the eu’s southern frontier, it is in the Pyrenee Moun-
tains where most detentions and deportations have been carried out.1 
The readmission treaty between Spain and France signed in 2002 estab-
lished that ‘[...] each contracting party will readmit into its territory 
[…] without any kind of formal procedure, the national of a third state 
who does not comply with, or who has ceased to comply with the con-
ditions of entry’ (Boletín Oficial del Estado 2003). ‘Without any kind 
of formal procedure’ means that people could be turned back without 
any form of legal assistance. Despite protests by the different colleges of 
lawyers and a court decision stipulating that the right of the ‘returnee’ 
to effective legal assistance was to be respected, the Spanish govern-
ment has always responded in the same way: since would-be immi-
grants are returned under the heading of ‘readmission’ and not ‘turned 
back’, the bilateral agreement applies. At the border, then, the bilateral 
agreement takes precedence over the Foreigners Law, which requires 
the observance of the right to legal assistance in all cases.
The readmission agreement that Spain signed with Morocco in 1992 
was reactivated in 2004 along the lines of the experience with France. 
Deportations to Morocco have also caused concern and unremitting 
protest. In 2006, for instance, leading Spanish newspapers denounced 
the immediate, forcible turning back of illegal immigrants from the 
Spanish enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla, citing violation of all the proce-
dures established by the Law on Foreigners. One member of the Civil 
Guard was quoted declaring: ‘We follow orders from the top, even 
though we all know they are against the law’ (abc 5 October 2006). 
The newspaper El País reproduced a recording of another Civil Guard 
member ordering: ‘If the fence can be opened and they can be rejected, 
then get them out!’ (El País 6 October 2006). Protests about the prac-
tices of detention and repatriation carried out in Moroccan territory 
have had a twofold aim: criticising the Moroccan government for vio-
lating immigrants’ human rights and censuring the Spanish govern-
ment and the eu for externalising immigration control.
Beyond the national border
Since 2006, the new mainstays of Spanish policy for controlling migra-
tory flows have been, first, fostering migration controls in the countries 
of origin and transit and, second, facilitating the repatriation of illegal 
immigrants. Officials in charge of border control in countries of origin 
and transit, as the then Minister of Interior Alfredo Pérez Rubalcaba 
indicated, were urged to ensure ‘[…] that the boats do not get far from 
their points of departure, or that they are intercepted as soon as possi-
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ble because, otherwise, not only will the danger of loss of human life be 
higher but also those people who survive will enter our territory and it 
then will be necessary to initiate the complicated, difficult and expen-
sive procedures of repatriation’ (Pérez Rubalcaba 2008: 76).
With this purpose in mind, the Africa Plan sought to reinforce 
migration control in the countries of origin or transit and repatria-
tion of illegal immigrants by tying it to development assistance. The 
Spanish government never denied that this was essentially a tit-for-
tat arrangement, and the countries of origin were no less aware of 
the deal’s conditions: Spain would let in more legal immigrants, offer 
projects building wells or other forms of development assistance and 
cancel debts in exchange for African countries’ cooperation in bor-
der monitoring and their agreement to accept returning illegal immi-
grants. Since 2006, Spain has signed a series of bilateral agreements 
with Senegal, Mali, Ghana, Cameroon, Ivory Coast, Cape Verde, 
Guinea-Conakry and Gambia. While these agreements do not seem 
to have resulted in a numerically significant rise in repatriations (par-
tially due to their costs), they do result in the externalisation and sub-
contracting of the control, detention, internment and repatriation of 
would-be immigrants.
If deportation measures have often been carried out on the border 
with only a bare minimum of legal guarantees and civil rights obser-
vance, on the far side of the border there is no such protection worthy 
of the name. Accordingly, it is here where detention and deportation 
are carried out with greater impunity. Morocco is a case in point. In 
2006, social organisations and human rights campaigners protested 
the deportation of sub-Saharan migrants to the Algerian border. They 
denounced the fact that somewhere between 1,000 and 1,200 immi-
grants had been dumped in the desert without food or water. In 2008, 
Amnesty International denounced the living conditions and human 
rights violations in a detention camp in Mauritania (known as Guan-
tanamito for ‘little Guantanamo’). Rebuilt by Spanish authorities, this 
camp fulfilled the function of receiving and retaining until repatria-
tion those emigrants who had attempted to leave Mauritania for Spain. 
These two examples make it clear how detention, retention and repa-
triation tend to be less ‘complicated’ and less ‘difficult’ when they occur 
beyond Spanish borders. The reason is simple: in this geographical and 
legal ‘beyond’, the state finally escapes legal, judicial and often, though 
not always, civil society checks.
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1.4 Conclusions
Immigrants’ rights, though originally relatively limited, expanded as 
the burgeoning presence of immigrants in the country made it nec-
essary to make their rights equal to those of Spanish nationals. Civil 
society and the opposition parties have played a highly significant role 
in the legal inclusion of immigrants. Their demands for equality could 
not be opposed by the government before the law, for otherwise its own 
democratic credentials would be jeopardised. However, this is only par-
tially true. If we look at the different policy instruments (residence per-
mits, regularisations, deportations) and take into account policies as 
they are not only written on the books but also put into practice, we 
realise that different forms of exclusion persist: first, by limiting immi-
grants’ rights during the first years of residence and second, by deport-
ing migrants without much accountability at the border and beyond. 
Only by considering these times and spaces of exclusion is it possible to 
understand the role of rights in liberal democracies.
Note
1 The numbers drop after 2007, as most people deported in earlier years (Romani-
ans and Bulgarians) were from then on eu citizens.
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2 Immigrants’ integration into the  
Spanish welfare state
A gap between rights and effective access?
María Bruquetas-Callejo
2.1 Introduction
In the last decade Spain has experienced a dramatic growth in popula-
tion primarily due to a very fast and intense migratory flow. Foreign 
population went from representing 2.28 per cent of the total population 
in 2000 to 12.17 per cent of the registered population in 2010 (more 
than 5.7 million persons). Between 1990 and 2005, Spain became one of 
the primary destination countries for immigration in the world, joining 
countries with a long tradition as receivers of migration flows such as 
the United States and Germany (United Nations 2006: 31).
In spite of restrictive migration policies and the non-policy of inte-
gration1 in force until 2006, immigrants in Spain soon began to enjoy 
economic and social rights. Foreign workers with a formal job contrib-
uting to the social security system are entitled to unemployment ben-
efits or pensions, just like nationals. Even immigrants with an irregular 
legal status have gradually earned entitlements to healthcare or social 
services. However, this relative broad array of rights does not seem to 
translate into effective access to welfare benefits and services, which 
negatively affects immigrants’ integration. How can we make sense of 
this apparent contradiction?
Conventionally, studies of integration have typically followed a neo-
institutionalist approach, understanding public measures for accommo-
dation in relation to nation-specific institutional frameworks. However, 
although until recently there was broad agreement on the existence of 
three or four ideal-type integration regimes that regulate immigrants’ 
inclusion in or exclusion from society, a growing consensus nowa-
days supports the idea that integration models are obsolete (Entzinger 
& Scholten 2012). The usefulness of integration regimes for empirical 
research is fundamentally questioned because of its failure to explain 
change, a consequence of its over-reliance on fixed national models 
(Bousetta 2001; Joppke 1999), and because they imply a normative lens 
over reality, being themselves projections of collective identity produced 
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by nationalist intellectuals and state actors (Favell 2003). Moreover, the 
regime approach is also questioned because formal integration poli-
cies and their practical application do not necessarily coincide (Van der 
Leun 2003; Moreno Fuentes 2003; Bruquetas-Callejo 2012). This also 
holds for the Spanish case, where we observe that in spite of the entitle-
ments acknowledged by the present policy framework of equal oppor-
tunities (peci programme 2006), immigrants experience greater disad-
vantages than nationals in many fields (Moreno Fuentes & Bruquetas-
Callejo 2011; Bruquetas-Callejo & Moreno Fuentes 2012). This suggests 
that the national integration regime falls short of explaining integration 
outcomes because of the presence of an implementation gap.
An alternative explanation would be to resort to the type of wel-
fare mix that characterises Spain. The welfare regime is another state 
institution that has a significant influence on immigrants’ integration, 
as the integration of immigrants and their descendants is to a large 
extent a question of socio-economic participation and opportunities 
of social mobility. A broad range of welfare-state-related institutions 
(welfare policies, labour markets, educational systems, etc.) have an 
effect on immigrants’ economic behaviour and therefore also on their 
specific patterns of social integration. Spain has a Mediterranean wel-
fare regime that has incorporated immigrant workers with a formal job 
into its insurance programmes and has included immigrants in its pro-
grammes based on residence. Yet, we see that in Spain, immigrants’ 
coverage of social risks is much lower than that of nationals, suggest-
ing the existence of a gap between de jure rights and effective rights. 
Empirical demonstration of such a gap would call into question the use 
of welfare regimes for explaining immigrants’ socio-economic integra-
tion outcomes.
In this chapter we will discuss immigrants’ effective access to social 
rights for the case of Spain. Using data from our previous study on 
immigrants and the Spanish welfare state (Moreno Fuentes & Bruque-
tas-Callejo 2011), we will give an overview of immigrants’ use of benefits 
and services in three areas: unemployment benefits and pensions, social 
services, and healthcare. Our data comes from a statistical exploitation 
of several official data sets provided by Spanish authorities at different 
levels, by international organisations (Eurostat, Organisation for Eco-
nomic Co-operation and Development, United Nations) and by social 
organisations (Fomento de Estudios Sociales y de Sociología Aplicada, 
foessa). Our analysis explores the importance of three sets of elements 
that contribute to explain the gap between rights and effective benefits: 
the characteristics of the welfare regime and economic system, immi-
gration/integration policies, and policy implementation.
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2.2 Immigrants’ entitlement to the Spanish welfare state
Spain has a Mediterranean welfare regime characterised by low social 
expenses, a strong multilevel governance and a strong reliance on the 
family for delivering care services. In particular, as is typical of Medi-
terranean welfare regimes, Spain combines contributive (Bismarckian) 
and universal (Beveridgean) benefits. This means that although entitle-
ment to old age pensions and unemployment benefits depend on one’s 
participation in the formal labour market and one’s contribution made 
to social security, other benefits such as health care, social services or 
education are universal entitlements provided to all residents in the 
country regardless of their nationality.
As a consequence, immigrants access the Spanish welfare state 
through two channels. On the one hand, Spain has incorporated immi-
grant workers with a formal job into its insurance programmes through 
the mere application of Bismarckian principles, since those principles 
establish that citizens obtain benefits proportional to the contribu-
tions they make to social security. Social security is an insurance sys-
tem financed through the contributions of workers and employers that 
offers protection for labour-related social risks such as unemployment, 
old age retirement, and sickness. As the basic criteria of entitlement 
depend on the contributions previously made, foreigners with work 
permit and jobs in the formal economy have always had equal access to 
the system. Also, non-contributive pensions and non-contributive dis-
ability benefits cover both Spanish citizens and legal foreign residents, 
as they are means-tested benefits granted to persons who lack contribu-
tive benefits and fulfil the necessary requisites.
On the other hand, the Spanish welfare state has extended its wel-
fare programmes based on Beveridgean principles (such as health 
care, social services or education) to include all persons residing in 
Spain regardless of their nationality or legal status (universalist crite-
ria). Undocumented immigrants have access to healthcare, education, 
social services and – for some – social housing programmes merely by 
registering themselves in the municipal population register, something 
quite unusual in Northern European countries.2
In those welfare sectors following Beveridgean principles, the exten-
sion of rights to immigrants has been the result of complex processes 
combining institutional inertias and historical conjunctures. The Span-
ish public health care system gives a clear example of the process of the 
extension of rights to immigrants, as it underwent a slow process of 
consolidation that meant the universalisation of health care in 1989.3 
But this universalisation of health care coverage referred only to Span-
24 María Bruquetas-Callejo
ish citizens due to a restrictive interpretation of the General Law on 
Health Care, while foreigners’ access to the public health care system 
remained conditioned on their contributions to the social security sys-
tem.
After the approval of the 1996 Child Welfare Law and the 1996 reform 
of regulations for the implementation of the 1985 Foreigners Law, preg-
nant women and children were the first undocumented immigrants 
who were formally entitled to National Health System services under 
conditions equal to those for Spanish citizens. However, this legislation 
was implemented only to a limited extent, and at the beginning of 1999 
health care coverage for undocumented immigrants was put on the 
political agenda. The debate over the Foreigners Law 4/2000 opened 
a window of political opportunity for the social coalition (made up of 
third-sector public health organisations and immigrant rights organi-
sations) advocating for the incorporation of immigrants into the health 
care system. This new law expanded health care coverage to all persons 
who could demonstrate that they were residing in Spain and lacked 
resources to cover the cost of their health care. The mechanism chosen 
to link health care coverage with the criterion of residency was enrol-
ment in the municipal population register, to exclude short-term visi-
tors to the country.
As generally occurs in Mediterranean welfare regimes, social ser-
vices are the less developed area of social policy, characterised by a 
complicated institutional organisation and inadequate funding. Article 
14 of Law 4/2000 entitles foreigners legally residing in Spain to basic 
and specialised social services and benefits under the same conditions 
as Spanish citizens. Foreigners with an irregular administrative status, 
on the other hand, have a right to basic social services and benefits 
through enrolment in municipal population registers. This distinction 
is not based on a clear legal definition regarding the content of basic 
and specialised services. As a result, each autonomous community has 
resolved in its own way the issue of undocumented immigrants’ access 
to its social services network: in some regions, requirements are flexible 
in order to facilitate access, while in others, semi-public schemes have 
been established to service undocumented immigrants, often run by 
third-sector organisations (Rodríguez Cabrero 2003).
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2.3 Effective access
Social security and contributive benefits:  
pensions and unemployment schemes
As admittance to benefits under the National Institute of Social Secu-
rity (inss) does not depend on nationality but on the contributions one 
has made, natives and foreigners with work permits and jobs in the 
formal economy have access to the system on an equal footing. This 
equal access to social security for foreign workers with a formal job 
means that the strong migratory flows of recent years has translated 
into a considerable and stable presence of foreign workers among the 
contributors to the Spanish social security. In the period 1996-2007 the 
Spanish economy created almost eight million new jobs, increasing the 
number of employed persons from 12.6 million in 1996 to 20.5 million 
in the second trimester of 2007. Half of those new jobs were taken by 
foreigners, which led to an increase in the number of foreigners con-
tributing to social security from four per cent in 2001 to more than 10.5 
per cent in October 2011.
What is more, the percentage of foreigners registered in the social 
security system in Spain has remained almost stable during the last years 
in spite of the economic crisis: between 10 and 11 per cent for male work-
ers and around 10 per cent for female workers. According to figures pub-
lished by the inss, in October 2011 there were 17.2 million contributors 
to social security, of which almost 1.8 were foreigners. Of these foreign 
contributors, 81 per cent were from non-eu countries. In addition, less 
than 1 per cent of the recipients of pensions in Spain are immigrants. Of 
this 1 per cent, more than half are eu citizens: the French at 16,400 and 
the Germans at 9,400 pensioners come in first and second respectively 
on the list of foreign recipients of retirement pensions in Spain.
The importance of these figures is huge if we consider this contribu-
tion to the welfare state in relation to the expenses that immigration 
implies for the social state. Economic studies of the costs and benefits 
of immigration for the Spanish welfare state generally agree on the net 
contribution that immigration has brought about. According to one 
study, in 2009 the contributions of immigrants to social security (€8.08 
million) was more than all the social expenses concerning migration 
(€6.50 million) (Otero 2010). As the great majority of immigrants are in 
their most productive years (between 20 and 40 years), they constitute 
a net contribution to the inss budget, and they will continue to be for 
at least the next two decades (assuming that the number of immigrants 
remains constant).
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These findings are particularly important, given that the Spanish 
welfare state dedicates an important share of its resources to old-age 
pensions. The contributions of immigrants have temporarily raised the 
ratio of contributors to pensioners to nearly 2.5 to 1. As a result, thanks 
to immigration, the Spanish pension system’s entry into a state of deficit 
will be delayed by almost five years – from 2023 to 2028 (González et al. 
2009). This clear positive balance will not be as sharply defined in the 
future when the first cohorts of migrant workers who settled in Spain in 
the mid-1980s begin to retire. Also, the present economic crisis, which 
has destroyed more than 2.2 million jobs in Spain, has had a greater 
effect on immigrant workers, whose unemployment rate was 32.7 per 
cent in 2011 compared with 19.5 per cent among natives.
Health care
As we have seen, the public health system in Spain has gradually ex-
panded its range of coverage to include almost all the population resid-
ing in the country, understanding that the right to health treatment is 
a basic human right. Nevertheless, the universalisation of the public 
health system has not guaranteed ‘de facto’ equity in access. Data from 
the Spanish Survey of Living Conditions between 2004 and 2008 show 
that immigrants declare that they are unable to access medical treat-
ment more often than nationals do. And more often than nationals do, 
immigrant informants tend to ascribe this lack of access to the scarcity 
of financial resources or time.
Analysis of the data from the foessa 2007 survey provides us with 
an accurate picture of disadvantaged sectors access to the National 
Health System (nhs). While three per cent of the population above 
the poverty line (i.e. above the threshold of 60 per cent of the median 
national income) responded that they did not have access to the nhs, 
this percentage increases to 5.2 per cent among those below the poverty 
line. In our analysis, we apply Guinea and Moreno Fuentes’ categories 
of homes depending on the number of indicators of socio-economic 
exclusion that affect them. ‘Integrated homes’ are those not affected by 
any indicator of exclusion, ‘precariously integrated homes’ are those 
affected by one indicator of exclusion, ‘vulnerable’ are those affected 
by two or three indicators, and ‘excluded’ are those homes affected by 
four or more indicators of exclusion (Guinea & Moreno Fuentes 2009). 
According to this classification, eight per cent of the individuals liv-
ing in ‘excluded’ homes declared they did not have access to the public 
health system; a majority of these individuals are undocumented immi-
grants. Similarly, 5.2 per cent of the ‘poor’ population – located under 
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the threshold of 60 per cent of the income median – also states their 
lack of access to public health. Moreover, foreigners living in ‘excluded’ 
homes have 9.1 times more risk than nationals to access health care 
through assistance schemes supplying regular health care services,4 and 
for foreigners living in ‘vulnerable homes’ this risk is a staggering 42.4 
times more than nationals.
Moreover, diverse indicators show that immigrants make a dif-
ferentiated use of health services. According to the 2006 National 
Health Survey, foreigners see a family doctor seven per cent less than 
the autochthonous population and a specialist 16.5 per cent less than 
natives. However, immigrants more often use emergency services: 65 
per cent of them had access to hospital treatment through this channel 
against 57 per cent of natives.
Social services
Data from 2008 regarding the use of social services by immigrants in-
dicates that foreigners represented approximately 13.7 per cent of the 
users recorded in the Social Service User Information System (siuss) 
database, a percentage close to the 11.55 per cent of the population that 
are foreigners in the 13 regions that participated in the database (msps 
2009). However, if we focus instead on the total number of interven-
tions, this group is clearly underrepresented. Of the total of 2,385,683 
social service interventions in 13 autonomous communities and cities, 
163,308 were identified as assistance to immigrants (representing only 
6.85 per cent of all the interventions).
In 2008, immigrants made up 11.2 per cent of the beneficiaries of 
minimum income programmes in Spain, a percentage slightly below the 
actual weight of the immigrant population in Spain’s overall population, 
which was approximately 12.2 per cent (msps 2010). In addition, if we 
take into consideration the fact that immigrants represent a greater pro-
portion of the population at risk of social exclusion, it is clear that the 
range of coverage of these programmes for the immigrant population is 
considerably below what would correspond to this group proportion-
ately and that a significant number of immigrants are left unprotected.
2.4 Elements helping to explain the gap
The Spanish welfare state has shown its ability to adapt reasonably well 
to the integration challenges brought about by the settlement of immi-
grants in a very short span. Nevertheless, Spain immigrants’ coverage 
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of social risks is far from sufficient, showing a mismatch between the de 
jure social rights of immigrants and the de facto access to benefits. How 
can we explain this?
Mediterranean welfare state
These inconsistencies can be attributed partially to the Mediterranean 
welfare regime’s heavy reliance on contributive schemes. The compara-
tive literature on welfare regimes reveals that insurance systems based 
on contributions have less redistributive capacity than regimes that rely 
more on universal entitlements, like the social-democratic welfare re-
gimes. That means that citizens still depend to a great extent on the 
market for their subsistence, and that the capacity for decommodifica-
tion of these regimes is only moderate.
There are various reasons why contributive schemes offer less pro-
tection for immigrants. First, a majority of immigrants find jobs in the 
informal sector. For undocumented immigrants, but also for many 
immigrants with work permits who cannot find a job in the formal econ-
omy, the informal economy is the only possibility to get a job. Workers 
employed in the black economy do not contribute to the social security 
and therefore are excluded from contributive protection schemes.
Second, most immigrants who work in formal jobs and contribute 
to social security have temporary jobs and are therefore entitled to only 
short periods of unemployment benefits or other contributive schemes. 
According to the National Employ Service, 60 per cent of immigrants 
were working in temporary jobs in 2007 against 39.2 per cent of natives. 
This means that immigrant workers are constantly entering and exiting 
the labour market (and social security), combining temporary formal 
jobs, informal jobs and periods of unemployment. The coverage of con-
tributive benefits is for them only limited, as the amount and duration 
of unemployment benefits are directly related to the contribution they 
make to social security and the duration of their contribution. The dual 
system of protection (contributive and non-contributive schemes) in 
Southern European countries generates a polarisation between hyper-
protected and under-protected users (Ferrera 1996), and immigrants 
tend to be concentrated in the latter.
The consequence of this limited access to welfare benefits is that 
immigrants are much more vulnerable to social risks than nationals, 
something that has become particularly acute in recent years due to 
the economic crisis. In the last five years, the percentage of immigrants 
receiving unemployment benefits almost tripled, from 5.8 per cent at 
the end of 2006 to 15.15 per cent in November 2010. As immigrants tend 
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to have shorter labour careers and work more often in temporary jobs 
than nationals, the coverage rate of unemployment benefits for immi-
grants tends to be relatively low. In 2010, the unemployed foreign popu-
lation had a coverage rate of 40 per cent, notably below the 78 per cent 
of unemployed native workers. What is more, from 2010 onwards the 
percentage of foreign workers protected by unemployment benefits has 
started to drop dramatically, since the period of perception of contrib-
utive benefit was finished.5 Also, the tendency of Mediterranean wel-
fare regimes to leave many services up to families and social networks 
implies that immigrants are less protected against social risks since they 
have weaker social networks.
Spain’s economic structure and immigration regime
The coverage that welfare systems offer to immigrants depends greatly 
on two interrelated factors: the country’s economic structure (includ-
ing its labour market) and its immigration regime. On the one hand, 
the economy and the welfare state need to be seen as two sides of one 
coin. The important role of the informal economy within the Spanish 
productive system and its demand for low-skilled workers represent an 
institutional inertia hindering the access of immigrants to insurance 
programmes. Although by its very nature the informal economy is dif-
ficult to quantify, various authors estimate the size of the Spanish infor-
mal economy to be between 20 and 23 per cent of gdp, which is high 
compared with the European average of 14 per cent in 2010 (Schneider 
2010). As we saw, those welfare states that rely strongly on contributive 
schemes and with large informal economies offer the least protection 
to immigrants, since immigrants are most likely to work in the deregu-
lated sector and the right to welfare is conditional upon participation in 
the regular labour market. The immigration regime reinforces this ten-
dency by denying or limiting certain categories of immigrants (such as 
asylum seekers or family members) the right to work, which effectively 
drives them to work in the informal economy, thereby excluding them 
from the contributive protection schemes.
Policy implementation
The process of implementing policy is to a large extent responsible for 
the mismatches between immigrants’ rights and their actual rights. 
One element contributing to the creation of an implementation gap is 
bureaucratic discretion. The application of policies is ultimately in the 
hands of low-level bureaucrats who are in direct contact with the citizens 
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and who are the ones allowing or hindering the effective translation of 
rights into facts. Although we lack qualitative data about the practices 
of low-level bureaucrats, our findings suggest a significant amount of 
discretion and discrimination in the process of granting benefits. Some 
comparative studies explain the higher levels of discretion in Southern 
European countries as being the result of the lenient bureaucratic style 
typical of these countries, in contrast to the more rigid style exercised 
by their Northern European counterparts (Jordan et al. 2003). In con-
trast, recent comparative studies considerably nuance this explanation 
in terms of bureaucratic cultures, showing instead that the high level 
of discretion in Southern Europe is a response to the under-resourced, 
demanding working conditions that low-level bureaucrats face, which 
leads them to develop ‘coping practices’ (Bruquetas-Callejo 2012).
Moreover, the decentralisation of policies also contributes to the dis-
continuity between policies and practices. The high degree of decen-
tralisation of integration policies in Spain implies extreme inequalities 
between regions and cities, as some have more resources to develop 
programmes than others. Immigrants living in different areas do expe-
rience considerable differences in their access and coverage to welfare 
services (Martínez de Lizarrondo 2006). Differences in implementa-
tion are the result of political decisions by local or regional authorities, 
and even national policies are interpreted and applied quite differently. 
The procedure for enrolling in the municipal register – which might 
seem to be a simple and straightforward matter – is an area in which 
politicisation or bureaucratic discretion can interfere with the effective 
access of immigrants to services such as health care, social services or 
housing programmes. In recent years some municipalities have blocked 
undocumented immigrants from enrolling in the municipal popula-
tion register, contravening Spain’s Basic Law on Local Government. 
Obtaining the necessary health care ‘card’ depends on the requirements 
imposed by officials of different government levels in the process (the 
inss, regional health services, state tax authority and municipal gov-
ernments). Another example of the variation that multilevel govern-
ance introduces in policy implementation is the reform of the General 
Law of Health Care recently passed by the Spanish parliament. Accord-
ing to this reform, undocumented immigrants are no longer entitled 
to health treatment. However, not all regional governments are equally 
willing to put this in force. Five regions have already declared that they 
will continue offering health treatment to undocumented immigrants, 
in effect ignoring the reform.
The multilevel governance pattern of the Spanish welfare state is 
also characterised by the participation of third-sector organisations 
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as executers (and sometimes as formulators) of policies. A majority of 
regional integration policies aims to offer equal opportunities (Martínez 
de Lizarrondo 2006), applying an individualist-universalist approach to 
rights. This is to be achieved by a strategy of ‘normalisation’, which sets 
out to improve the socio-economic mobility of immigrants through 
mainstream services for the general public instead of creating special 
schemes for immigrants. However, the majority of regional integration 
plans concern measures dealing with social services and are located 
within the social service departments. As a consequence, integration 
follows the modes of functioning typical of those departments that put 
the application of integration measures into the hands of social organi-
sations (Carrasco & Rodríguez Cabrero 2005; Tamayo y Carrillo 2002), 
which differentiates further the process of policy implementation, often 
introducing special programmes for groups with specific difficulties.
Notes
1 Following Penninx (2001), ‘non-policy’ – i.e. not having an explicit integration 
policy for immigrants – also has to be analysed as a policy.
2 Per 1 September 2012, legislative changes are being implemented in order to 
exclude undocumented immigrants from health care services. However, this 
measure has provoked considerable opposition: five regions have refused to apply 
it and many professionals in the health care sector are calling for civil disobedi-
ence.
3 Until the beginning of the 1950s it was composed of a multiplicity of social insur-
ance schemes that were gradually merged, becoming a relatively unified system 
within the social security system (the Spanish National Health System) in the sec-
ond half of the 1980s.
4 For those excluded from national health care services (e.g. undocumented immi-
grants) several ngos provide health assistance.
5 Social security contributions entitle to receive unemployment benefit during a 
specific period. After that, unemployed workers can receive social assistance ben-
efits for unemployed.
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the socio-economic dimension
3 Trade unions and the representation of 
migrant and ethnic minority workers
Challenges in deteriorating industrial relations
Judith Roosblad
3.1 Introduction
Industrial relations in the Netherlands are under severe pressure. Trade 
unions are caught in an internal power struggle. They are redefining 
their role in socio-economic decision-making and are inventing new 
ways of representing the interests of the working population. Joint con-
sultation bodies such as the Social Economic Council (ser) have suf-
fered a significant loss of influence, and the renowned ‘polder model’ is 
in decline. What do all these changes mean for the Dutch trade unions 
and what is the impact of these changes on the promotion of interests 
of migrant and ethnic minority workers?
3.2 Explaining trade unions’ choices
In my PhD thesis (2002), I examined how trade unions have dealt with 
immigration and migrant and ethnic minority workers in the past cen-
tury. The main research question was as follows: What was the attitude 
of the Dutch trade unions towards immigration and immigrant work-
ers in the period since the Second World War, with an emphasis on the 
period between 1960 and 1997? I outlined three major dilemmas that 
trade unions came up against in responding to the issue of immigra-
tion and immigrant workers (see also Penninx & Roosblad 2000). The 
first dilemma was whether to resist or cooperate with government and 
employers to recruit labour immigrants. A second dilemma arose after 
the immigrants had arrived and settled into society: should such work-
ers be regarded as an integral part of the trade union rank and file and 
be actively recruited as members, or should they be wholly or partly 
excluded from union representation? And if the trade unions chose to 
follow a line of inclusion: should they concentrate solely on the com-
mon interests of indigenous and migrant workers together and pursue 
general policies for all workers, or should they also stand up for the spe-
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cific interests and needs of their migrant members, devising targeted 
policies to achieve material equality?
To explain the choices that trade unions made in their policies 
towards immigration and immigrant or ethnic minority workers, I have 
formulated a set of explanatory factors. The first concerns the position 
of power that the trade unions occupy in society and in the national 
socio-economic decision-making process. The assumption is that the 
more powerful a trade union is, the more effectively it can wield its 
influence to steer government policies as well as the policies of employ-
ers’ associations in directions favourable to the union. I applied several 
indicators to assess the power of trade unions. Trade unions were con-
sidered more powerful (at the national level) if they maintained strong 
ties with governing political parties, if they had a high degree of organi-
sation, and if they were not fragmented but had a strongly centralised 
and unified union structure. The second factor involves conditions in 
the economy and the labour market. At times of widespread unemploy-
ment, the competition (actual or presumed) between indigenous and 
immigrant workers might increase, making union policies of inclusion 
more difficult to maintain. In times of economic growth, there would 
presumably be more room for special measures to improve the social 
and economic position of immigrants, such as language courses, educa-
tion and training, or affirmative action. The third factor relates to soci-
ety as a whole. Social trends may have a strong impact on the attitudes 
of trade unions (just as such attitudes may strongly influence society). 
Trade union policies towards immigration and immigrants are influ-
enced by factors such as the public discourse, institutional arrange-
ments, legislation, and key institutional actors like national authorities, 
churches or political parties. The ways such actors respond to immigra-
tion and immigrants are important considerations for trade unions to 
take into account.
The main objective of this chapter is to examine what has changed 
since the international comparative study we conducted in 2000 (Pen-
ninx & Roosblad 2000) and my PhD thesis in 2002. I will tentatively 
analyse the changes that have occurred with regard to the explanatory 
factors, such as changes in the social, political and economic climate, 
in industrial relations and within the trade union movement since the 
turn of the century and whether these have had an influence on the 
representation of minority workers’ interests. Furthermore I will exam-
ine whether the dilemmas we have formulated are still relevant. In this 
chapter I will solely focus on the Dutch Confederation of Trade Unions 
(fnv), which is the largest confederation in the Netherlands.
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3.3 Changes since the turn of the millennium
Changes in political and social climate
In my PhD thesis, I presumed that trade union policies towards im-
migration and immigrants are influenced by factors such as the public 
discourse and key institutional actors such as national authorities or 
political parties. The ways in which such actors respond to immigra-
tion and immigrants are important considerations for trade unions to 
take into account. Furthermore, I formulated the hypothesis that the 
more powerful a trade union is, the more effectively it can wield its 
influence to steer government policies (regarding immigration and im-
migrants) in directions favourable to the union. One indicator of trade 
unions’ power (at the national level) is the strength of their ties with 
governing political parties. There has never been a strong link between 
the political coalition in power and the trade unions. There have been 
periods in which the political parties in power were quite responsive to 
the demands of the trade unions, for instance during the period 1973 
to 1977 when the PvdA (the social democratic party) and the cda (the 
Christian democratic party) were in power. However, the link between 
the PvdA and the fnv (the Dutch Confederation of Trade Unions) has 
never been as strong as for example the closely intertwined relation 
between the Labour Party and the Trade Union Congress (tuc) in the 
uk until the end of the 1970s (Roosblad 2000). From the 1960s to the 
1990s, changes in political coalitions in the Netherlands also hardly in-
fluenced the way the government dealt with immigration and integra-
tion issues. Although the shift from a centre-left government during 
the period 1973 to 1977 to predominantly centre-right coalitions from 
1977 to 1989 caused a change in socio-economic policies, there was no 
real marked difference of opinion between the major political parties 
regarding these issues and there was a great deal of consensus about the 
way ethnic minorities should be integrated into Dutch society (see also 
Sleegers 2007). This was also true for the administrations during the 
1990s. What was key in the integration policies during the 1990s was 
the improvement of the socio-economic position of ethnic minorities. 
The focus was on employment, education and political participation 
(Entzinger 2003; Spijkerboer 2007; Sleegers 2007). Although the leader 
of the conservative party vvd ventilated his criticism on multicultural-
ism and the slow integration of minorities, especially Muslims, in the 
early 1990s, this debate did not immediately lead to a great shift in poli-
cies when the vvd came into power in 1994. Again during the gov-
ernments consisting of a broad centre coalition between the conserva-
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tive party vvd, the social democratic party PvdA and the liberal party 
D66 (1994 until 2002), in which the Christian democrats had no seat (a 
novelty in Dutch political history), government policies on integration 
mainly focused on the socio-economic enhancement of migrants and 
ethnic minorities.
From the turn of the century, however, topics such as immigration, 
integration and multiculturalism began to dominate the political agenda 
throughout Europe. In the public and political debate on integration, 
the emphasis has shifted from socio-economic integration to overcom-
ing cultural and religious differences (Sleegers 2007; Duyvendak 2006). 
Immigration was criminalised and because of international political 
and religious terrorism, migrants (especially Muslims) were perceived 
from a security perspective (Marino & Penninx 2010). The turn of the 
century also marked the beginning of a politically unstable period in 
the Netherlands. Between 2002 and 2012, the country had five general 
elections. After eight years of a broad centre coalition, a series of cen-
tre-right governments came to power under a Christian Democrat, Jan 
Peter Balkenende. The rise of the political party of the populist Geert 
Wilders led to an even more outspoken anti-Islam discourse.
Changes in industrial relations
Another indicator of the power of trade unions is the way in which they 
are structured. Strongly centralised and unified trade unions are con-
sidered more powerful (at least at the national level) than trade unions 
with a fragmented and decentralised structure. Dutch labour relations 
have always had a strong element of corporatism, also known as the 
Dutch polder model. In order to participate in the national corporat-
ist system, the internal centralisation of the trade unions was of great 
importance. Especially after the Second World War, there was a strong 
perception within the trade unions that the confederations were bet-
ter equipped to take decisions in socio-economic matters than the af-
filiated unions. The task of carrying out the centrally formulated poli-
cies in their respective sectors of industry fell to the affiliated unions. 
At the end of the reconstruction period, this automatic acceptance of 
the policies of the confederations changed. During the 1960s and the 
1970s the affiliated unions grew in importance vis-à-vis the trade union 
confederations. This was due to several factors, such as the widespread 
introduction of decentralised bargaining, a more flexible wage policy 
which enhanced the importance of the negotiating unions, and a grow-
ing emphasis on the well-being and working conditions of individuals 
in the workplace. Although this has led to situations in which the trade 
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union confederation and member unions have held diametrically op-
posite viewpoints, the centralisation of the unions remained an impor-
tant feature throughout the 20th century (Roosblad 2000).
Especially in the second half of the 1990s, the Dutch polder model 
flourished. It was a reflection of the good relations between employers, 
unions and government that had steadily developed since the Wasse-
naar Agreement of 1982, based on shared goals and mutual trust. The 
Netherlands did well economically, unemployment was minimalised, 
and the government budget was in order.
In the past decade, this situation has drastically changed. The influ-
ence of Dutch trade unions in the national socio-economic decision-
making process can be measured using a number of indicators. Firstly, 
the Social Economic Council (Sociaal Economische Raad or ser), an 
official advisory council of the government in which social partners 
and independent experts appointed by the government are represented, 
is an important body that influences national socio-economic issues. 
Secondly, there is the Labour Foundation (Stichting van de Arbeid), a 
national consultative body in which trade unions and employers’ asso-
ciations make agreements on issues in the field of labour and industrial 
relations. Upon request, the Labour Foundation also gives advice to the 
government on labour-related topics. Furthermore, the trade unions 
were represented on the board of other national councils such as the 
National Employment Agency (Landelijk Bureau Arbeidsvoorziening). 
In the past decade, the influence of these consultation bodies has dete-
riorated drastically. This was due to a number of factors. First, there has 
been a change in governing style. The government appeared to have 
less need for advice from consultative bodies such as the ser. The num-
ber of requests for advice given to the ser has dropped substantially 
since the turn of the millennium. Second, the employers’ associations 
seemed to have better access to the coalition in power than the trade 
unions, which provided them the opportunity to directly influence 
government policies without consulting the trade unions. A third key 
factor was the decline in the internal centralisation of the trade unions 
(see next paragraph), which led to an even further disintegration of the 
Dutch polder model.
Changes within the trade union
An important change was the shift in the balance of power within the 
trade unions. At the end of the 1990s, the trade union movement was 
mainly characterised by large-scale mergers. In 1997 the Transport Un-
ion, the Union for Business Services, the Union for Food Workers and 
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the Industrial Union merged to become fnv Bondgenoten, while the 
Association for Police Officers entered into a partnership with the un-
ion for public services (abvakabo fnv). These mergers had implica-
tions for the power relations within the trade union movement and be-
tween the confederation and affiliated unions. The two super unions 
together represented over two-thirds of fnv membership. They ques-
tioned the role of the confederation and wanted a more active role in 
the national socio-economic decision-making process. This resulted in 
a redistribution of seats in the ser: while previously the seats of the 
workers’ associations had always been occupied by representatives of 
the trade union confederations, in 2000, the presidents of the two larg-
est fnv member unions were admitted to the ser. The mergers were 
intended as a first stepping stone towards a unified trade union move-
ment. But already in 2000, the burst of the internet bubble put a spoke 
in the wheel of these plans. The stock market crash caused the equity 
value of fnv Bondgenoten, and especially the former Industrial Union, 
to collapse. The unification of all affiliated unions was put on hold.
The stock market crash was also a prelude to the economic crisis 
of 2002/2003. Economic growth practically stopped, which increased 
the government’s budget deficit. The subsequent Balkenende govern-
ments introduced reforms in social security, such as early retirement 
and disability insurance, and in health care. This ultimately led to a 
conflict between the social partners and the government and a crisis 
in the Dutch polder model. In 2004, the trade unions launched a mas-
sive campaign in which 300,000 people – an unusually high turnout 
by Dutch standards – demonstrated against these government plans. 
Although the dispute was settled in the autumn of 2005 through joint 
consultation, this was a significant sign of the decline of the Dutch pol-
der model.
Crisis within the fnv
Since 2007, the global economy has been in decline. This major global 
recession, characterised by various systemic imbalances, was sparked 
by the collapse of the housing market in the United States in 2007 and 
the outbreak of the financial crisis of 2007-2008. Because the interna-
tional financial markets were closely intertwined, the global recession 
affected the entire world economy. In the course of 2008, the Eurozone 
was officially in an economic recession, which took a downward turn 
at an unprecedented speed. Once the credit crisis broke out in 2008, 
the debate within the Netherlands on state pensions (aow) soon re-
started. The government decided in the spring of 2009 to increase the 
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state pension age from 65 to 67 years. After initially fiercely resisting 
this measure, the leaders of the fnv recognised that the economic cri-
sis, the aging population and increasing life expectancy made reform 
of the pension system inevitable. The government requested the ser to 
come up with alternative cutbacks to reduce government spending by 
the same amount (4 billion euro) as the government would have saved 
on increasing the state pension age. The deadline for the ser’s recom-
mendations was set for 1 October 2009. The trade unions proposed al-
ternative cuts in areas other than the state pension, such as a reduction 
in the mortgage rebate for expensive villas. As it became clear that the 
employers’ association did not want any alternatives and that they not 
only wanted to increase the state pension age but also to raise the retire-
ment age, the trade unions came up with an alternative plan for a flex-
ible retirement age. But again, the employers did not agree with these 
proposals and rejected the plans shortly before the deadline of 1 Octo-
ber 2009. The ser trajectory had failed miserably. Meanwhile the crisis 
had created a huge budget deficit, which resulted in more austerity and 
economic reforms. This intensified the pressure from the fourth Balk-
enende government to increase the state pension age even more. After 
the failure of the ser agreement, the government continued to prepare 
its own legislation to change the retirement age.
The fall of the fourth Balkenende government on 20 February 2010 
presented an unexpected turn in the retirement debate. The increase of 
the retirement age was left to the new government, which would come 
into office sometime after the elections of 9 June 2010. The social part-
ners seized this opportunity to make another attempt to find a joint 
solution they saw suitable. This ultimately led to an agreement in prin-
ciple on the state pension and retirement age in the Labour Foundation, 
on 4 June. The social partners agreed on an age increase from 65 to 66 
in 2020 (and possibly to 67 in 2025), but the possibility of retiring at the 
age of 65 remained, with a slightly lower but still decent pension. The 
fnv presented the principle agreement to its members: 80 per cent of 
the members voted in favour of the agreement. The vast majority of the 
affiliated unions also approved of the agreement. Only the union for 
older workers (anbo) and the union for the maritime sector (Nautilus) 
voted against.
On 14 October 2010, the first government led by Mark Rutte, con-
sisting of the conservative vvd and the Christian Democratic cda and 
with the support of the populist pvv, came into office. In early 2011, the 
social partners and the newly installed government began consultation 
rounds to come up with a joint initiative to increase the retirement age, 
which was based on the pension agreement of the Labour Foundation. 
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They succeeded in June 2011, but the largest fnv union (fnv Bondgen-
oten) had now turned against the plans. One of the main objections was 
the fear for a loss of purchasing power for people who still wanted to 
retire at the age of 65. The second largest member union, the union for 
public services abvakabo, rejected the agreement as well. But because 
the majority of the member unions agreed, the pension agreement was 
ratified on 19 September 2011. This led to a conflict within the fnv: 
the two largest unions represented the majority – two-thirds – of the 
membership of the fnv. They argued that that meant that the majority 
of the fnv members was against this agreement and that therefore the 
confederation had no mandate to sign the agreement. This conflict led 
to a crisis within the fnv and a fierce debate on a radical overhaul of 
its structure.1
New organising methods
Although the pension debacle was the immediate cause of the rupture 
within the fnv, it was in fact a reflection of a more fundamental and 
deeper dissension within the fnv between a moderate and pragmatic 
faction that wanted to represent workers’ interests via consultation 
with employers and government and was willing to negotiate reforms 
in the social security system and a radical faction that wanted to pro-
tect workers’ interests through industrial action and was determined to 
preserve industrial rights already attained.
Trade unions in the Netherlands have always had a fairly strong 
institutional position, with stronger political influence at the national 
level than at the shop floor level, which can negatively affect their abil-
ity to protect the interests of immigrants within the immediate working 
environment. Their institutional position does not directly depend on 
their capacity to mobilise workers. As a result, incentives for organ-
ising new groups of workers are relatively weak (Marino & Roosblad 
2008). The recruitment of members occurs on an occasional basis: 
inside the workplace it is done through voluntary initiatives of trade 
union activists; outside the workplace recruitment takes place in con-
junction with other initiatives organised in association with churches, 
mosques and so on. These initiatives are related to several issues of pub-
lic interest – such as the pension age campaign – and are often used as 
a means of providing information about trade unions. Such campaigns 
are addressed to both workers and non-workers, ethnic minorities and 
natives. Like many other trade unions in north-west European coun-
tries, the Dutch trade unions are experiencing a decline in membership 
due to an ageing population and an inability to organise new groups 
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of workers (youth, women, the growing groups of workers engaged in 
atypical forms of employment, ethnic minorities and regular or irregu-
lar labour migrants). Their scarce presence in the workplace makes it 
more difficult to connect with these new groups and to protect their 
interests. In order to incorporate at least one of these new groups, 
fnv took up the promotion of the special interests of undocumented 
domestic workers in 2006, after a number of undocumented domestic 
workers had collectively joined abvakabo fnv and demanded rep-
resentation of their interests. Gunther (2011) shows the difficulties the 
trade union faced in protecting the specific interests of these work-
ers. Kloosterboer (2007) argues that although this group was formally 
included in the trade union, in practice, representation was limited to 
support for individual disputes with employers, for example by helping 
workers collect overdue pay. There was no collective action to combat 
the exploitation of these workers, nor did fnv offer legal aid if these 
workers were fired or if they attempted to become legalised, which in 
fnv’s view is a political issue.
In order to revitalise the trade union, trade union officials sought 
new tactics to organise workers. Some trade unions in Anglo-Saxon 
countries had reversed the trend of declining membership by running 
assertive organising campaigns at the workplace, engaging in strate-
gic research and strengthening their position in local communities. 
fnv Bondgenoten adopted this strategy and developed systematic 
approaches to workplace organising, setting up training programmes 
for new organisers, especially for the cleaning sector and domestic 
workers (including many female undocumented workers: see Gunther 
2011). Soon after, abvakabo fnv and fnv Bouw (the trade union for 
construction workers) followed.
In November 2007, fnv Bondgenoten launched the “Cleaners for 
a Better Future” campaign to improve the working conditions of the 
150,000 cleaners in the Netherlands, a high share of which are ethnic 
minorities and undocumented workers. The cleaners demanded a wage 
increase (10 euros instead of 8.90 euros gross per hour), a reduction of 
the workload, language courses and more respect for their work. The 
campaign was successful in many respects: the demands for a salary 
increase were granted, and despite the dirt and the piled-up waste they 
had managed to gain the support of the public, they had become visible 
in the workplace and they had gained respect from their employers.
This new and innovative form of campaigning also met with a lot of 
criticism. Organising was originally developed in a union-hostile envi-
ronment such as in the us. The moderate factions within the fnv were 
uncomfortable with this aggressive form of campaigning, arguing that 
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this did not fit the Dutch way of dealing with disputes. The willingness 
to go on strike had always been low in the Netherlands. These moder-
ate unionists felt that industrial action had to be a last resort when all 
other options (consultation) had failed. They also argued that the strat-
egy would not work for all types of disputes and in all sectors of indus-
try. Furthermore, the campaigns were highly capital-intensive, which 
meant that other sectors had to contribute to the cleaning sector. A 
number of sectors disagreed with this transfer of money.
The pension agreement and the debate on assertive campaigning 
exposed a tension between the trade unions’ position as ‘social part-
ner’ involved in institutionalised social dialogue with those wielding 
economic and political power and their role as campaigning organisa-
tion endeavouring to recapture some of the political power the labour 
movement had lost via industrial action and becoming more grassroots.
3.4 Representing minority workers’ interests
With all the turmoil in the past decade, it is interesting to examine the 
extent to which the trade unions strived to include minorities in their 
organisation and to represent their interests. Three areas can be dis-
tinguished in which trade unions can promote minority workers’ in-
terests: in the labour market, in society as a whole and in their own 
organisation. During the 2000s, not only the political climate towards 
immigrants and ethnic minorities but also the labour market position 
of immigrant and ethnic minority workers deteriorated. During the 
1990s, unemployment levels among minorities had declined. Never-
theless, it was still twice as high as amongst the native population (scp 
2001). During the 2000s, this situation changed. From 2004 onwards, 
the youth unemployment rate had fallen, but the unemployment rate 
among ethnic minority youths remained alarmingly high. In 2006, un-
employment among non-Western ethnic minority youths reached 22 
per cent, whereas it was only nine per cent among Dutch youths. With 
the global economic crisis, the labour market opportunities for minori-
ties, especially youth, took a downward turn. Overall unemployment 
increased sharply in 2012. In the first quarter of 2012, 6.2 per cent of the 
workforce was unemployed. One year earlier, the unemployment rate 
was at 5.4 per cent. The number of unemployed workers of non-West-
ern origin increased from 99,000 to 125,000. At 15 per cent, the un-
employment rate in this group was two and a half times as high as the 
average unemployment rate. Unemployment among low-skilled ethnic 
minorities is 20 per cent, almost three times as high as among low-
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skilled native Dutch (seven per cent). Among highly educated ethnic 
minority workers, 16 per cent were unemployed. This is more than five 
times as many as among highly educated natives (three per cent). Partly 
this is due to the fact that highly skilled minority workers are mostly 
young people, a category that has a much higher unemployment rate 
than older workers (Forum 2012).
In contrast with the 1990s, the social partners did not come up with 
measures to improve the labour market opportunities of ethnic minori-
ties. In 2007, they did agree on a ser advice on improving the labour 
market position of ethnic minority youths which argued that one 
very valuable strategy would be to raise the educational level of ethnic 
minority youths. The advisory report recommended the intensification 
of efforts to remove language and educational disadvantages in primary 
and secondary education, to prevent young people from dropping out 
of school, to increase the number of pupils who continue their edu-
cation, and to create work placement and apprenticeship places. The 
report concluded that the primary focus should be on training lead-
ing to certification combined with practical work. In other words: not 
‘work first’, but ‘work and education first’. Although the ser called on 
employers’ associations and trade unions to make an extra effort to 
increase employment opportunities for ethnic minority youths, it pro-
posed no concrete measures to improve these opportunities (ser 2007).
Within the fnv, the focus had shifted from formulating policies 
for specific target groups, such as minority workers, to a diversity 
approach. At the fnv Convention of 2006, the fnv decided to make 
diversity one of its priorities. The president of the fnv, Agnes Jonge-
rius, was a particularly fervent advocate of diversity. Already in 2004, 
after the murder of Theo van Gogh and the intensification of the anti-
Islamic discourse articulated in particular by the populist politician 
Geert Wilders, the fnv had taken the initiative to instigate a dialogue 
in the workplace between workers of various cultural backgrounds to 
improve the position of ethnic minority workers at the shop floor level. 
However, contrary to the 1980s when the far-right Centre Democratic 
party won a seat in parliament in the general elections of 1982, the 
fnv did not publically raise its voice against Geert Wilders’ populist 
party, the pvv. After the 2006 Convention, the fnv launched a num-
ber of campaigns to promote diversity on the work floor and within its 
own organisation. According to the campaign coordinator, these cam-
paigns had some impact and did raise more awareness for diversity. 
The confederation had succeeded in establishing an organised network 
of active fnv members who carried out numerous campaigns at the 
municipality level and worked closely with community-based organi-
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sations to influence local policies. The confederation also increased the 
number of ethnic minority employed within its organisation. How-
ever, the campaign coordinator did argue that the many pilot pro-
jects yielded little result in the labour market and have hardly led to 
a more sustained participation and involvement of minority workers 
and minority officials within the member unions. One exception is the 
organising campaign of fnv Bondgenoten. Although these campaigns 
did not specifically targeted migrant and ethnic minority workers, great 
efforts were made to involve these workers in workplace organising and 
include them in training programmes for new organisers. I have not 
seen official figures, but it is generally assumed that the organising cam-
paigns of fnv Bondgenoten succeeded in increasing the membership 
rate of migrant and ethnic minority workers. It is, however, too soon to 
conclude whether these actions will have a long-term impact.
3.5 Towards a new trade union movement
In this chapter I have tried to examine what has changed since the in-
ternational comparative study we published in 2000 (Penninx & Roos-
blad 2000) and my PhD thesis in 2002. I have described the changes 
that have occurred regarding the explanatory factors we have formu-
lated in the original study, such as changes in the social, political and 
economic climate, in industrial relations and within the trade union 
movement since the turn of the century, and I have analysed whether 
these changes influenced the representation of migrant and ethnic mi-
nority workers’ interests. I have found no clear evidence that factors 
such as the social (public discourse), political and economic climate 
have had a direct effect on trade union policies. However, these are pre-
liminary findings that require further research.
A factor of much importance is the change in industrial relations and 
the changes within the trade union movement itself. Through changes 
in industrial relations and a shift in the balance of power within their 
own organisations, trade unions have lost their strong institutional 
position and had to witness a deterioration in their capacity to influ-
ence socio-economic decision-making. This has affected their ability 
to represent workers’ interests, especially in sector-transcending issues 
at the national level. The new trade union faces a difficult challenge. It 
has to reinvent itself to save itself from obsolescence. At the same time, 
it has to find a balance between using new ways of organising workers 
and trying to recapture institutional and political power at the national 
level.
trade unions and the representation of minority workers 47
To what extent are dilemmas we have formulated in the Penninx & 
Roosblad study still useful, and what impact did the described changes 
in the past decade have on the outcome of these dilemmas? As to 
the immigration dilemma, Marino & Penninx (2010) argue that this 
dilemma has lost relevance. Since the 1990s, the regulation of migra-
tion has taken place primarily as a result of governmental initiatives 
both at the national and at the European Union level, without the direct 
involvement of employers, trade unions or other civil society organ-
isations (see also Groenendijk & Minderhout 2004). However, at the 
sector level, trade unions and employers’ associations are often still 
involved in negotiating the terms and conditions of employing labour 
migrants in specific segments of the labour market (Roosblad 2005; De 
Lange & Pool 2004; Ter Beek et al. 2005).
With respect to the second dilemma – inclusion or exclusion – the 
deterioration of the power and influence of the trade unions forced the 
unions to broaden their scope. Although trade unions had formally 
always been open to all workers (regardless of their legal status), the 
decline of trade union membership triggered them to actively incor-
porate new groups of workers in their organisation, such as undocu-
mented workers, which required a rethinking of strategies and coali-
tions (Gunther 2011; Martinez Lucio & Perrett 2009a, 2009b).
The third dilemma – equal versus special treatment – is also still 
valid. Immigrant and ethnic minority workers have their own chal-
lenges within the process of establishing the new trade union move-
ment. At the moment of writing (2013), there is a vigorous debate going 
on amongst migrant and ethnic minority workers within the fnv 
regarding the way in which they should organise themselves within the 
new movement. A number of ethnic minority officials have promoted 
the idea of a separate association for ethnic minority workers within 
the new confederation analogous to the separate associations for youth 
and women within the fnv. Such an association would have its own 
funding and would have the ability to set up its own campaigns with-
out first needing the approval of the other unions. However, among 
migrant and ethnic minority members, there is insufficient support for 
this idea. A majority of these members argue that their direct interests 
are best served through collective bargaining agreements in the sec-
tor in which they are employed. An association for migrant and ethnic 
minority workers would not have any say in these collective bargain-
ing agreements. They prefer the idea of establishing a well-organised 
network of minority workers with a strong power base within the sepa-
rate unions and a capacity to influence the political agenda of the trade 
union movement.
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The ability of the new fnv to represent minority workers will clearly 
depend on its ability to overcome its current crisis. But the extent to 
which it will be able to attract and retain new generations of migrant 
and ethnic minority workers also depends on its potential to organ-
ise workers in poorly organised sectors as well as workers engaged in 
atypical employment such as temporary work, subcontracting or self-
employment, of which a significant share is of an ethnic minority back-
ground.
Note
1 See: www.fnv.nl; www.stvda.nl.
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4 Between old and new dilemmas
Describing trade unions’ inclusive strategies
Stefania Marino
4.1 Introduction
In 2000, Berghahn Books published a volume edited by Rinus Pen-
ninx and Judith Roosblad entitled Trade Unions, Immigration, and Im-
migrants in Europe, 1960-1993: A Comparative Study of the Attitudes and 
Actions of Trade Unions in Seven West European Countries. It consisted 
of seven national case studies analysed within a rigorous common an-
alytical framework developed by the two editors. This book, written 
from a migration studies perspective, has become one of the studies 
most widely read and quoted by industrial relations scholars working 
on issues related to immigration. This is an exceptional result in view 
of the boundaries between disciplines. However, it is hardly surpris-
ing, considering that the two editors started their analysis by looking 
at factors and mechanisms that are central to the comparative research 
on trade union strategies and adopted a perspective that was novel for 
scholars working in the field of employment relations. Both the concept 
of ‘union dilemmas’ that was the starting point for their empirical ob-
servations and the set of factors they identified as playing a key role in 
producing differences across countries have been referred to and tested 
against research results in many subsequent studies (e.g. Krings 2010; 
Marino 2012; Connolly, Martínez-Lucio & Marino, forthcoming).
I started collaborating with Rinus Penninx and Judith Roosblad 
while working on my PhD thesis, and Rinus formally became my 
supervisor during the second year of my studies. My research per-
spective was very much a comparative industrial relations one and my 
interest in the representation of migrant workers was more a tool I 
intended to use to analyse trade unions’ internal dynamics and dem-
ocratic procedures, their decision-making processes and their iden-
tity, as well as their ability to ‘renew’ themselves and respond to exter-
nal challenges. The dialogue with Penninx and Roosblad made me 
aware of the importance of considering a cross-disciplinary perspec-
tive in dealing with my research topic and encouraged me to integrate 
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insights from disciplines with different epistemological and methodo-
logical foundations.
In this chapter, I revise one of the first attempts made in my PhD 
thesis to consider issues stemming from the two fields of study when 
engaging with empirical research in this field. This attempt consists of 
an instrument developed to guide analysis of trade union strategies 
towards migrant and ethnic minority workers, a ‘heuristic scheme’ 
for preparing research questions and analysing the data. This instru-
ment is based on the dilemmas individuated by Penninx and Roosblad 
(2000) as well as on others arising in trade union debates and literature. 
I remember that Rinus was not too convinced by this attempt since he 
believed that such an instrument risked trapping my empirical obser-
vations. I hope he will find this revision more convincing.
4.2 ‘Historical’ dilemmas
In their book, Penninx and Roosblad (2000) identify three dilemmas 
that trade unions had to face in dealing with immigrant workers in 
the period between 1960 and 1993. The first dilemma is formulated in 
terms of ‘resistance to or co-operation with’ national governments as 
they recruited migrant workers to fill vacancies in the period of re-
construction after the Second World War. On the one hand, increased 
immigration could have had negative consequences for the national 
workforce because it could push down wage levels. Furthermore, em-
ployers could have used migrants as an ‘industrial reserve army’ in 
order to weaken the position of trade unions in collective bargaining 
and industrial disputes. On the other hand, trade unions were aware 
of the importance of migrant workers for the development of national 
economies. Furthermore, opposing immigration would have led to a 
break with the tradition of international solidarity widely embraced 
by trade unions.
A second dilemma, ‘the inclusion versus exclusion dilemma’, con-
cerned migrants already present in the country and the choices trade 
unions had to make regarding the extent to which migrant workers 
should be included among the rank and file and in the organisation 
itself. On the one hand, excluding migrants might have caused rifts 
within the labour movement that would have weakened the unions’ 
negotiating positions. On the other hand, inclusive strategies would 
have risked causing discontent among the national workforce, with the 
interests of migrant workers being perceived as conflicting with those 
of native workers.
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If the unions decided to include migrant workers, they would have to 
take into account the differences between native and migrant workers 
– for instance, the cultural or ethnic characteristics of migrant groups 
as perceived by the host society and trade unions on the one hand, and 
by the migrants themselves on the other; problems related to trade 
union participation within structures created long before their arrival; 
etc. (Penninx & Roosblad 2000). Thus trade unions were confronted 
by a third dilemma, the ‘equal versus special treatment’ as defined by 
De Jongh (1984). The choice here was whether to ignore diversity and 
adopt general policies for all workers or to take into account the specific 
interests and needs of their migrant members and devise specific poli-
cies for them. To choose equal treatment by itself would have been to 
ignore the initial disadvantages of migrant workers and might have done 
nothing to improve their position. By contrast, if unions had adopted 
special measures, ‘a sort of white backlash may arise: native unionists 
may feel frustrated and may resist special measures in favour of immi-
grants’ (De Jongh 1984: 766). Penninx and Roosblad also argue that 
special treatment must be evaluated on the basis of its real scope and 
intensity: ‘special policies may be of quite a different kind, having dif-
ferent implications’ (2000: 11). There are measures intended to remove 
barriers within trade unions in order to facilitate migrant participa-
tion (translated documents, bulletins, special counsellors, etc.); there 
are measures that take into account the circumstances of migrants, for 
instance specific regulations that enable them to take longer summer 
holidays in their countries of origin; there are policies that negotiate 
cultural or religious concessions such as the right to take time off for 
non-Christian religious holidays, or the provision of a place of worship 
and halal food for Muslim workers.
Penninx and Roosblad (2000) claimed that the first two dilem-
mas were superseded in the countries under consideration. The first 
dilemma – whether to cooperate with or resist recruitment policies – 
was no longer relevant after the mid-1970s, when governments adopted 
restrictive immigration policies and trade unions simply had to endorse 
such policies. With respect to the second dilemma, unions decided to 
represent migrant workers during the 1980s after the failed attempt by 
national states to encourage migrant workers to return to their coun-
tries of origin. Hence they opted for inclusion only ‘once it had become 
clear that a large number of immigrants intended to stay permanently 
and that immigrant workers themselves were attempting to improve 
their labour position by a number of means’ (Penninx & Roosblad 
2000: 8). Thus it is argued that trade union decisions were shaped by 
two exogenous factors, namely government policies and the permanent 
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settlement of immigrant workers. The two authors claim that these 
dilemmas cannot be regarded as resolved once and for all. Since exter-
nal circumstances either relieved unions of the need to make choices or 
directed their action, changes in external circumstances might revive 
the same dilemmas in different countries at different times.
4.3 Current dilemmas and real inclusion
Despite the spread of restrictive migration policies and the strengthen-
ing of border controls, immigration to Western Europe has increased 
during the past decade. The free movement of labour and the accession 
of countries from Central and Eastern Europe to the eu have created a 
new dynamic of labour migration that poses unprecedented challenges 
to host societies. In addition, the current global economic crisis is nega-
tively affecting this scenario and the labour markets of host countries 
are proving unable to easily absorb migrants for a range of social and 
economic reasons. Differences in interests between national and mi-
grant workers, and the marginalisation of migrant workers, are becom-
ing more manifest and pose a threat to social stability. Trade unions in 
Europe, as elsewhere, are some of the first organisations called upon to 
respond to such challenges, firstly because immigration is mainly seen 
as a labour issue and secondly, because conflicts between national and 
migrant workers often manifest themselves in the labour arena.
In the current scenario, the ‘old’ dilemmas acquire a new form. The 
‘resistance or cooperation dilemma’ has once again become relevant, 
as trade unions have to choose between endorsing or opposing gov-
ernments’ increasingly restrictive immigration policies. Some schol-
ars have pointed out that trade unions’ choices in this respect are still 
focused on the protection of the national workforce. For instance, Watts 
(2002) explained the recent favourable attitude of Italian and Spanish 
unions towards more open immigration policies and their attempt to 
recruit and represent migrant workers by arguing that trade unions 
believe restrictive immigration policies and the consequent increase in 
illegal immigration will increase irregular economic activity, thereby 
damaging the wages and protection of native workers.
The ‘inclusion versus exclusion dilemmas’ is an important issue in 
the light of the worsening economic scenario in many host European 
countries and the consequent growth in hostility between native and 
migrant workers. As Penninx and Roosblad (2000: 14) explain: ‘in 
times of widespread unemployment the competition (whether actual 
or supposed) between indigenous and migrant workers could increase, 
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making a trade union policy of inclusion more problematic’. Since trade 
union declarations on the need to include migrant workers are wide-
spread across European trade unions, and in the light of trade union 
policies intended to achieve this aim, the ‘inclusion versus exclusion’ 
dilemma seems to have lost importance in the trade union debate. 
However, not only is there frequently a gap between inclusive policy 
and practice (Marino 2012) but trade unions’ approach to certain issues 
can be contradictory. In other words, the way trade unions define the 
concept of ‘inclusion’ and the way they deal with the ‘equal versus spe-
cial treatment’ dilemma are central points.
Inclusion is here defined as full recognition of migrant workers 
as having the same social, employment, political and ‘organisational’ 
rights of all other workers and members, being able to join the organi-
sation at all levels and to participate in both internal debates and the 
formation of general strategies. Acceptance of this definition of inclu-
sion implies the adoption of special policies and measures addressing 
the position of migrant workers both within the union and in the wider 
social sphere, in the labour market and in the workplace. From an ana-
lytical point of view, this implies that the ‘equal versus special treat-
ment’ has to be further disclosed.
In this operation, one of the dimensions of the ‘equal versus special 
treatment’ that has to be taken into account is the way in which trade 
unions decide to organise migrant workers’ voice within their organi-
sations. This dimension is very important if the inclusion of migrant 
workers also means the integration of their point of view within the 
trade union organisation and its general policies. Vranken (1990) notes 
the existence of two organisational models for migrant workers within 
trade unions. The first is the ‘internationalist model’, which excludes 
any organisation of workers along national or ethnic lines on the basis 
of the internationalism doctrine in order to avoid exacerbating the divi-
sion between foreign and indigenous workers. The second is the ‘plu-
ralistic or diversity model’ which, by contrast, accepts the specificity of 
migrant workers and allows (and even encourages) the establishment 
of their own associations within the trade unions. The literature on 
women’s groups within trade unions has underlined the positive effect 
they might have in promoting the self-determination of women and 
their presence in leadership position, in implementing anti-discrimina-
tion and positive action campaigns as well as in redefining union inter-
ests and reconstructing union agendas and new forms of democracy 
(Parker 2002). However, this literature has also highlighted the dan-
ger of ghettoisation and marginalisation that is inherent in such sepa-
rate groups. The same concern is shared by Virdee and Grint (1994), 
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who analyse self-organisation by black workers in uk trade unions. 
Some authors, consequently, have noted that inclusive outcomes are 
not guaranteed by the mere presence of an internal democratic space 
(e.g. Flynn, Brewster, Smith & Rigby 2004) but instead depend on the 
extent to which the groups’ proposals and ideas are able to influence the 
decision-making process, including the process and content of collec-
tive bargaining. Without structural links, special bodies risk disadvan-
taging rather than benefitting underrepresented groups, since they can 
easily be turned into powerless ghettos (Briskin 1993).
Another choice concerns the type of action adopted on behalf of 
migrant workers. In this regard, Ambrosini (2000), when discussing 
the representation strategies of Italian unions, distinguishes between 
two models of action: the ‘protective’ and ‘bargaining’ models. The 
protective model is based on ‘charitable protection’ and focuses on 
responding to general social needs; its mode of action is based on ‘legal 
and bureaucratic advice, network cooperation with public and non-
profit institutions, pressure on public institutions, direct help’. Accord-
ing to Vranken (1990), trade unions have often acted as ‘welfare agen-
cies’ for migrants and as their first ‘political’ organisation in defence 
of their basic social and economic rights. This has been due to the 
fact that the concentration of migrant workers in specific geographi-
cal areas ‘increased awareness of their presence and contributed to its 
being seen as a problem. It is because of this identification of “migrants” 
with “migrant workers” that trade unions have been concerned with 
all migrants and their problems’ (Vranken 1990: 47). The bargaining 
model, on the other hand, is based on negotiating activity; it is focused 
on the promotion of workers’ rights in workplaces and its type of action 
consists of ‘bargaining, initiating individual and collective disputes, 
representatives training’.
This model can be further specified if the content of trade union 
claims is kept distinct from the mode of action. The idea is that it is pos-
sible to bargain on social matters and to act politically on work-related 
issues. With respect to the claims, trade unions may decide to opt for 
the defence of either social needs (residence permit, accommodation, 
health insurance) in order to improve living conditions, promote social 
integration and achieve equality in society and the labour market; or 
they may decide to concentrate on work-related matters (wages, work-
ing hours, holidays, etc.), considering migrants as workers to be repre-
sented and promoting equality and integration in the workplace and 
the labour market. The promotion of migrant workers’ social rights is 
a central issue in the current scenario in view of the status of many 
migrants as only partial citizens in the host societies (see for instance 
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Hammar 1990; Lockwood 1996). The solution of problems relating to 
migrants’ legal position, as well as their access to welfare resources, is 
often given priority over the achievement of equal labour rights. From 
a trade union point of view, providing services and campaigning for the 
extension of social rights is in line with the tradition of ‘international 
solidarity’. Furthermore, despite the increasing political propaganda 
about the need to save welfare resources for the use of natives only, the 
risk of displeasing native workers by defending migrant workers’ social 
rights is still limited. In fact, it is more often trade union actions aimed 
at facilitating migrant workers’ access to labour rights that native work-
ers regard as unfair.
However, unless they defend work-related rights, trade unions will 
find it difficult to improve migrant workers’ material conditions in the 
workplace. They also risk weakening their active participation in trade 
union action because migrant workers might see unions as ‘voluntary 
associations’ from which they expect to receive help without giving 
their specific support. To conclude, choosing solidary action by itself 
would push union action for migrant workers outside the boundaries 
of the unions themselves and into the wider society, causing them to 
neglect their specific role: unions can act as social and voluntary asso-
ciations, but no social and voluntary association can act as a union in 
standing up for migrant workers.
The last set of choices is related to the ‘instrument’ used to promote 
migrants’ rights: by bargaining at central or decentralised levels or by 
raising the political profile of an issue in the socio-political sphere. In 
defending both citizenship and industrial rights, in fact, trade unions 
may either negotiate with other social actors (also including govern-
ments) and reach formal or informal agreements on a specific issue or 
they can promote a socio-political debate in the form of social cam-
paigns and demonstrations. Choosing between one or the other of these 
options has controversial consequences. On the one hand, choosing 
bargaining activity risks exposing trade unions to criticisms by native 
workers, the advantage being the gaining of migrant workers’ trust and 
hence their greater participation. On the other hand, shifting the focus 
of activity to the political arena has not only solidary significance but a 
strategic one as well. By involving voluntary associations, social move-
ments, religious associations, political parties and so on, unions share 
responsibility for their actions with other social actors and at the same 
time gain greater powers of persuasion over other negotiating partners 
and their own rank and file. However, adopting an outright ‘political’ 
strategy would push union action outside their own boundaries into 
the wider society.
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The set of choices discussed here reflects the complexity of the cur-
rent situation but also makes clear that the promotion of genuine inclu-
sion for migrant workers (as well as for other marginal groups) requires 
trade unions to widen their traditional role and to invest more in their 
role as social and ‘political’ actors.
4.4 A heuristic scheme for trade union strategies
The trade union dilemmas discussed in the previous sections represent 
some basic choices that trade unions have to make in representing mi-
grant workers. Since the focus of attention here is on the representation 
of migrant workers already present in the country, the dilemma of ‘re-
sistance or cooperation’ is not further discussed. Rather, the following 
dilemmas will be considered in this section:
– inclusion versus exclusion;
– equal versus special treatment;
– unitary versus plural model;
– social versus industrial rights;
– political versus bargaining action.
This set of choices may be used as a device to investigate trade union 
strategies. As already mentioned, such an instrument could be useful 
in guiding the gathering of empirical material and the analysis of data 
when comparing trade union actions across countries.
The first three sets of actions constitute dilemmas, which implies a 
straightforward choice between two alternatives. However, the choice 
of mode of action and the range of claims to be defended are not oppo-
site and alternative. It is important to stress that trade unions may take 
the same action not only towards migrant workers who are already 
members and ideally also without the express intention of recruiting 
them. This is because of their twofold nature: ‘Unions are simultane-
ously and inextricably, even if with changing emphases over time, both 
free organizations (with a defined base, internal leaders elected accord-
ing to statute, an administrative bureaucracy, rules of internal behav-
iour) and agents of more general representation, or movements poten-
tially addressed to all those having in common the condition of work-
ers (thus with uncertain and mutable perimeters and borders)’ (Regalia 
1988: 352).
These sets of choices have been ordered so as to depict a process of 
choice.
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figure 4.1 Scheme 1
Each choice (represented by an arrow) describes a specifi c logic of 
action. Choosing one solution implies a step further in the process 
leading to merely theoretical types of union models (arrival points rep-
resented by the rounded boxes). Th e last three dilemmas operate simul-
taneously. Each arrival point should be considered as a potential type 
of union action. Th ere is only one exception: the possibility that unions 
opt for exclusion (choice A). In this case, the process results in self-
organisation by migrant workers (Scheme 1 in fi gure 4.1).
figure 4.2 Scheme 2
Th e consequences of trade union exclusion of migrant workers may 
provoke several kinds of reaction on their part, which can be sum-
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ited by two axes: the legal/illegal action axis and the formal/informal 
degree of organisation axis (Scheme 2 in figure 4.2). The intersection 
between the axes indicates migrant workers renouncing representation. 
The most illegal/most informal point in scheme (X) constitutes, for 
instance, spontaneous acts of sabotage in workplaces or riots. The most 
legal/most formal point (Y) stands for the formation by migrant work-
ers of a new union that is recognised by other actors. The position in 
this space is influenced by several factors (contacts with unions in the 
country of origin, formal and informal contacts with other organisa-
tions and social movements, presence of a strong leadership, etc.). The 
formation of a new union is the riskiest option for existing trade unions 
since it might result in the weakening of union bargaining power.
If trade unions opt to include migrant workers, they will be con-
fronted with the equal versus special treatment dilemma. Choosing 
the equal treatment option will result in the second box, which is the 
adoption of a colour-blind strategy. Although characterised by a gen-
eral egalitarian attitude, these trade unions do not pay attention to spe-
cific migrant worker problems and claims unless these cannot be rec-
onciled with the claims of the traditional constituency. For this reason, 
trade unions might be unable to improve migrant workers’ position in 
the labour market and the workplace and might find it more difficult 
to include their voice within the organisation. For their part, migrant 
workers may decide to resort to self-organisation in search of better 
representation (moving back to point 1).
If the union chooses special treatment, the process reaches the last 
three dilemmas, which operate jointly. The various combinations of 
choices lead to one final point (point 3) constituted by a continuum of 
possible strategies formed by the intersection of different solutions. The 
extremities of the continuum are, at one end, the ‘inclusive industrial 
model’ and, at the other, the ‘inclusive associative model’.
The first ideal type is formed by the intersection of unitary model, 
work-related rights and bargaining action. This ideal type is charac-
terised by an egalitarian attitude, though concerned with the different 
needs and interests of minorities. It attempts to create a collective voice 
that turns specific migrant worker rights into general rights on the basis 
of justice and solidarity. Key points are awareness of belonging to the 
same class and encouraging participation by dispensing identity goods 
to members. However, this union does not provide a democratic self-
organised space for migrant workers and in this way may well obstruct 
the self-promotion of migrant workers’ claims and their active par-
ticipation in cultural change within trade unions. Furthermore, this 
type of trade union specifically focuses on work-related rights to be 
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defended strictly within the industry sphere. This focus could restrict 
trade unions’ ability to promote equal rights in the social and political 
spheres which, as noted above, are a key factor in the effective inclusion 
of migrant workers.
The second ideal type is made up of the intersection between plural 
organisation, political action and social rights. Unions belonging to the 
second ideal type favour the formation of specific bodies which, how-
ever, could be quite isolated within the organisation. Furthermore, they 
renounce the use of the traditional trade union instruments that ena-
ble them to act either as pressure groups in defence of migrants’ social 
and political rights or as voluntary associations providing services to 
migrant members. In this way, these trade unions are unable to pursue 
demands for improved working conditions and the elimination of dif-
ferences at the industry and company levels.
Thus in neither ideal type can migrant workers achieve inclusion 
as defined in this section. Instead, the extent to which they are able to 
provide ‘real inclusion’ depends on the extent to which they are able to 
keep together and recompose these different logics of actions.
4.5 Conclusions
In this chapter, we have described a ‘heuristic scheme’ for the analy-
sis of trade union strategies towards migrant workers that is developed 
with a view to guiding the collection and descriptive analysis of empiri-
cal material. Such an instrument might be especially useful when com-
paring trade union strategies towards migrant workers across different 
countries.
The analysis of trade union strategies through a progressive se- 
quence of choices might help to reveal the extent to which inclusive-
ness is embedded in trade union choices. However, it is important to 
emphasise that this instrument addresses only unions’ formal policies 
and cannot take into account possible gaps between those policies and 
unions’ practices. These gaps or the lack of effort by trade unions to 
overcome obstacles to implementation are often to blame for poor out-
comes with regard to inclusion (Marino 2012).
This analysis of formal trade union policies constitutes a relevant 
starting point for the analysis of trade unions’ attitude towards the 
inclusion of migrant workers. However, any attempt at analysis needs 
a broader focus on the efforts and actions of trade unions at central 
and decentralised levels as well as an investigation of the resources and 
institutional links made available to migrant workers seeking to self-
organise in the inclusion process.
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5.1 Introduction
Various studies indicate that first-generation immigrant entrepreneurs 
start their businesses in ethnically concentrated neighbourhoods. The 
start-up of these businesses gives advantages compared to native en-
trepreneurs because financing, inexpensive labour, suppliers, networks 
and customers are primarily allocated in the immediate ethnic circle, 
the so-called ethnic-cultural resources. The entrepreneurial activities 
in this market are on the other hand confined by type, size and perfor-
mance. These markets are enclosed, become saturated, the potential re-
mains untapped, the degree of specialisation is low, there is fierce com-
petition, the long-term opportunities are considered limited and the 
businesses frequently fail (Light 1972; Waldinger 1986; Jones, Barrett & 
McEvoy 2000; Jones & Ram 2000; Rath 2000a, 2000b; Kloosterman 
2000). Some immigrant entrepreneurs flee these saturated markets and 
settle down in poorer native neighbourhoods.1 Other entrepreneurs 
have specialised their ethnic products, such as the clothing market 
of South Asians and jewellers in Britain, and sell it primarily to their 
cultural counterparts across a far larger, even unlimited, geographical 
area. Some others settle down in the richer native neighbourhoods and 
their sales are geared towards the more rewarding open market, sell-
ing high-value-chain products.2 According to Jones et al. (2000) and 
Jones & Ram (2000), this is the final phase in the breakthrough of im-
migrant enterprises. These businesses can only be released when they 
outgrow the geographical limitations of ethnic markets and sell main-
stream products.3
This image presented in research literature of the ethnic market 
is refuted by various studies, which argue that the economic vitality 
of ethnically concentrated neighbourhoods has long been underesti-
mated. A significant percentage of new entrepreneurs choose deprived 
urban areas as their first place of business (Kloosterman & Van der 
Leun 1999a, 1999b; Rath 2002; Santokhi 2010). This creates the impres-
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sion that these neighbourhoods provide fertile soil for immigrant 
enterprise and focus on every economic activity imaginable. Klooster-
man & Van der Leun (1999a, 1999b), for example, hypothesised that 
immigrant entrepreneurs potentially contribute to reinforcing the local 
economy in these neighbourhoods and that they offer not only specific 
goods and services but also provide employment and serve as informa-
tion interchange and model to others. Small enterprises such as per-
sonal services in particular are on the rise thanks to developments such 
as outsourcing and offer further employment opportunities (Klooster-
man 2000). Encouraging employment in these areas could create jobs 
and businesses for both native and immigrant residents. It should be 
noted that mainstream products in the high-value chains can also be 
sold to (co-)ethnic customers, as Rusinovic (2006) concluded in her 
research on second-generation immigrant entrepreneurs. She came to 
the conclusion that the second-generation entrepreneurs in particular 
are also active in a market that she calls the niche market. In this mar-
ket, products such as mortgage and insurance packages are offered to 
(co-)ethnic customers exclusively. These customers come from all over 
the city, but mostly from ethnically concentrated areas. This means that 
mainstream markets need not be geared towards the native population 
in non-ethnic neighbourhoods by default.
The conclusions drawn in the above-mentioned scientific literature 
depict a twofold picture of economic potentials of immigrant entrepre-
neurship in ethnically concentrated areas. Some researchers emphasise 
the limitations of market potentials, while others point at opportuni-
ties. The development of multicultural tourism4 in ethnically concen-
trated areas in The Hague is an interesting case to assess this twofold 
picture. In this paper I shall explore whether this image of the devel-
opment of immigrant entrepreneurship is applicable to all markets by 
describing the development of a specific market potential, namely mul-
ticultural tourism in ethnically concentrated areas in The Hague. The 
central question to be answered is: how do factors mentioned in the 
literature interfere in the case of The Hague? The underlying questions 
related to five factors elaborated in the literature are:
1 What role can government policy play?
2 What role can the social infrastructure play in creating a multicul-
tural landscape?
3 In what way is the critical infrastructure connected to multicultural 
tourism?
4 What impact does the geographic concentration of immigrant en-
trepreneurs have on the development of multicultural tourism?
5 What are the potential negative effects of promoting multicultural 
tourism?
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5.2 Multicultural tourism: theoretical embedding
The economic policy of the city of The Hague focuses on investing in 
efforts to increase the tourist appeal of ethnically concentrated areas 
by way of City Mondial, a programme based on the development of 
Chinatown and an Avenue Culinaire in the heart of the city. I will now 
summarise a number of important factors found in the literature that 
contribute to the success of multicultural tourism. From international 
studies on the rise of Chinatowns and other multicultural districts and 
the economic significance of cultural diversity in gateway cities, it can 
be concluded that certain factors need to be satisfied to boost the po-
tential of multicultural tourism as well as immigrant entrepreneurship.
Firstly, government policy must play a key role. The government 
should provide an attractive investment climate for enterprise and 
good accessibility of these urban areas, while encouraging a good qual-
ity of life and actively combating crime (Rath 2005; Hall & Rath 2007; 
Collins 2007).
Secondly, a social infrastructure in ethnic areas offers space for a 
varied social and socio-cultural life. However, this does not imply that 
the ethnic minority population should necessarily live there (Collins & 
Castillo 1998; Hall & Rath 2007; Jones et al. 2000). Furthermore, mul-
ticultural tourism should form part of the broader local tourist indus-
try. It takes more than the presence of immigrant enterprises selling 
cultural products to create a multicultural landscape that draws a large 
population of tourists (Bodaar & Rath 2005, 2006; Nicis Institute 2009).
Thirdly, Zukin (1991) pointed out the importance of the so-called 
critical infrastructure formed by individuals and institutions. Zukin 
gives the following explanation for the interest in multicultural prod-
ucts. There is a critical infrastructure of individuals who are connected 
in some way with cultural production and appreciation and who influ-
ence public taste. The critical infrastructure influences the popularity of 
the unique cultural products (Rath 2002: 20, 2005, 2007; Hall & Rath 
2007). However, the ethnic-specific attractions must also appeal to a 
significant number of consumers if these individuals, institutions and 
intermediaries want to enjoy sufficient opportunities in this market. This 
means that, besides the small-scale and recurring socio-cultural activi-
ties, there should also be indications of sufficient and varied large-scale 
festivals that would draw a large general audience as well as tourists.
Fourthly, the presence of a large number of smaller immigrant enter-
prises should be based on the trade of ethnic products. Modern multi-
media, the information society and constant immigration are precon-
ditions for this tourist industry. Ethnic minorities can rapidly mobilise 
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their new or existing networks in their country of origin for the man-
ufacturing of cultural products and benefit from the low production 
costs. It is also possible to instantly anticipate the current demands of 
both tourists and consumers from their own population group (Rath 
2005, 2007).
Finally, any potential negative effects ensuing from multicultural 
tourism should be combated. Rath (2005, 2007) commented that it is 
important to stay alert with respect to potential inter-ethnic conflict, 
the male-female power balance which could encourage the oppression 
of women who are dominant in this sector (no wages or low wages), 
as well as voyeurism and stereotyping of ethnic districts and cultural 
manifestations. Ethnic minorities might also interpret this policy as 
unwanted interference (cultural imperialism) in their lives, as a large 
percentage started selling cultural products as a means of preserving 
and reinforcing their cultural identity (Rath 2005, 2007). This could 
result in conflict and obstruction. Furthermore, tension could arise 
between tourists and the local population, for example regarding the 
use of public spaces.
On the strength of the aforementioned factors that influence the 
development of multicultural tourism, the following image of the city 
of The Hague emerges.
ad 1 Government policy
We can deduce from the policy documents of The Hague that the lo-
cal authorities have consciously set the tone in the development of City 
Mondial as a multicultural product. As regards Chinatown, we can 
conclude that the Chinese entrepreneurs with their presence in the city 
centre and plans for promoting Chinese entrepreneurship have created 
a fertile climate and attracted policy attention. It was possible to com-
bine existing plans for the rezoning of this area with the initiatives of 
local citizens and businesses. The Municipality of The Hague played an 
active role in the development of Chinatown. The local council, for ex-
ample, invested in market research to assess the feasibility of the tourist 
concepts of City Mondial, Chinatown and Avenue Culinaire (Weimar 
Marktonderzoek 1999). To that end, municipal as well as European re-
sources were utilised from the urban 1 and Objective 2 programmes.5 
The local government also played an important role in institutional-
ising Chinatown and Avenue Culinaire, assisting in the development 
of a broad network of investors, expanding the working area of City 
Mondial, establishing a multicultural and exotic image through the use 
of Chinese ornaments and signposts, renovating the streets and pave-
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ments, bringing adjustments in the traffic route to make the area more 
accessible, facilitating the establishment of two Chinese gates to high-
light the Chinatown area, funding most of the campaign for multicul-
tural tourism and embedding it in the generic policy. Efforts to improve 
liveability included the Business Security Warranty and camera sur-
veillance, assisting neighbourhood management organisations in keep-
ing the neighbourhood clean, safe and well-maintained, and helping 
shopping street managers to act as a bridge between entrepreneurs and 
consumers.
The Municipality of The Hague used the multicultural tourism 
instrument to improve the image of ethnic minorities and socially and 
economically disadvantaged districts. The municipality consciously 
developed an intensive city marketing programme aimed at stimu-
lating immigrant entrepreneurship by branding districts with a high 
percentage of immigrants as areas where multicultural tourism could 
make a positive contribution to their image and economic potential. 
The development of City Mondial and Chinatown is successful within 
the set targets.
ad 2 The social infrastructure
The small number of migrant organisations that existed in the 1960s 
and mid-1970s put together hardly any neighbourhood-oriented ac-
tivities, because the immigrant population was too small and scattered 
across the city. Instead, ethnic minorities would meet at various loca-
tions during festivals and religious activities at rented spaces, football 
matches, film screenings, performances by artists from their home 
country, weddings, funerals, The Hague market and specialty super-
markets. The rich cultural life gained momentum from the mid-1970s, 
partly owing to the growth of the city’s immigrant population and the 
municipal welfare policy. Most of the migrant organisations are situ-
ated in ethnically concentrated areas and satisfy the requirements of 
the municipal subsidy policy. Migrant organisations received financial 
support to represent and serve the interest of their supporters. The lo-
cal subsidy policy also facilitated regular small-scale socio-cultural ac-
tivities. The growth of the immigrant population has served to further 
strengthen the social infrastructure in the City Mondial areas of Schil-
derswijk, Transvaal and Centrum/Stationsbuurt. There are approxi-
mately sixty religious institutions for immigrants concentrated mainly 
in these ethnic areas, and they form now an appealing multicultural 
landscape for tourists. The City Mondial walking tour also includes a 
visit to a number of large religious institutions.
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ad 3 The critical infrastructure
The third factor I looked at is the critical infrastructure, which is 
formed by individuals and institutions that are connected in some way 
with cultural production and appreciation and who influence public 
taste (Zukin 1991). As early as the 1960s and 1970s, there was already 
a demand for ethnic entertainment in the city centre, albeit on a mod-
est scale. In those days there were also two cinemas on the Boekhorst-
straat. Both the Roxy and Thalia theatres were leased out to entrepre-
neurs for the showing of Bollywood films.6 The theatres served as a 
meeting place and helped to develop and reinforce cultural identities. 
Surinamese entrepreneurs were active in the entertainment market 
and developed a network in Great Britain and India for the showing of 
movies and contracting Bollywood musicians and actors to perform in 
The Hague. These entrepreneurs took the first steps in creating a criti-
cal infrastructure for major cultural events and can be considered the 
cultural middlemen and trendsetters of the early days.
Since 1996, City Mondial forms the cornerstone of The Hague’s 
multicultural tourism, with Chinatown and Avenue Culinaire as sub-
projects. City Mondial has developed exotic products and created an 
atmosphere of urban leisure and entertainment to attract a broad audi-
ence of tourists. Since the establishment of City Mondial, increasing 
numbers of intermediary institutions have started forming a critical 
infrastructure. Large-scale festivals such as Ha-Schi-Ba (now going by 
the name of Kaschba), the Hindu Spring Festival of Colours (Holi), 
the Hindustani Film and Music Festival, the Hindu Festival of Lights 
(Divali), and the outdoor Multicultural Milan Festival (a three-day 
event attracting more than 50,000 visitors each year) provide a plat-
form for trendsetters and cultural middlemen to make these activities 
appealing for tourists as well.7 A number of the ethnic organisations, 
such as Eekta and Milan Foundation, have now become part of the 
multicultural tourism industry and are involved in organising major 
events. The Chinatown Foundation, together with the local authori-
ties, is playing an important role in promoting The Hague in China to 
catch the attention of tourists and Chinese firms. The establishment of 
the Wahdo Hotel in the heart of Chinatown and numerous specialised 
Chinese restaurants illustrate that Chinatown is part of the generic 
tourist economy of the city. The municipality is now conducting 
research into the possibilities for commercial activities between The 
Hague and India, in which the presence of a large Hindustani com-
munity and their cultural expressions could play an important role in 
attracting tourists and firms from India.
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ad 4 The concentration of immigrant entrepreneurs  
 in the city mondial area
The concentration of a large number of immigrant entrepreneurs sell-
ing ethnic-cultural products is an important condition for the develop-
ment of multicultural tourism. The city of The Hague meets this con-
dition. In the period 1989-2005, the number of immigrant entrepre-
neurs in The Hague increased from 1,308 to 7,000. This linear increase 
has taken place in a period of economic growth and decline. In these 
figures the second generation immigrants, 15%, is not included.8 If we 
look at the spatial concentration of the immigrant entrepreneurs, then 
it is evident from table 5.1 that the percentage of immigrant residents 
in a district correlates with the presence of immigrant entrepreneurs. 
The ethnic concentration in districts like the city centre (Centrum) and 
Laak is the consequence of many factors such as the cheap housing 
stock and the migration of the native Dutch to other parts of the city 
due to the urban renewal policy (stadsvernieuwing). Immigrants filled 
up the vacancies. The immigrant population is increasing and more im-
migrants settle down in middle-class neighbourhoods such as Escamp 
District (Stadsdeel) and Leidschenveen-Ypenburg. In those neighbour-
hoods, both the number of immigrant residents and the number of im-
migrant entrepreneurs are increasing. The presence of an ethnic clien-
tele plays a role in this settlement.

















Loosduinen 46,128 35,082 76 24 13
Scheveningen 52,782 38,750 73 27 18
Leidschenveen-
Ypenburg
34,664 23,728 68 32 19
Haagse Hout 41,387 25,944 63 37 23
Segbroek 58,708 37,501 64 36 24
Escamp 107,876 57,012 53 47 35
Centrum 96,977 29,967 31 69 38
Laak 37,058 13,732 37 63 41
Total 475,580 261,716 – – –
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The policy of urban restructuring (herstructurering), which started in 
The Hague in the 1990s, also had a positive impact on the number and 
quality of new immigrant firms. In this restructuring policy, houses and 
business premises were combined to form so-called ‘mixed functions’ 
or ‘dual land use’. In three streets situated in the multicultural tourist 
area that I investigated, it emerged that 90 per cent of the entrepreneurs 
were immigrants (Santokhi 2010). These businesses had recently been 
established there, which evidently meant that in this case, mixed func-
tions in the shape of dual land use in restructuring districts provided 
opportunities for immigrant entrepreneurship. It was clear that the 
presence of the immigrant population in this district influenced this 
percentage; immigrants with resources mostly obtained from their own 
communities and savings had succeeded in starting up these businesses 
there (KplusV 2005). This also demonstrates the resilience of these dis-
tricts, which often had a reputation of being deprived districts with a 
poor social image. The strong growth of immigrant entrepreneurship 
takes place in districts where you would not expect it. Policy has also 
changed ideas about immigrant entrepreneurship as well as the image 
of districts with a high percentage of immigrants and given immigrants 
more faith in their own opportunities. Companies that were considered 
to have no future in the most concentrated ethnic areas still exist. There 
is obviously a dynamic in these neighbourhoods that is not always fully 
recognised.
The concentration of immigrant entrepreneurs in the inner city 
(Centrum) was a pre-condition for the development of City Mondial 
as a carrier of the concept of multicultural tourism. As regards China-
town, the municipal policy consciously chose a geographical concen-
tration of small-scale entrepreneurs to shape the local tourist industry. 
Without this concentration, there could be no development of a mul-
ticultural landscape to draw urbanites and tourists to the area. Dur-
ing its pioneering phase from 1996 to 2000, City Mondial had already 
made the first attempts to market multicultural tourism in The Hague’s 
most ethnically concentrated areas of Transvaal and Schilderswijk, 
where more than 85 per cent of the population are of ethnic back-
ground (dhic 2012). In Chinatown, Chinese businesses have created a 
solid environment for assessing the feasibility of the Chinatown con-
cept and for marketing it. The Municipality of The Hague also devel-
oped Chinatown in the city centre as a tourist draw, and the product 
development is also geared towards this. Attracting tourists also means 
the concentration of certain market sectors, such as restaurants, pas-
try shops, small retailers, personal services such as hairdressers and 
massage parlours, souvenir shops and health centres. The aim of this 
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policy is not for established entrepreneurs to seek out alternative pro-
duction environments but instead to provide these businesses with a 
sustainable existence, because the development of Chinatown hinges 
on the continued presence of successful businesses in the area so they 
can serve as a model for new enterprises and preserve the area’s tour-
ist appeal.
ad 5 Potential negative effects
Some of the negative effects of multicultural tourism often cited in lit-
erature have also emerged in the city’s discussions from time to time. 
The fears of voyeurism by some local politicians and of inter-ethnic 
tensions as a result of multicultural tourism proved to be unfounded. 
The broad support in political circles due to the positive results finally 
put an end to this negative image. Sixty per cent of the visitors said 
in a survey (City Mondial 2004; City Mondial 2006) that they would 
definitely visit this district again, although city residents, tourists and 
entrepreneurs avoided the district in the 1980s and 1990s because it was 
considered uninhabitable. This negative image of the district has mean-
while been dispelled as far as these visitors are concerned. There are no 
indications from the immigrant communities of cultural imperialism. 
The settled businesses in this area see multicultural tourism as a pos-
sibility for additional income.
Tensions occasionally erupt between the organising intermediar-
ies (cultural middlemen) and local residents and their intermediary 
bodies (residents’ organisations) on the use of public space for large-
scale events such as the Holi Festival. It concerns basic matters such 
as permits, parade routes, public nuisance and post-festival clean-ups. 
However, these do not constitute tensions between tourists and locals. 
There are no indications that immigrant entrepreneurs experience 
unsolicited disruptions of their daily work rhythm or their cultural 
manifestations.
5.3 Conclusion
This study of the development of multicultural tourism in an ethnically 
concentrated area in The Hague confirms the five factors mentioned 
in the literature. These factors could be applicable in the development 
of other multicultural districts such as Little India, which is being dis-
cussed within the Surinamese community of The Hague. The impact of 
the five factors can be highlighted as follows.
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Government policy
The Municipality of The Hague played an active role in the develop-
ment of Chinatown as part of its policy to develop multicultural tour-
ism. The local council invested in market research to assess the feasi-
bility of the tourist concepts of City Mondial, Chinatown and Avenue 
Culinaire. The municipality also utilised financial resources, helped in 
institutionalising Chinatown, assisted in the development of a broad 
network of investors, expanded the working area of City Mondial, es-
tablished a multicultural and exotic image through the use of Chinese 
ornaments and signposts, embedded the marketing of multicultural 
tourism in the generic policy, renovated the streets and pavements, 
funded most of the campaign for multicultural tourism and improved 
the liveability of the area by installing camera surveillance and assisting 
in neighbourhood management of security.
Social infrastructure
The rich cultural life of The Hague gained momentum from the mid-
1970s, partly owing to the growth of the city’s immigrant population 
and the municipal social welfare subsidies for participation in the so-
ciety. This policy facilitated regular small-scale socio-cultural activi-
ties. The growth of the immigrant population has served to further 
strengthen the social infrastructure in the City Mondial areas of Schil-
derswijk, Transvaal and Centrum/Stationsbuurt. A number of ethnic 
organisations have become part of multicultural tourism and are in-
volved in organising annual large-scale festivals that form an appealing 
multicultural landscape for tourists. The City Mondial walking tour for 
example includes a visit to a number of large religious institutions.
Critical infrastructure
In the 1960s and 1970s, a number of immigrant entrepreneurs took the 
first steps in creating a critical infrastructure for major cultural events 
and can be considered the cultural middlemen and trendsetters of the 
early days. This fertile ground was an important factor for City Mon-
dial to form the cornerstone of The Hague’s multicultural tourism, with 
Chinatown and Avenue Culinaire as sub-projects. Since the establish-
ment of City Mondial in 1996, increasing numbers of intermediary in-
stitutions and entrepreneurs contributed to the critical infrastructure 
to attract tourists and the local population.
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Geographic concentration of immigrant entrepreneurs
This study proves that ethnically concentrated areas are not by defini-
tion stifled by negative neighbourhood effects. The main aim to develop 
multicultural tourism by means of City Mondial was to attract locals 
and tourists to the area in an effort to stimulate the neighbourhood’s 
economy. Policymakers consciously chose a geographical concentra-
tion of small-scale entrepreneurs to shape the local tourist industry. 
Without this concentration, there could have been no development of 
an exotic multicultural landscape. This form of concentration is a pre-
condition for the branding of the district, and it should be noted that, 
though Chinese businesses are the carriers of the Chinatown concept, 
the aim is to raise the visibility of other ethnic groups in this area as 
well so that Chinatown becomes a ‘global district’ where non-Chinese 
businesses can also flourish. Chinatown has become a marketplace 
where a growing variety of mainstream products are traded. Examples 
of these include health stores, acupuncturists, furniture stores, haute 
cuisine restaurants, pastry shops, wholesalers in specialised products 
and beauty parlours.
The research on The Hague illustrates that most of the immigrant 
entrepreneurs establish their businesses in districts with a high percent-
age of ethnic minorities, and their numbers are increasing every year. 
They take full advantage of the opportunities offered in the commercial 
market. They set up their businesses increasingly in high potential mar-
kets. So, ethnically diverse neighbourhoods can count their economic 
blessings. The concentration of immigrant entrepreneurs in the inner 
city (Centrum) was a pre-condition for the development of City Mon-
dial as a carrier of the concept of multicultural tourism.
Potential negative effects
In the initial years of the development of multicultural tourism, some 
local political parties were reluctant to proceed due to fears of voyeur-
ism. This negative image was soon dispelled because of the positive im-
pact of multicultural tourism on the local economy.
Notes
1 The ethnic products that are traded in this market are slightly more specialised 
than those in the local ethnic market, and the immigrant entrepreneurs usually 
cater to a native clientele competing with native businesses in the same sector. 
These concern businesses such as Chinese takeaways (Jones et al. 2000). Com-
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pare middlemen minority (Bonacich 1973; Ward 1987; Waldinger, Aldrich & 
Ward 1990a; Waldinger, McEvoy & Aldrich 1990b).
2 These markets are characterised by a high percentage of native customers, and 
businesses are situated at strategic locations, such as filling stations and hotels. 
Indian restaurants that serve native customers across the entire city and entrepre-
neurs who manufacture export products are examples of businesses in this mar-
ket (Jones et al. 2000).
3 Jones & Ram (2000) define four breakout strategies: product differentiation, 
portfolio breakthrough where entrepreneurs own more than one business, pro-
motion breakthrough (marketing, advertisements) and mobility towards middle-
class locations.
4 Multicultural tourism refers to the trade in ethnic-cultural products – both tangi-
ble and intangible – in a physically recognisable multicultural urban landscape.
5 Programmes funded by the European Union.
6 In 2012, The Hague had a population of 502,803. Half of the population had an 
ethnic background. The Surinamese (47,038 = 9.3%), most of them Hindustani 
(an estimated 85%), make up the city’s largest immigrant group (dhic 2012). The 
screenings lost their audience to the rising popularity of video stores in the 1980s 
and 1990s. They regained their appeal in the late 1990s, partly owing to satellite 
television and the screening of Indian tv shows by cable companies. The Stichting 
Hindustaans Film- en Muziekfestival (Hindu Film and Music Festival Founda-
tion) was established in 2002 in support of the screening of Bollywood films and 
the performance of Indian song and dance.
7 Other examples are: Mela, Navratan Shopping Evenings, the Chariot Festival 
(Rath Yatra), the Chinese Moon Festival, Chinese New Year celebrations, Chi-
nese markets, the Crossing Border World Music Festival, the Miss India Holland 
elections and the ‘Around the World in your own City’ programme.
8 Van den Tillaart & Poutsma 1998; KplusV 2005.
9 KplusV (2005: 12).
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6 The educational mobility of second-
generation Turks in cross-national perspective
Empirical findings, explanations and policy lessons1
Philipp Schnell
6.1 Introduction
Children of immigrants are leaving school and entering the labour 
market in increasing numbers in most northwestern European coun-
tries. Their opportunities and achievements in these countries are often 
regarded as the ‘litmus test’ for integration and for the success or failure 
of policies in this field (Penninx 2003). The key arena in which to ex-
amine the integration of immigrant youth is that of educational attain-
ment (Kao & Thompson 2003; Zhou 1999). Here, there is a substantial 
body of literature that looks at the comparative academic achievements 
of different immigrant ethnic groups, and at the varying degrees of ed-
ucational mobility among their children (see Heath, Rothon & Kilpi 
2008 for a review; Penn & Lambert 2009).
Considerable attention has been devoted to the children of Turkish 
immigrants because Turks are one of the largest immigrant groups and 
among the most disadvantaged in terms of education. Previous studies 
have reported high drop-out rates among Turkish youth, in parallel with 
a higher tendency to repeat grades and generally lower levels of access 
to higher education (Dustmann, Frattini & Lanzara 2012). Although 
patterns of disadvantage are evident in most countries, first compara-
tive studies point to remarkable variations from one country to another 
in terms of the extent of the disadvantage faced by second-generation 
Turks (Crul & Vermeulen 2003). However, neither the precise scale of 
the differences in educational mobility nor the reason for the cross-bor-
der variations is at all clear (Heath et al. 2008). Current research tends to 
focus primarily on differences in levels of achievement between second-
generation Turks and the majority groups in their various countries. 
Other studies that do examine cross-national variations often pay little 
attention to the role played by variations in the institutional arrange-
ments of the different countries’ education systems. If they address this 
issue at all, they often reach conflicting results that leave both empirical 
lacunae and unanswered questions (Schnell 2012). In this essay I aim to 
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partially redress this issue by asking: What causes variations in the edu-
cational mobility of second-generation Turks across countries? More 
precisely, I examine differences in the degree of educational mobility 
of second-generation Turks across three European countries and five 
cities, namely Sweden (Stockholm), France (Paris and Strasbourg) and 
Austria (Vienna and Linz). Data for this study comes from the ties 
survey, a collection of data about the children of immigrants from Tur-
key (as well as from the former Yugoslavia and Morocco) now living in 
fifteen European cities in eight countries, which was carried out in 2007 
and 2008.2 From the pool of available countries participating in ties, 
Austria, France and Sweden have been selected as suitable ‘cases’ for 
comparison. Sweden has an education system with late selection and 
full-day teaching. By contrast, the Austrian education system has early 
selection and half-day teaching. Finally, France has been selected as a 
third case for this comparison. Although its education system is similar 
to the Swedish one, a number of national studies have revealed that the 
French education system may also have ‘selective moments’, making it 
an interesting contrasting case. In all three countries (and their five cit-
ies), samples of second-generation Turks and a comparison group are 
used. Taken together, the empirical analyses of this study are based on 
a total sample of 2,294 respondents.
I will begin by studying educational mobility at the aggregated level 
by analysing differences in educational attainment. The analysis then 
goes on to investigate educational pathways in order to shed light on 
the processes of educational mobility. In an attempt to establish what 
the explanatory factors actually are, and to understand the divergent 
patterns of educational mobility among the Turkish second generation 
across the different countries, emphasis will be given to interaction 
mechanisms that exert influence at both an individual and an institu-
tional level. I define ‘interactions’ as the interplay between the insti-
tutional arrangements of education systems and different individual- 
and group-related resources that are relevant for navigating success-
fully through these systems (Schnell 2012). Finally, in the concluding 
remarks of this essay, I reflect on a number of modest policy-related 
implications drawn from this empirical groundwork. I provide recom-
mendations for policy action aimed at developing meaningful strate-
gies and interventions to reduce ethnic educational inequalities, abol-
ish structural barriers and promote educational mobility for the chil-
dren of immigrants.
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6.2 Cross-country differences in degrees of educational mobility
Beginning with a first glance at educational outcomes, the investiga-
tion of absolute differences between second-generation Turks across 
the three countries revealed that the size of the group of high achievers 
(those with post-secondary education or higher) is more than twice 
as high in France and Sweden as it is in Austria. At the same time, the 
highest percentage of early school-leavers (those with primary and 
lower-secondary education at most) among the Turkish second gen-
eration was found in the Austrian cities (Table 6.1).
table 6.1 Early school leaving and achieving a post-secondary/tertiary educational  

















Early school leaver 30% 14% 19% 3% 9% 4%
High achiever 14% 36% 31% 70% 47% 61%
Source: ties 2007-2008, author’s analysis
Comparing second-generation Turks and their comparison groups 
across the three countries and five cities showed that differences in edu-
cational attainment were most pronounced at the highest and lowest 
ends of the education ladders in Austria and France. In both countries, 
such comparative attainment differences were higher overall than in 
Sweden (compare Table 6.1).
These cross-country attainment differences are mirrored in the anal-
ysis of educational pathways. In general, second-generation Turks are 
academically more disadvantaged than the comparison group because 
they are more likely to be placed in less academic tracks at school, and 
so are less often found in the academically orientated tracks that lead to 
tertiary education. These relative differences in educational pathways 
are most pronounced in the Austrian education system. They can be 
seen clearly in France, and they are least pronounced in the Swedish 
education system.
Overall, the comparisons of educational attainment and educational 
pathways revealed similar rankings across the three compared coun-
tries (and five cities): second-generation Turks show the weakest per-
formance in Austria, a medium to high level in France, and the best 
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performance in Sweden. The educational mobility of second-genera-
tion Turks across Austria, France and Sweden thus shows significant 
differences. The next section turns to the question of how these differ-
ences can be explained.
6.3 Explaining cross-country differences
In order to explain the differences described above, I argue that on the 
one hand it is important to consider a number of specific institutional 
arrangements within each education system, which together form 
country-specific institutional constellations. On the other hand, such 
institutional arrangements shape to a great extent the interaction with 
individual-level factors and resources, such as family resources or the 
significant role of peers and teachers. They also determine their mag-
nitude and direction, and set the point in time at which educational 
resources become relevant (Schnell 2012; Schnell & Crul 2013). In this 
section, I will show these varying interactions and thus illustrate the 
influence of individual-level factors on educational attainment.
The main components of the Austrian education system are the late 
starting age of pre-schooling (around age four), the early segregation 
into different ability tracks (at the age of ten), a low degree of perme-
ability between education tracks after the early tracking, and a half-day 
teaching system in compulsory education. The impact of this institu-
tional constellation on the early stages of a student’s education leads to 
greater interaction with family resources. Parents are important agents 
in this early period in supporting their children’s learning and mak-
ing school choices. Children of less educated parents are frequently 
streamed into less academic tracks in lower-secondary education. This 
is particularly true for second-generation Turks who are more often 
tracked into the lower stream (66 per cent versus 41 per cent for the 
comparison group) because they originate in higher numbers from less 
educated families, thus confirming the specific relevance of the parents’ 
educational backgrounds in the early selection process. This process is 
reinforced by the low participation rates in pre-schooling by second-
generation Turks in the Austrian cities (65.5 per cent as compared to 
83 per cent among the comparison group). Both factors contribute to 
explaining the greater downward streaming of second-generation Turks 
at the first transition point after primary school, and this early selection 
determines to a large extent their subsequent educational pathways.
The significance of within-family resources is also related to the half-
day schooling system that persists throughout the compulsory edu-
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cation years. The responsibility to learn is transferred to the parental 
home and to the students’ leisure time, which makes parental involve-
ment and support significantly more important for students in terms of 
learning and homework. Although the relevance of family support has 
been clear for all students in the Austrian system, family support is of 
greater importance for second-generation Turks than for the compari-
son group.
While family resources are especially important in the early phase 
of schooling, outside-family agents and related resources become more 
important later. In order to climb to the top of the educational ladder, 
access to the resources provided by non-immigrant peer networks as 
well as the support offered by teachers become crucial for the children 
of Turkish immigrants in Austria. In particular, the support of teachers 
in upper-secondary education is of great importance for second-gen-
eration Turks if they are not to abandon their academic careers before 
entering post-secondary or tertiary education.
The Austrian education system offers the option of moving upwards 
at the end of lower-secondary education to students who have been 
placed in the vocational stream after primary school. In this context, 
non-immigrant peers are important if a student is to move upwards 
at this stage, because second-generation Turks on the vocational path 
usually come from less educated families who are rarely equipped with 
the knowledge or resources to support them in the upward process. 
Best friends outside the family become the major source of information 
and support. But the low percentage of second-generation Turks who 
finally move upwards (23 per cent) indicates that the support provided 
by the peer group is not adequate in very many cases.
In France, an early pre-school starting age (around age three), full-
day pre-school services, guaranteed pre-school places, and a full-day 
comprehensive compulsory schooling system are among the main com-
ponents of a national institutional constellation that leads to relatively 
few interactions with family resources. In particular, supplementary 
help from family members is regarded as less important because this 
type of support is institutionalised in the education system. The orienta-
tion process that determines selection into upper-secondary education 
is the single most crucial institutional arrangement for French students. 
Although this first selection happens relatively late (around fifteen), the 
orientation process involves a high degree of interaction with a num-
ber of individual-level factors. Firstly, having highly educated parents 
increases the chances of students being streamed into academic tracks. 
This correlation between tracking decisions and parents’ educational 
backgrounds explains to a large extent why there are unequal continu-
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ation rates into the academic track for second-generation Turks and 
their comparison group (53 per cent compared to 80 per cent for the 
comparison group). Secondly, teachers and the support and advice they 
provide are crucial at this stage in streaming students upwards towards 
the academic tracks. Finally, the ethnic composition of peers in school 
matters a great deal for second-generation Turks at this point. If par-
ents cannot help, peers in the comparison group – whose parents or 
older siblings have experience and knowledge of the French education 
system – become crucial sources of information for second-generation 
Turks. Selection into different types of upper-secondary tracks through 
this orientation process determines to a large extent the educational 
pathways that students will follow.
In addition, differentiation in the upper-secondary academic tracks, 
and the ‘second chance’ to enter post-secondary and tertiary educa-
tion by the vocational route, are also important features of the French 
institutional constellation. The late opportunity for an upward trans-
fer interacts less strongly, however, with the educational background 
of parents or with family support. Instead, the number of native peers 
in the vocational school and the support provided by teachers are the 
most important factors for second-generation Turks being able to 
acquire the relevant certificate and enter post-secondary and tertiary 
education by this route.
In Sweden, the institutional constellation of the education system 
is composed of full-day pre-school services that children can attend 
from two years old onwards, and an integrated track from primary 
school until the end of lower-secondary education, with full-day teach-
ing. The first allocation into different tracks comes at the transition 
into upper-secondary education (at the age of fifteen/sixteen). Other 
important elements are the high degree of permeability between tracks 
in upper-secondary education and the possibility of entering post-
secondary/tertiary education from all upper-secondary tracks (both 
academic and vocational). Routine full-day schooling leads to fewer 
interactions with individual-level factors and makes family resources 
less relevant in the educational mobility of the study groups. Even at 
the first transition point, before entering academic or vocational tracks 
in upper-secondary education, family characteristics (such as parents’ 
education or the availability of additional educational resources) are 
unimportant because the transition is not linked to a specific differen-
tiation process. As a result, second-generation Turks enter academi-
cally orientated tracks in numbers similar to the comparison group, 
irrespective of family background (slightly more than 50 per cent in 
both groups).
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Moreover, the high degree of permeability between tracks, and the 
fluid links between the upper-secondary tracks and post-secondary 
and tertiary education, mean that individual-level factors are of minor 
relevance to the educational mobility of second-generation Turks. 
Interactions with individual-level factors appear only at the highest end 
of the Swedish education system. Students with less-educated parents 
leave the education system more often than they continue. This is par-
ticularly true of second-generation Turks because they come in higher 
numbers from less-educated families. Apart from parents’ education 
levels, peers are perceived as the most important influences on second-
generation Turks in this phase of schooling.
The findings of my study highlight the fact that explaining cross-
national differences in the educational mobility of second-generation 
Turks cannot be limited to a single set of factors. Two elements are 
involved in the mobility process: first, the children of Turkish immi-
grants, with their own individual characteristics, family backgrounds 
and relationships with important agents such as peers and teachers; 
and second, the countries’ education systems, each with their particu-
lar institutional arrangements. It is the interaction between the two that 
determines the direction, and the ultimate outcome, of the educational 
mobility process. But education systems, in terms of their institutional 
arrangements and the way they determine the relevance of individual-
level factors, matter more for the outcome of this process. Those sys-
tems that provide more favourable institutional arrangements make 
the educational mobility of second-generation Turks less dependent on 
individual-level factors and resources, thus leading to greater educa-
tional achievement. The examination of these interactions throughout 
a student’s entire education highlights the favourable and unfavourable 
institutional settings that are relevant in terms of grasping variations 
in educational mobility in a cross-national comparison. Findings from 
this study point to the need to explore interactions between institu-
tional and individual-level factors in order to understand variations 
in the educational success of second-generation Turks across various 
countries.
6.4 Concluding remarks: lessons for policy
The differences in the educational mobility of second-generation Turks 
across the three countries represent a daunting challenge, especially for 
those countries whose education systems incorporate unfavourable in-
stitutional arrangements. My findings suggest that the combination of a 
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number of important generic institutional arrangements seems to lead 
to greater levels of inequality and a lower chance of upward mobility 
for second-generation Turks because of greater interactions with indi-
vidual level resources – as compared to the situation in other countries.
One of the most pressing questions that arises from these observa-
tions is: what should we do? In this concluding section I will provide 
some policy recommendations based on the findings of this study that 
I believe should be at the heart of a more effective educational mobility 
experience for second-generation Turks in particular, and for children 
of immigrants in general.
Reject early selection and tracking — As the data suggest, the ear-
lier a student is selected and tracked into different (ability) schools, 
the higher the importance of the parents’ educational background. 
In Austria, larger inequalities in parents’ educational attainment lead 
to stronger differences in their children’s chances in school, since the 
education system is highly selective at an early stage of schooling. The 
opposite is the case in France and Sweden, where disadvantaged chil-
dren of less-educated parents are less dependent on their family back-
grounds when tracked at a later age. This finding has profound conse-
quences for second-generation Turks (and children of immigrants in 
general) measured against their comparison groups. The great majority 
of the Turkish second generation has its roots in families whose par-
ents frequently have low educational qualifications and often lack the 
means to support their children in school-related activities. They also 
have limited information on school choices. Being tracked into differ-
ent streams after just four years of compulsory education provides too 
little time for their children to overcome these initial disadvantages. In 
addition, delayed selection increases the chances of children of less-
educated parents entering academic streams. Policy action is needed to 
restructure the selection moments towards a system with delayed selec-
tion in order to reduce inequalities and to provide a sufficient learning 
period for children of immigrants to catch up with students of non-
immigrant origin.
Increase pre-school opportunities and quality — My findings reveal 
that among the most important generic institutional factors that may 
explain educational differences across countries are pre-school attend-
ance and age on entering education. Results for France and Sweden 
indicate that almost all children of both groups attend some sort of 
pre-school facilities already at age three. By contrast, pre-school edu-
cation in Austria usually takes place in the kindergarten, which is not 
considered part of the education system and thus has the ethos of early 
childcare rather than early education. Moreover, as shown in this study, 
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second-generation Turks attended kindergarten facilities less often, 
and the majority of those who went to pre-school started later than age 
four, which consequently leads to a shorter duration of pre-schooling. 
The different institutional arrangements for pre-school attendance and 
starting age result in remarkable differences in the preparation time for 
compulsory education for young children across the three countries. 
Second-generation Turks whose parents may have limited education 
and language skills do not achieve the schooling readiness of their class-
mates of non-immigrant parents, and thus have to rely more heavily on 
pre-school education. If the preparation time in pre-school facilities is 
short, they are already in a disadvantaged position when starting com-
pulsory education in primary school. My empirical evidence confirms 
that if early childhood education starts at a sufficiently young age, it sig-
nificantly aids the development of second-generation Turks, especially 
in the case of children from low socio-economic family backgrounds. 
Thus, municipalities should be obliged to provide pre-school places free 
of charge for all children and pre-school services should offer a full-
day care system. They should also provide the opportunity to start at a 
younger age (e.g. age three). In Austria, as recently claimed in a num-
ber of studies (Nusche, Shewbridge & Rasmussen 2009; Wroblewski & 
Herzog-Punzenberger 2009), further development is still needed in the 
quality of pre-school education and support, in particular with respect 
to the quality of language support (Herzog-Punzenberger & Schnell 
2012). Finally, because placing young children in pre-school may not 
be the cultural practice of some immigrant parents, programmes are 
needed which allow information on early education to be shared with 
immigrant families.
Longer training hours in schools — During my research, I found that 
the educational success of second-generation Turks in Austria is much 
more dependent on various forms of additional support provided by 
their parents than that of their counterparts in France and Sweden. In 
addition, measuring them against their comparison group revealed 
that family involvement and support is an important aspect in the 
Austrian education system for all groups, while it is almost absent in 
France and Sweden. The results show, however, that second-generation 
Turks rely even more on educational support from their parents than 
do children of the comparison group. These findings point towards one 
important institutional feature: the major distinction between the three 
education systems is the half-day school system in Austria on the one 
hand, and full-time education in France and Sweden on the other. As 
a result, the family becomes the focal point of an educational system 
which delegates learning and homework to the family home, where the 
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educational success of students is highly dependent on the help pro-
vided and the time families spend with them. By contrast, with systems 
such as those in France and Sweden that offer full-time education and 
supervised homework tutorials in schools, the role of help provided 
by parents becomes important only once children face difficulties and 
need more support than is on offer at school. Half-day school systems 
should therefore expand after-school programmes that provide tangi-
ble academic support, such as homework help, language tutoring and 
information about extra-curricular activities and future pathways, thus 
reducing dependence on support at home, especially for children of 
immigrants such as second-generation Turks.
Prioritising teacher preparation — One significant finding to take 
away from my study is the vital role of teachers during the educational 
careers of second-generation Turks in all three countries. Because Turk-
ish parents possess relatively few means to support their children’s edu-
cation, teachers play a very important role in their schooling. They 
serve as motivators who reinforce aspirations and act as gatekeepers in 
advising on more prestigious tracks, in particular for second-generation 
Turks from disadvantaged family backgrounds (Schnell, Keskiner & 
Crul 2013). Interpersonal social relations between students and teach-
ers increase the chances of successfully managing the most important 
transition points and are significant agents for second-generation Turks 
when navigating successfully through the indirect routes of these educa-
tion systems. But not all teachers have been trained to deal with students 
and classrooms that are becoming increasingly diverse. While in France 
and Sweden ‘diversity training’ is built in as part of initial teacher educa-
tion (Taguma, Kim, Brink & Teltemann 2008), substantial numbers of 
the teacher population in Austria lack the knowledge and skills to meet 
the needs of students with an immigrant background since intercultural 
education is not a compulsory module in their education (Furch 2009). 
Ministries and educational policymakers should introduce mandatory 
initiatives to strengthen the capacity of teachers to support and advise 
students of immigrant origin. Linguistic diversity and intercultural edu-
cation should become a core principle in the curriculum for teacher 
training in all European countries. The new programmes must provide 
teachers exposure to, and appreciation of, the family backgrounds of 
Turkish second-generation students and the children of immigrants. 
In addition, initiatives should be launched to increase diversity among 
new teachers themselves (Herzog-Punzenberger & Schnell 2012), 
and non-governmental organisations supporting the development of 
teachers in intercultural education should be promoted through state 
resources and funding (Luciak & Khan-Svik 2008).
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Building mentoring and community supports — Mentoring relation-
ships often evolve in after-school programmes and community-based 
organisations, and they can generate considerable social good. Further-
more, as previous research suggests, mentoring relationships can make 
a significant difference in adolescents’ lives (Suárez-Orozco, Suárez-
Orozco & Todorova 2008). For second-generation Turks and for 
minority youth from disadvantaged family backgrounds with limited 
social resources, mentors can support students in schools by providing 
homework tutoring, guidance in important school choices, or simply 
by acting as role models. As the data suggest, Turkish parents are often 
unable to provide sufficient educational support for their children, and 
mentors can provide a valuable service by filling that void. The need for 
mentoring or community support is all the greater for second-genera-
tion Turks in an education system like Austria’s, which delegates learn-
ing and homework to the family home because of its half-day train-
ing system. Previous research in Austria (as well as in countries like 
the Netherlands or the United Kingdom) has shown that community 
involvement and mentoring programmes, if available, are associated 
with improved student outcomes because they reduce the pressure on 
parents who may lack the skills to support their children (Jeynes 2005, 
2007; Schofield 2006). But community and mentoring programmes 
depend on funding to establish such programmes. Thus, ministries and 
their agents should not only encourage immigrant or neighbourhood 
communities to organise educational support programmes for young 
students, but they should also offer resources and clarify the application 
processes for funding.
Turkish immigrants are one of the largest groups of foreign origin in 
Europe. Faced with all the difficulties that invariably beset migrants in 
a new country, parents understandably see schooling as the path to a 
brighter future for their children. The five recommendations outlined 
here should be seen as the first elements in a framework aimed at abol-
ishing structural barriers and building a more forward-looking educa-
tion policy that better serves the needs of second-generation Turks who 
have chosen education as the means to change their lives.
Notes
1 This essay is based on my dissertation which was supervised by Rinus Penninx 
and Maurice Crul (2008-2012).
2 The participating countries and cities were Austria (Vienna and Linz), Belgium 
(Brussels and Antwerp), France (Paris and Strasbourg), Germany (Frankfurt 
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and Berlin), Spain (Madrid and Barcelona), Sweden (Stockholm), Switzerland 
(Zürich and Basel) and the Netherlands (Amsterdam and Rotterdam). The full 
data set brings together almost 10,000 respondents. The term ‘second generation’ 
refers to children of immigrants who have at least one parent born outside the 
survey country (in this case, born in Turkey) but who were themselves born in 
the survey country and have had their entire education there. At the time of the 
interviews, the respondents were between 18 and 35 years old.
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the ethno-cultural dimension
7 The ‘ethno-cultural position’ reconsidered
An investigation into the usefulness of the concept  
when it comes to Moroccans
Anja van Heelsum
7.1 Introduction
In 1997 I argued that the concept ethno-cultural position – introduced 
as part of Penninx’s heuristic model in 1988 – should be used instead 
of the concept ethnic identity (Van Heelsum 1997). I had used this new 
term to find out how second-generation Surinamese in the Netherlands 
define themselves, and in particular how they are influenced by others 
in their self-definition. Fifteen years later, I want to investigate how the 
concept of ethno-cultural position functions with another ethnic group 
and a larger data set.
I will explain my assumptions about the advantages of the concept 
of ethno-cultural position compared with the concept of ethnic identity 
and see whether this reasoning holds for Moroccans. Firstly, some the-
oretical elaborations should make clear what the two concepts encom-
pass and where they differ. Ethnic identity, a term that refers – accord-
ing to an often-cited author in this field, the British psychologist Jean S. 
Phinney – to claims of a common ancestry one shares, at least a similar 
culture, race, religion, language, kinship or place of origin within the 
context of a group (Phinney 2003). She maintains that “ethnic identity 
is a dynamic, multidimensional construct that refers to one’s identity or 
sense of self as a member of an ethnic group” (2003: 63).
Ethnic identity is not very obvious for a person when everyone 
around him or her shares the same culture, but the awareness of it and 
its salience increases in the immigration context, since immigrants 
usually live in a country where they are not the majority group. Native 
inhabitants of countries with only one national group tend to think less 
about their ethnic identity than those in countries where more than 
one ethnic group reside, since in the latter there is more reason to think 
about specific ethnic group characteristics. What differentiates them? 
Is it culture, language, experience? Immigrants can choose to define 
themselves mainly in terms of their country of origin, but also in terms 
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of the new country, or as usually happens, in both terms. But what is 
most important depends on a lot of factors.
As the above situation shows, ethnic identities are defined in rela-
tion to others. Decisions on how to define oneself are made by indi-
viduals but are strongly influenced by the opinions of those whom peo-
ple consider part of their ‘own’ group – the in-group – as well as those 
whom they consider members of the out-group. The ethnic and reli-
gious identities of a person are some of the many social identities with 
which people define themselves in relation to their chosen group mem-
bership (Tajfel & Turner 1986). Boundary setting is part of determining 
where the difference between one’s in-group and the out-groups lies, as 
stated in one of the classics in the field, Frederik Barth’s Ethnic groups 
and boundaries (1969).
Most authors on this subject agree that ethnic identity formation is 
a dynamic process; the subjective belief of being part of a certain group 
with certain reasoning about the common origin, descent and history is 
determined by wider social and material circumstances, cultural mean-
ings and historical conditions (Verkuyten 2005: 80). Just like identity in 
general, ethnic identity should not be considered a stable characteristic, 
since it can be redefined when circumstances change. For instance, a 
Moroccan immigrant can arrive in the Netherlands as a not very reli-
gious young man, interested in work and the adventure of moving to a 
new country, but after having lived in the new context for 30 years, he 
might become more aware of the Muslim aspect of his roots and decide 
that this is a central aspect of his identity.
In some cases, cultural and religious elements are intertwined or 
might fight for prioritisation. This might be the case for the Muslim 
groups in this study. The question to what extent it is more important 
to identify as a national group or as a religious group or maybe as one of 
the religious denominations becomes relevant. In the case of Muslims 
in Western Europe, stigmatisation seems to have increased in the last 
ten years (Shadid & van Koningsveld 2002; Saeed 2007). Consequently, 
the attention of the ethnic groups in this study might have shifted into 
putting more emphasis on the religious aspect of their belonging – 
related to a more defensive attitude to defend their faith than was nec-
essary in their country of origin.
The concept of ethno-cultural position was introduced by Rinus Pen-
ninx in his dissertation in 1988. The ethno-cultural position relates to 
defining oneself and being defined as a member of a specific group. 
That is very near to how ethnic identity is defined, but the advantage 
of this concept is that, in addition to what he calls position acquisition 
– i.e. the way in which people define themselves – an explicit element 
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of his model is the element of position allocation, i.e. the way in which 
others see them.
The way in which people see themselves is on the one hand deter-
mined by views they develop independently or among in-group mem-
bers, but in addition to this there are the positive and negative views 
that out-group members have that influence their thinking. In the 
migration context, stigmatisation of newcomers is rather common. 
Cultural differences are easily perceived as negative and sometimes 
even as threatening by members of the host society. Penninx argues 
that this element is so important that it should not be seen indepen-
dently from the ethnic self-definition.
A last relevant point is that the actual acceptance of immigrants 
or ethnic minorities by the host society might not be the same as the 
acceptance that immigrants perceive. A lack of perceived acceptance 
might lead to negative feelings and frustrations, and in some cases 
the negative image of the out-group becomes so important that it is 
internalised. This is a phenomenon that has been described for Afri-
can Americans in the United States and colonial minorities in Europe. 
Whether this process has also become relevant for Muslims in Europe 
remains an open question. In this chapter I pay attention to both the 
actual acceptance as reported by members of the receiving society and 
the perceived acceptance as reported by immigrants.
I configure a model that includes both position acquisition – i.e. the 
ethnic identity element – and the new element of position allocation. I 
will use data gathered in the eurislam project concerning Moroccans 
in Europe. In addition to survey data among Muslims and natives in 
six European countries (France, Belgium, the Netherlands, Germany, 
the uk and Switzerland), data were also gathered on claims concerning 
Muslims in the newspapers in these countries (see Tillie, Koomen, Van 
Heelsum & Damstra 2013). Using both survey and newspaper data, I 
will test whether position allocation is indeed as relevant and intercon-
nected as Penninx states, and to what extent the results from the much 
smaller study of Van Heelsum (1997) can be confirmed. If position allo-
cation is as highly correlated and interrelated as in the earlier study, the 
conclusion would be confirmed that ethno cultural position is a better 
alternative to ethnic identity.
7.2 Conceptualisation and method
The conceptualisation I used in 1997 was based on one single indicator 
for position allocation, namely a set of questions on experienced dis-
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crimination (Van Heelsum 1997: 30). In the current analysis, more data 
of a more varied nature are available. This enables me to improve the 
conceptualisation, particularly with regard to the position allocation. 
From the eurislam survey data, I have selected the 1,513 Moroccan 
respondents (about 250 per country). The four variables that I have se-
lected for this paper are: 1) identification with Morocco, 2) identifica-
tion with the country of origin, 3) identification as a Muslim, and 4) 
perceived acceptance by the national majority.
For the fourth indicator, I have used the answers of 2,314 respond-
ents from the national majority group for the variable ‘acceptance of 
immigrants’. Having both the perceived and the actual acceptance adds 
to the strength of the model.
The fifth and sixth indicators are drawn from the eurislam media 
data, namely the mean tone of the debate in every country and the mean 
tendency to generalise on Muslims in every country. The assumption is 
that the tone of the debate and the tendency to generalise in the news-
papers are good indicators of the position allocation in a country. This 
means I have a more elaborate model and a higher number of indi-
cators on position allocation than was the case in 1997. The relations 
between these indicators are graphically displayed in figure 7.1.
figure 7.1  Elements of the ethno-cultural position as operationalised  
  in this chapter
7.3 Results
I will now test the conceptual model using the eurislam data, inter-
preted as indicators to measure the ethno-cultural position of Moroc-
cans in Europe. But first, I will discuss the results on self-definition (po-
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sition acquisition). Then the opinions of others as seen by respondents 
in the survey will be presented (indicator of position allocation), and 
in a third section the opinions as presented in the media are discussed 
(indicator of position allocation). After that the internal consistency of 
the model and its indicators will be tested to see whether our reasoning 
on position acquisition and position allocation holds.
Position acquisition:  
ethnic and religious self-identification of moroccans
As explained in section 7.2, ethnic self-identification encompasses sev-
eral elements that are at play at the same time: the element of the coun-
try of origin, the country of settlement and, in the case of Moroccans, 
the religious element. In the survey, three questions were asked that I 
will now consider: 1) To what extent do you see yourself as a member of 
the Moroccan community? 2) To what extent do you identify with the 
Netherlands, Germany, Switzerland, uk, Belgium or France (respec-
tively)? 3) To what extent do you see yourself as a Muslim?
The percentages of people who agree or strongly agree to these ques-
tions are given in table 7.1. The table presents the combined scores of 
those who strongly and very strongly agree with the statement: “To 
what extent do you see yourself as a member of the … community?” 
(strongly agree, agree, somewhat, hardly, not at all).
table 7.1 Identification of Moroccans with their country of origin, country  
 of settlement and religious identification (% of those who strongly  
 + very strongly agree with the questions stated below)
nl de ch uk be fr
1. To what extent do you see yourself as a member 
   of the community of your country of origin?
64% 60% 83% 81% 76% 83%
2. To what extent do you see yourself as Dutch,  
   German, Swiss, British, Belgian or French?
66% 45% 63% 33% 58% 43%
3. To what extent do you see yourself as a Muslim? 71% 57% 74% 71% 73% 81%
As table 7.1 shows, the extent of identification with the Moroccan com-
munity is in nearly all cases slightly higher than the identification with 
the country of settlement or the religious identification. Only in the 
Netherlands is there a slightly higher identification with the country of 
settlement (66 per cent) than with the Moroccan community (64 per 
cent).
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Position allocation: how are immigrants seen  
by the majority and to what extent do they feel accepted?
After having seen how Moroccans in this study define themselves, I 
will now turn to the way they are seen by the majority and the extent 
to which they feel accepted. We first look at the actual acceptance by 
majority group members based on the survey and then at the perceived 
acceptance by Moroccans themselves, also based on the survey.
Respondents from the national majority group were asked to what 
extent they see immigrants who permanently live in the Netherlands, 
for instance, as Dutch. This question was not asked for Moroccans 
separately but for all immigrants. As table 7.2 shows, the replies given 
by the majority respondents in the six countries vary significantly, 
with respondents in the United Kingdom showing the least degree of 
acceptance of immigrants (9.4 per cent). Those in Germany, Belgium 
and Switzerland were in between, while the French and Dutch showed 
the most acceptance (France 59.4 per cent). Given the issues surround-
ing the wording of the questions in the uk (see note under table), we 
should be careful about concluding that there are serious discrimina-
tory problems in the uk.
table 7.2 Acceptance by the national majority and perceived acceptance by  
 Moroccans (% of those who strongly + very strongly with the questions  
 stated below)
nl de ch uk ** be fr
National majority:
To what extent do you see 
immigrants who permanently live 
in the Netherlands/Germany/etc. … 
as Dutch/German/etc . ... ?’ * 56.3% 37.6% 46.1% 9.4% 36.0% 59.4%
Moroccans:
‘To what extent do Dutch/ etc. … 
people see you as a Dutch/ etc. … 
man or woman’. 38.4% 35.8% 55.1% 13.5% 43.4% 32.8%
* This question refers to all immigrants, and not only to Moroccans.
** Note that the results may have been influenced by an unintended question wording 
effect. First, the term immigrants may have a different meaning in different countries – 
for instance in the uk, colonial minorities such as Pakistani are usually not considered 
immigrants. Second, the question ‘To what extent do English people see you as English’ 
might not include all uk citizens, which would suggest that all kinds of minority groups, 
including the Scots and the Welsh, are not part of the English.
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The second row in the table shows the acceptance by the host society 
that Moroccans perceive, which shows a similar pattern as on accep-
tance of the majority group. Again, the uk stands out with an excep-
tionally low perceived acceptance level (13.5 per cent). In between are 
(in increasing order) France, Germany, the Netherlands and Belgium 
and the highest acceptance level is found in Switzerland (55.1 per cent).
Position allocation: muslims as seen in the newspapers
The second element of position allocation that might relate to perceived 
acceptance by the majority is the image of Muslims in the media. Me-
dia portrayal might be a factor that immigrants consider when talk-
ing about their ethnic identity. It is often stated that: a) Muslims are 
pictured negatively in the media, and b) that the differences that exist 
among them are ignored into a generalised picture that fits all (Van- 
parys et al. 2013).
The newspaper articles that were gathered by the eurislam team 
were coded in such a way that a score could be calculated to indicate 
how positive or negative the claims made about or by Muslims were. 
A score between -1 and +1 was given to each claim. By averaging the 
scores thus attributed across all claims, we obtained a raw yet helpful 
overall indicator of the discursive context in this field. The general indi-
cator per country is presented in table 7.3.
table 7.3 Mean position (positive/negative) of the claims on Muslims found  
 in national newspapers
Mean Standard error n
Netherlands .23 .792 805
Germany -.17 .951 769
Switzerland .03 .888 775
United Kingdom .23 .560 1141
Belgium .09 .815 784
France .26 .679 426
The first conclusion we can make is that the mean score on this index 
is in general nearer to zero than to minus one or plus one. That indi-
cates that, although there are a lot of positive and negative scores on 
each claim separately, overall there is a balance between the number of 
positive and negative claims. The six countries can be placed into three 
groups: 1) countries that offer a relatively open and “positive” context 
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(France, the Netherlands and the uk), 2) countries that are more closed 
but still on the positive side (Belgium and Switzerland) and 3) countries 
with a particularly closed and “negative” context (Germany). Conse-
quently, Muslims in different countries face very different discursive 
contexts, which might influence their ability to integrate socially, politi-
cally and culturally. In addition, positions are more polarised in certain 
countries than in others, as indicated by the standard errors. Specifi-
cally, claim-making in this field seems most polarised in Germany and 
least so in the uk and France, where a larger consensus seems to con-
verge towards a positive stance vis-à-vis Muslims.
table 7.4 Objects of claims found in newspaper articles on Muslims  
 (in percentages)
nl de ch uk be fr
Muslims as actors 60.4 89.9 78.1 63.8 79.4 41.0
All Muslims in general 32.3 12.6 42.3 26.5 23.8 22.0
Majority/most Muslims 2.6 1.7 1.5 1.4 3.1 1.1
Minority / a small group / a particular 
categorical group of Muslims 12.6 50.1 14.4 18.3 36.7 6.8
Individual Muslims 11.4 22.2 18.4 15.1 15.3 8.3
Unclassifiable Muslims 1.5 3.3 1.5 2.5 .5 2.8
Islam as religion 10.5 7.6 14.6 2.9 8.9 18.4
Islam in general 7.0 2.3 11.9 2.0 7.6 10.2
Islam mainstream .1 .1 .3 .0 .0 2.1
Minority currents within Islam 2.0 .0 1.0 .0 .2 1.1
Specific religious stream/movement 
within Islam .9 5.2 1.4 .8 .9 4.1
Unclassifiable Islam .5 .0 .0 .1 .2 .9















Now I will use the media data to find out whether Muslims are really treated 
as one single category as often as some authors assume. Analysing what the 
objects of the claim in the newspapers were, I can draw conclusions about 
the percentage of claims that address Muslims in general or Islam in general, 
without distinction or subgroups. As table 7.4 shows, in the Netherlands Mus-
lims in general were mentioned in 34.9 per cent of the cases (upper two rows) 
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and Islam in general 7.1 per cent, which together add up to 42 per cent 
of generalising statements. Specific statements were made in 12.6 per 
cent of the cases, where a minority or a small/particular group was 
addressed, and in 2 per cent of the cases a minority current in Islam 
was addressed, which together make up 14.6 per cent. This means that 
in more than half of the claims, actors in newspaper articles refer to 
Muslims as one category and do not differentiate between radical Mus-
lims and mainstream Muslims, for instance. The implication of speak-
ing of Muslims as one category is that a stereotypical image of Muslims 
is presented in the newspapers and that the more liberal Muslims are 
often ignored.
The row with ‘minority/a small group/a particular categorical group 
of Muslims’ reveals that there were more of these specific claims in Ger-
many and Belgium, while the opposite is true for the Netherlands, Swit-
zerland, the United Kingdom and France. Talking about Islam in gen-
eral compared to minority currents within Islam takes place more often 
in Switzerland and France than in the other countries.
The internal consistency of the model
To make the different types of data comparable for analysis in one 
model, I have added the newspaper variables per country to the survey 
data set: the indicator for the tone of the debate and the indicator for 
generalisation in the debate (this is the added percentage of codes on 
generalisation). This means that the data set on newspapers was added 
to the survey data set. Altogether, therefore, I have seven indicators in 
my model, as I suggested theoretically in figure 7.1. To find out how the 
indicators are related, I have calculated the correlations between these 
seven indicators in the same manner as I did in my 1997 study (Van 
Heelsum 1997: 112). The results are presented in table 7.5.
The correlation matrix shows a less clear-cut pattern than in my ear-
lier study of second-generation Surinamese (Van Heelsum 1997: 114), 
where all indicators were positively correlated with each other, includ-
ing the experienced discrimination. In the current case, there are 14 
significant correlations out of 21. Considering only the significant cor-
relations, the table shows that those who identify more with Morocco 
also identify more as Muslims and in that case they identify less with 
their country of settlement. A positive identification with Morocco is 
correlated with a negative tone in the debate and more generalisations 
in the debate. That not all correlations are significant might mean that 
some indicators of the ethno-cultural position do not fit so well with 
the concept.
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table 7.5 Correlations between the seven variables
1. id Mar 2. id Eur 3. id Mus 4. accept 5. feelac 6. tone 7. general
1. id Mar 1.000
2. id Eur **-.204 1.000
3. id Mus ** .310 ** -.132 1.000
4. accept ** .111 -.017 .032 1.000
5. feelac -.080 ** .317 ** -.094 ** -.106 1.000
6. tone ** -.164 ** .001 ** -.195 ** -.453 .060 1.000
7. general ** -.096 .062 -.023 ** .523 -.051 ** -.546 1.000
1 = identification with Morocco; 2 = identification with the country of settlement; 3 = 
Muslim identification; 4 = acceptance score national majority per country; 5 = feeling of 
acceptance; 6 = tone of debate, positive/negative mean score of the tone of articles per 
country; 7 = tendency to generalise in newspaper articles per country
n is at least 1174, * p<.01 ** p<.001
Using once again the same method as I did in 1997 (Van Heelsum 1997: 
113), I will check with an exploratory factor analysis how much the indi-
cators have in common, and whether it makes sense to divide figure 7.1 
of the ethno-cultural position into two factors, namely position acqui-
sition and position allocation. A factor analysis method searches for 
a similar variance in the responses that could indicate an underlying 
latent variable. The outcomes are presented in table 7.6 and show that 
all indicators load in a three-factor model: not a single indicator drops 
out, which means that they form a set – which was not visible in the 
correlations in table 7.5. Three main factors turn out behind the list of 
seven indicators, so there is one extra factor compared with the theo-
table 7.6 Scores of factor analysis (principal component analysis, varimax rotation)
Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3
1.id Mar -.014 .802 -.111
2.id Eur .093 -.202 .771
3.id Mus .072 .783 -.041
4.accept .801 .018 -.086
5.feelac -.111 .035 .834
6.tone -.795 -.275 -.042
7.general. .863 -.167 .029
Explained variance 29 % 20 % 19 %
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retical model. This combination of three factors explains 68 per cent of 
the variance, and the factor loadings on these factors are high (around 
.80), which is a good result.
The three high factor loadings on factor 1 are: acceptance by the 
majority population (+), tone of debate (-) and the tendency to general-
ise in the debate (+). So this first factor seems to represent a latent vari-
able concerning the opinions of others (position allocation), namely 
dominant views in the societies in which Muslims live. Factor 2 seems 
to be the position acquisition: indicators that load high on the second 
factor are identification with Morocco (+) and identification as Muslim 
(+). Factor 3 is something I did not expect, namely a combination of 
the identification as a member of the country of settlement (+) and the 
feeling of acceptance (+). One could maybe call this the relation with 
the country of settlement. In figure 7.2, these results are presented in a 
graphic manner and I have reconstructed the model that I had earlier 
suggested, taking into account the three factors that appeared in the 
factor analysis.
figure 7.2 New model of the ethno-cultural position
The figure makes clear that identification with Morocco and identifica-
tion with the country of settlement are not part of the same factor. I 
expected respondents’ identification with the country of settlement to 
be part of self-identification (position acquisition), and the perceived 
3. Muslim identication
Ethno cultural position 
.80
Identication with the 






Media: 1. tone of 
debate  in news-
papers













identication with the 
country of settlement
Relation with new country
102 Anja van Heelsum
acceptance to be part of the second factor – i.e. opinions of others (posi-
tion allocation). The relation with the country of settlement – though 
correlated with identification with Morocco and identification as Mus-
lim – seems conceptually part of a third factor together with perceived 
acceptance. The earlier model, used in 1997 for second-generation Suri-
namese, does not exactly fit the case of Moroccan respondents in the 
eurislam survey and needs adjustment.
7.4 Conclusion and discussion
In this paper I have tested an operationalisation of the model of the 
ethno-cultural position on a large data set with Moroccan respond-
ents in six European countries. The model did not function in the same 
manner as in the earlier study among second-generation Surinamese, 
but the two main factors – position acquisition and position allocation 
– turned out to be relevant again. The central question of this chapter 
was: is the use of the concept of ethno-cultural position still relevant or 
should we revert to the concept of ethnic identity? As explained earlier, 
the extent to which position allocation is connected to and interrelated 
with position acquisition is the decisive issue. The conclusion that we 
may draw is first that the model of the ethno-cultural position is effec-
tive also in the case of Moroccans, though not quite in the same way as 
for Surinamese. We may even conclude that position allocation – the 
influence of the opinion of others – has become more relevant to in-
clude due to the current climate of considerable prejudice or due to the 
fact that we are analysing Moroccans, a different ethnic group. For sure, 
position allocation is highly interrelated with position acquisition.
But what can explain the differences between the earlier study of 
Surinamese and the current study on Moroccans? There are a few expla-
nations related to content that could clarify the new findings, such as 
the difference between the Surinamese and the Moroccans, and the dif-
ference between the time period in which the studies were conducted 
(1993 and 2011 respectively). There are also a few method-related expla-
nations.
The first content-related factor is related to differences between the 
Surinamese and the Moroccans. It could be argued that Surinamese 
(of any generation) have more reasons to be resentful of the history 
of Surinam as a Dutch colony, with borders that were created by the 
colonisers and with a majority of the population either being imported 
as slaves or workers or immigrating independently. This context could 
create a very different feeling of belonging than in the case of Morocco, 
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an ancient kingdom that was colonised by the French, where the effect 
of the colonists on Moroccans was probably less destabilising. Second, 
the Surinamese often mention that they do not feel fully recognised as 
Dutch in the Netherlands and become irritated with the often-asked 
question ‘Where do you come from?’, which indicates to them that the 
native Dutch see them as outsiders. In France, there is an official dis-
course and ideology of equality – though of course this doesn’t mean 
that Moroccans are actually equal to the native French. Altogether, it 
does not seem illogical that for the Surinamese, particularly the second 
generation, self-identification and their relationship with the country 
of settlement are more strongly related, while in the case of Moroccans 
these two factors are more independent of each other.
The second content-related factor that could explain the difference 
between the findings is the year in which the two surveys took place. 
The survey of the Surinamese took place in 1993 at a time when the 
atmosphere in the Netherlands was relatively friendly to immigrants, 
while the survey of the Moroccans took place in 2011 when prejudice 
and negative attitudes towards immigrants and particularly towards 
Muslims were rather common. Anti-Islamic viewpoints had become 
common in the political debate by then. It is possible that these negative 
attitudes have the effect of disconnecting Moroccans’ attitude towards 
their country of settlement from their self-identification.
Then there are two explanations that relate to methodological differ-
ences. The first difference lies in the indicators that were not exactly the 
same. The 1997 study used more indicators for position acquisition and 
only personal opinions from a survey, while the 2011 study on Moroc-
cans include more indicators for position allocation and both personal 
opinions from the survey by both Moroccans and majority respond-
ents and a mean country indicator deducted from newspaper data. As I 
argued earlier, this new conceptualisation is better. There are, however, 
no obvious reasons why the different indicators would cause a side-effect.
The second methodological issue is that the Netherlands (in the case 
of the Surinamese) is compared to six European countries (in the case 
of the Moroccans). The main purpose of this paper is to test a theoreti-
cal model for Moroccan respondents and not to compare countries, but 
the results might have been different if we had compared one country 
to one other country. Then the question would have remained whether 
comparing both groups in the Netherlands would be more suitable or 
whether comparing the country of the coloniser for both groups would 
be more suitable. I have chosen to use the large data set and see this as 
an advantage, since specific country effects were eliminated by using 
six countries.
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I end with the conclusion that Penninx’s views on these issues in 
1988 showed great thoughtfulness and forward-looking insight into the 
relevant processes under consideration in the long run. His reasoning 
has stretched to a period with a completely different social setting for 
immigrants in Europe. And even for those researchers who prefer to 
keep using the more established term ethnic identity, it is worth con-
sidering whether to include elements of position allocation to be able to 
grasp people’s consideration when forming their ethnic identity.
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Hoe hoort het eigenlijk … in Nederland? ‘How to behave correctly … 
in the Netherlands?’ This book, intended for those unfamiliar with the 
country, was presented at a meeting of municipal officials in 2006.2 The 
index runs from A for Aalsmeer, flower auction, and C for Calvin to V 
for volksaard (national character) and Z for zuurkoolstamppot met spek 
(sauerkraut hash with bacon). The authors claim to make a contribu-
tion to the feeling of being at home in the Netherlands. They argue: 
‘You can only be a full member of society if you speak the language, 
know the customs and habits and understand their background and 
importance.’ History, constitution, education, care, rules of politeness 
and many other matters are dealt with. Newcomers cannot miss what is 
characteristic of the Netherlands and the Dutch.
‘Imposing civilisation’ is not discussed in the book, nor is ‘the com-
bating of anti-social behaviour’. Nevertheless these concepts are impor-
tant for Dutch society. The country has a tradition of (re-)educating, 
civilising and opposing what is seen as anti-social or unacceptable. 
Undesirable behaviour is not tolerated and at the very least condemned: 
that is not how things should be done. What is unacceptable was and is 
continually redefined. We are supposed to know how to behave.
But what is desirable behaviour? What counts as a virtue, and which 
social virtues are appreciated? In Hoe hoort het eigenlijk … in Neder-
land?, this is not spelled out. However, if newcomers follow the guide-
lines and advice and acquire all the information, then the authors 
believe that they will become part of Dutch society and thus be incor-
porated.3 Whether Dutch society will accept them as full members is 
another matter.
In this chapter, the question of desirable behaviour is central: what 
have been the substance of, and the changes in, society’s valuation of 
virtues over the last few decades? Undoubtedly there are many answers 
to this question, depending on place, time, and age – children are not 
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expected to behave in the same way as adults. I will be attempting to 
give at least one answer, on the basis of research into Royal decorations 
in Leiden. This material gives some insight into what is considered 
exceptionally worthy behaviour and thus rewarded. This is the coun-
terpart of the punishment and combating of undesirable behaviour. 
Decorations – which for that matter are not dealt with in Hoe hoort 
het eigenlijk … in Nederland? – are signs of appreciation of particularly 
desirable behaviour. Virtues, values and norms are expressed in con-
crete rewards in the form of the royal lintjes (ribbons). Rewards and 
punishments hold social order together.4 Changes in the reasons for the 
award of Royal decorations are a reflection of changes in the definition 
of desirable behaviour. They show that the social order itself is under-
going change.
For this article I consulted the files of royal decorations in Leiden 
over the period 1974 to 2009.5 Leiden was chosen for purely practical 
reasons and will not have differed significantly from other municipal-
ities since the decoration system applies nationally. Therefore I have 
occasionally added examples from other localities as illustrations. 
Questions as to the grounds on which decorations were awarded, the 
ratio of the sexes receiving decorations and to what extent immigrants 
have been incorporated into the system will be addressed on the basis 
of both individual cases and statistical trends. This decoration system, 
it will be argued, reflects important aspects of social change.
8.2 ‘Considering the great merits’:  
 Grounds, motivations and proposers
In the 1970s and 1980s, many people were decorated on the basis of 
their long-standing employment. For one of the awarded men, N.’s fifti-
eth anniversary of service in 1984 was the reason his employer submit-
ted a proposal for a royal decoration. Before World War ii, N. started 
as ‘junior assistant at the greengrocer’s cart’. His employer described 
N’s working life: ‘Starting at six o’clock in the morning, taking the horse 
from the field, feeding it in the stables during winter. A break for his 
own meal was not possible, he had to eat his bread while selling from 
door to door. When the horse was moulting, it was sometimes bread 
with horsehair. … The work usually lasted from 7 a.m. until 7 p.m.; Sat-
urdays often until 11 o’clock in the evening.’ In the post-war years, N. be-
came involved in the export activities of the greengrocer’s firm. This did 
not mean he made less hours: ‘That work started sometimes at 3 o’clock 
in the morning and ended at 12 in the night. On Saturdays, Bank Holi-
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days and the 3 October festival too.’ Working on the third of October 
(the day celebrating the Relief of Leiden), the town’s most important 
festival! N. must have been a great exception. But he was an exceptional 
employee: ‘N. has always identified himself with the firm.’ N. received 
his decoration – the silver Honorary Medal – at his farewell celebration.
A long working life as a small businessman could also lead to a deco-
ration; the people who were decorated included hairdressers, butchers 
and plumbers. The proposals for decorations often came from family 
members, e.g. the daughter who thought that her father, who in 1979 
had run his own barbershop for 50 years, deserved a medal. She added 
that her mother had died very young and that her father had had to 
raise seven daughters on his own, among them triplets, alongside run-
ning his shop. Another self-employed individual was the 90-year old 
Miss A.v.D., landlady of a student house. She was nominated by the 
then student residents for her care of many generations of students. 
Famous and less well-known former residents supported the proposal.
During the years 1974-1989, 46.4 per cent of all proposals for medals 
were exclusively based on the grounds of exceptional merits in a long-
standing working life as employee or self-employed. In 1974, even 60.1 
per cent of the proposals were motivated as such. By 1989, that percent-
age had declined to 31.7. These percentages include the requests of the 
Ministry of Defence for medals for its employees; it was this ministry’s 
employment policy to propose decorations for those retiring or cele-
brating an anniversary. In 1994, this Ministry submitted only two pro-
posals on these grounds and none thereafter. In the period 1994-2009, 
the number of requests on the basis of long service dropped steadily to 
12.7 per cent of all proposals. In 1994, another 24.2 per cent of requests 
with this motivation were submitted, while in 2009 no such proposals 
were made.
The achievements gradually had to consist of more than long and 
outstanding working services. Social activities became more impor-
tant: 39.3 per cent of all the requests in 1974 had been submitted on the 
grounds of dedicated dutiful work in the job in combination with social 
merits. In 1994, this percentage was 42.3, rising to 53.5 per cent in 2009. 
Decorating a person based on exceptional merits in his or her field of 
employment is, however, still possible, although it is ‘tested whether 
these extraordinary merits are also of social significance for society. If 
the social relevance of exceptional merits for society cannot be estab-
lished, then it is considered to be only a matter of distinctive and exem-
plary duty fulfilment towards the employer. Decorations for that reason 
would not be granted.’6 Examples of decorations proposed by employ-
ers are the crosses of Loyalty and Merit of the Order of the same name 
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which the monarch provides to ‘those who have honourably and loyally 
assisted Us or members of Our House with meritorious and distinctive 
fulfilment of their duty or performance of their daily work.’ After 25 
years of service, the cross in silver may be awarded, and after 35 years, a 
gold cross.7 Collective labour agreements hold similar decorations. This 
type of reward forms a part of employment policies.
A.v.d.H. was nominated in 1974 on the grounds of his brilliant 
career. As a 14-year-old, he started to work as a junior clerk at the Bank 
of Dutch Municipalities. He held many positions in the organisation 
‘in an excellent and dynamic way’, until he became managing director 
in 1968. This exceptional career was the motivation of the application, 
although the elucidation also mentioned his activities as member of the 
board of various foundations and his work as local councillor.
In 1979, B. received the silver Honorary Medal, but not only for 
his long-standing work as small businessman. ‘Barber Sjakie’, self-
employed since 1938 after having worked for many years for others, 
was widely known by the Leiden population: ‘Almost every student 
from the thirties knows “barber Sjakie”. When walking through Leiden 
today with mr. B., one notices that he is greeted by many people. And 
he knows them all by name – professors, doctors and physicians.’ This 
hairdresser was an important social figure in the neighbourhood and 
this was described in detail in the proposal. Everybody could appeal to 
him: ‘The hairdresser had a telephone available, night and day. Even for 
a new suit or money, one could get help from him.’
The Orthodox Reformed Church Leiden proposed in 1987 a decora-
tion for the organist on the occasion of his 50-year jubilee. The church 
council based the proposal on a description of the qualities and the 
merits of the organist. The council also mentioned that he had always 
been a loyal church member and gave the following explanation: ‘In the 
dark years of wartime he experienced the schism and liberated himself 
of the connection to a church that imposed non-scriptural doctrines.’8 
The thoughts of the proposer resonate in the request.
Especially in the first decades studied, the contributions to society 
through social activities as volunteer often consisted of church work, 
sometimes alongside other charity work. The decorated people were 
often members of church councils, volunteers in their church, mem-
bers of church choirs, and all this for many, many years. Long-stand-
ing executive work as committee members of associations and founda-
tions was also rewarded. All kinds of social organisations in towns and 
neighbourhoods, including associations for amateur theatre, music 
and sports, could not have existed without the support of very loyal 
and dedicated volunteers. The Dutch Rabbit Breeders Association, the 
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theatre association ‘For everyone’s pleasure’, the Christian Music and 
Show Band ‘Concordia’, the organisation ‘The Hague Pilgrimages’ and 
the fencing society ‘Lunge and Parry’ are all examples of associations 
and clubs that could only exist thanks to the enormous efforts of vol-
unteers.
Being active in politics or just being a social person in the neigh-
bourhood was also very much appreciated. Professors received decora-
tions for their exceptional academic work, but often with a reference 
to the great significance of their work for society and the efforts of the 
decorated persons for work-related activities. Also sportspersons with 
great (Olympic) successes could count on a decoration.
The proposers of royal decorations were employers including the 
government administration, social organisations including churches, 
the (municipal) government – which might consider that a citizen, who 
was not its employee, had done exceptional work – as well as family, 
colleagues and other private persons. The proposers meant to thank 
people and to make them a role model. This continues to be the case.9 
Employers and boards of organisations were aware, however, that the 
glory of the decorations also reflected well on their company or organi-
sation. Often they would ask that the decoration be presented on the 
occasion of their own jubilee or other milestone.10
8.3 After 1994: Decorating ‘democratically’
A new system of royal decorations was introduced in 1994 after 30 years 
of discussion. One of the most important aspects of the revision was the 
attempted democratisation of the system through an even distribution 
of decorations over all sections of the population. It came into effect in 
1996 and still applies to this day.11 The term ‘exceptional merits’ received 
a contemporary interpretation, and contributions to society are much 
more explicitly rewarded. Rank, class or automatism were no longer 
to play a role in the awarding. Most automatisms were thus abolished, 
with the exception of decorating members of parliament.12 The Leiden 
files show indeed, as mentioned earlier, that the last ‘automatic’ pro-
posals of the Ministry of Defence date from 1994. Criticism has been 
directed, however, at decorations that have been awarded after ten years 
of membership in parliament with two re-elections: these awards are 
seen by members of the public as (unjust) automatisms. Reactions in 
the press and in the social media after the farewell of members of par-
liament in September 2012 included comments that all mps received 
awards even though one member may have performed better than the 
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other, and that moreover they are paid for their work. The explanation 
by the Chancellery does not seem sufficient.
The decoration system of 1994 consists of two Orders: the Order of 
the Lion of the Netherlands with three grades, and the Order of Orange-
Nassau with six grades. They are both honorary orders, which means 
that people can be rewarded on the basis of their personal exceptional 
merits to society. The criteria in the Protocol of Order for conferring 
describe the type of merits involved.13 A decoration in the Order of the 
Lion of the Netherlands may be granted, according to paragraph 1, to 
persons on the grounds ‘of special services of a very exceptional charac-
ter to society.’ Such services are evident when:
– someone has carried out a responsibility or has shown a capability 
which is considerably more than society could expect;
– someone has carried out activities in an excellent way from which 
society profits considerably, and especially when societal apprecia-
tion cannot be shown otherwise.
A decoration in the Order of Orange-Nassau may be granted ‘because 
of exceptional merits towards society’. These services are evident when:
– someone has made efforts for a long time for the benefit of society or 
has stimulated others;
– someone has achieved one or more remarkable performances or 
carried out activities with a special value for society.
According to paragraph 2 of the Protocol, when establishing excep-
tional merits, this can refer to someone who over a considerable period 
of time has carried out activities in a way that distinguishes him or her 
from others and gives evidence of a distinct and exemplary fulfilment 
of duty. The Protocol seems to make it still possible to decorate some-
one for his/her long-standing and exceptional employment, since there 
is no distinction made between paid and unpaid activities.
The new system was meant to disconnect social status from the grade 
of decoration. Public opinion has it that there are ‘high’ and ‘low’ deco-
rations and that the social position of the proposed determines which 
type of decoration s/he will receive. In other words, the social position 
and the grade of decoration would, contradictory to the meaning of the 
system, not be disconnected. This should not be possible, as ‘rank, class 
or automatism’ are not supposed to be of any influence.14 The Chancel-
lery explains that the majority of all proposals lead to the designation 
of Member in the Order of Orange-Nassau.15 The decorated persons 
are usually volunteers who perform their activities close to their direct 
environment and with local effect. This is the determining factor.
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The Chancellery adds that it is also possible that volunteers, but 
also members of parliament or persons with exceptional merits in 
their main position, be appointed Knight or ‘Officier’ in the Order of 
Orange-Nassau. This happens regularly, depending on the character, 
effect and intensity of the activities, at the local, provincial, national 
or international level. The next grade in the Order of Orange-Nassau 
is ‘Commandeur’. According to the Chancellery, only a few people 
on a yearly basis are appointed to this grade, which is given only for 
extremely exceptional business-like merits to society with very heavy 
responsibilities, often together with a global effect.
The idea of ‘high’ and ‘low’ decorations being associated with social 
positions is understandable. Only the existence of several grades means 
several ‘ranks’. Although merits and not the social position are exam-
ined when someone is proposed for a particular grade, this examination 
entails weighing the special merits and the importance of these merits 
for society. It is inevitable, then, that people associate a social position 
with the kind of decoration. To carry out activities that can be quali-
fied as extremely important for society, the proposed must necessarily 
hold a high social position. The former vice-prime minister and former 
royal commissioner Hans Wiegel was appointed ‘Grootofficier’ and for-
mer prime minister Jan Peter Balkenende was appointed ‘Ridder Groot-
kruis’, while the local alderman would probably be appointed Mem-
ber or Knight in the Order of Orange-Nassau. In the current system, 
‘Barber Sjakie’ would receive a decoration no ‘higher’ than Member.
Columnist Frits Abrahams of newspaper nrc Handelsblad articu-
lated his difficulties with distinctions in decorations.16 He wrote about 
his experience witnessing the annual presentation of decorations by 
the then deputy mayor Asscher in Amsterdam. He commented: ‘Most 
people received appointments as member or “Knight” in the Order of 
Orange-Nassau. “Knight” is a step higher than Member. So it could 
happen that a nearly 90-year old lady who had for years collected par-
cels of clothing for the poor in Hungary and Africa, only could become 
“ Member”, although Asscher told her: I bow to you, a golden citizen of 
Amsterdam.’ Abrahams concluded: ‘One bows to knights, not to mem-
bers. Away with the distinctions!’
8.4 Women, voluntary work and immigrants
The new system was intended to show more appreciation for women, 
volunteers and immigrants. In Leiden, a small proportion of those dec-
orated were women. In 1974, 13 per cent of them were women, and in 
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1994 the proportion had even declined to 9 per cent. In 1981, a well-
informed citizen wrote: ‘For some years I have noticed that it is above 
all men from the confessional parties who receive Royal decorations. I 
am glad to say that in our town there is a woman, not from such a party 
who – at least in my opinion – deserves such a distinction.’ By 2004, 
the situation had improved, and 31 per cent of the proposals were for 
women, but the trend did not continue, and in 2009 the proportion of 
women was still 30 per cent.
The entry of women into the decoration system was not easy, but 
this difficulty can be explained, at least partially. Originally, in the 1970s 
and 1980s, people with a long career were rewarded. Later, those who 
were active in society in addition to their main job were also given 
decorations. These people had thus been in paid employment from the 
1930s or 1940s. This effectively restricted the choice to men and unmar-
ried women; at least until the 1950s, it was assumed that the husband 
earned the money and his wife remained at home and cared for the 
family. Indeed, until 1956, married women could not enter into a labour 
contract without their husband’s permission, and only in 1957 was the 
prohibition lifted on married women working in government service. 
From the 1960s, the level of participation of women in the labour mar-
ket has slowly increased. Women were thus long unable to build their 
careers in the same way as men.
In 1979, the staff of a well-known Leiden establishment took the ini-
tiative to campaign for a royal decoration for its director on his retire-
ment. His achievements were impressive and the proposal was widely 
supported, by the mayor of Leiden, the university and other organisa-
tions. It was notable that all the supporters commented that M.’s wife 
also deserved a decoration. Not only had she performed some of the 
tasks in question, but it was regularly commented that everything 
revolved around her. A request was presented for both of them, but 
the Queen’s Commissioner replied that the Minister ‘had not found 
enough grounds to award a Royal decoration to Mrs. N.M.-de G’.
It would appear also that long social activity as a volunteer in many 
organisations, church work and clubs was long the preserve of men. 
Certainly within the churches, official tasks were generally performed 
by men. It is also possible that it was precisely women, with their rela-
tively low level of participation in the labour market, who did much 
of the volunteer work, particularly caring for the elderly and needy in 
their direct surroundings. These often quite remarkable merits were not 
to be honoured, however, as was shown in a letter from 2005: ‘Strange 
as it may seem, individual care is entirely outside the decoration sys-
tem, as otherwise no limits could be set.’
lauded in leiden 113
The Leiden files reflect the increasing importance given to social 
achievements, usually volunteer work. This is shown not just by the 
appreciation of achievements in addition to paid employment, but also 
from those proposals that were exclusively on the basis of exceptional 
social merits. In the period 1974-1989, 16 per cent of the proposals had 
this motivation, but in the period 1994-2009 that percentage had risen 
to 48.2 per cent. The increase began in 1989, at 33.3 per cent, as opposed 
to a mere 7 per cent in 1984 and reached an absolute high point in 2004 
at 62.1 per cent.
In Amsterdam, too, it was above all volunteer work that was rewarded. 
In 2010, the deputy mayor commented at the above-mentioned cere-
mony: ‘You are the social capital that our city requires’, and the columnist 
Abrahams believed that no exaggeration. ‘There are so many volunteers 
who have sacrificed half their lives for others, whether in the handball 
club (a favourite sport among those who receive decorations), the social 
centre the Merry Witch (Hippe Heks) or in the coffee bar for the home-
less.’ There are also what might seem to be competing rewards for volun-
teers, such as the Co Verhoog Prize for the Leiden volunteer of the year.
Slowly, but definitely, attention began to be paid to minority groups, 
also in Leiden.17 The first case, in 1998, concerned a woman who had 
been born in Curaçao and who was proposed by her employer; in 2001, 
a man from Surinam was proposed by someone of the same back-
ground; and in 2002, a foundation for Turks in the Netherlands pro-
posed an award for a Turkish citizen of Leiden. In 2004, proposals were 
received from an Aruban family member for a Leidenaar from that 
island, and for a Turkish Leidenaar from a member of his family who 
had lived in the city, and in 2005 for a Surinamese Leidenaar from an 
inhabitant of The Hague who had come from Surinam. It is notable that 
the initiative came from the immigrant groups but that the proposals 
were supported by non-immigrants as well.
8.5 Rejection and refusal
On occasion, a proposal would be rejected because the achievements 
were not considered remarkable or long-lasting enough, or because 
they were (in part) remunerated or had already ended. ‘It is not an au-
tomatism that a proposal for a decoration … will be honoured. The 
decoration is not a scatter-gun’, a 1995 Leiden circular declared in a 
rather severe manner.18 According to this circular, a decoration would 
only be awarded for ‘very exceptional/remarkable personal achieve-
ments for society’ that have demonstrated continuity.
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There is always an inquiry beforehand to check that the candidate 
is of unimpeachable reputation. The police and judicial authorities do 
a background check, which is followed by a decision on whether any-
thing in the person’s background would prevent the award of the deco-
ration.19 Minor offences such as poaching, committed once, were not 
held against a candidate for long. Repeated (traffic) offences prevent an 
award for fifteen years. One citizen of Leiden who had received a fine 
and an unconditional ten days in jail in addition to a conditional sen-
tence did receive a royal decoration eighteen years later.
However, no pardon was ever given to someone with a war past. Pro-
German and nsb sympathisers could never be decorated, even when 
the individual concerned denied the accusation flatly. One particularly 
painful case occurred in the 1980s when an unsuspecting employer 
proposed an employee who had done her work for many years remark-
ably well, as was demonstrated extensively and with much appreciation. 
However, the individual in question turned out to have been a member 
of the nsb as late as 1944 and to have remained very pro-German up to 
the end of the war. Various incidents confirming this were mentioned. 
After the War, she had been condemned to be interned for just under 
a year. The employer was informed that this employee would not be 
given a royal decoration.
Refusals did occur occasionally without any reason being given, or 
merely because the person to be awarded would ‘not appreciate’ such 
a decoration, or because the individual felt there was no reason for the 
achievements to be rewarded. In 2004, one Leiden citizen refused a 
decoration because she considered the award in question to be of 
too low a rank. Republican motives are also a well-known reason for 
refusal. The Dordrecht poet, Jan Eijkelboom, who was anyway very 
selective in the acceptance of distinctions, was not prepared to accept a 
royal decoration because: ‘I belong with Jan de Witt, not with Orange-
Nassau’, thus referring to his seventeenth-century townsman Johan de 
Witt, the raadpensionaris who had been the most powerful politician in 
the country during the high days of the Republic, the first stadhouder-
less period.20 Literary figures from Leiden such as Rudy Kousbroek and 
Anton Korteweg had no such qualms; they accepted their decorations.
The Leiden files reveal the great appreciation that those decorated 
had for their award. Many sent a letter to the mayor after the presenta-
tion in which they not only thanked him for the impressive gathering 
at the town hall but also relayed their pride and pleasure. They felt they 
were being recognised for their achievements. Some wrote that, given 
what they had done, they did not consider their award necessary, but 
were above all touched by the fact that so many people had made an 
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effort to request an award for them, and precisely for this reason had 
accepted it.
8.6 In conclusion
This chapter has addressed the central question: what have been the 
substance of, and the changes in, society’s valuation of virtues over the 
last few decades? Exceptional and continuous achievements performed 
over a long period form the basis for the award of royal decorations. 
This was true for the whole period under examination, from 1974-2009. 
What did change, however, was what were considered achievements 
and virtues – in other words, what was perceived as praiseworthy. The 
most evident change was the shift from recognising long and notable 
performance in paid employment to acknowledging long and notable 
work as an unpaid volunteer. The qualities that were rewarded in the 
old system were decades of hard work, no illness, not bothering about 
an extra hour or more, great efforts for the firm, a strong identification 
with the company, providing assistance to younger colleagues and be-
ing willing to train them. For those who worked for themselves, com-
parable qualities were appreciated. These virtues could be seen as indi-
rect contributions to society.
Gradually, these qualities came to be considered insufficient; more 
and more attention was paid to social work carried out in addition to 
the main employment, until a person’s social work alone came to rep-
resent almost half of the awards. The often impressive and long-term 
work performed by volunteers can be seen as a direct contribution to 
society. If the decorated employee was seen as a pillar of the company, 
the volunteer is a pillar of society as a whole.
These changes highlight and reflect changes in society. The sem-
blance of social stability has disappeared. By 2009, the final year that was 
researched, it was neither likely nor desirable for a person to remain so 
long with a single employer. Temporary contracts are common and dis-
missals have become easier. Unlike in the immediate post-war period 
when working for 30, 40 or even 50 years in the same firm was consid-
ered laudable, employees are nowadays encouraged to change jobs reg-
ularly, particularly early in their career, in order to develop their skills 
and acquire different kinds of experience. Equally, the increased num-
ber of women and the slow entry of migrants and their children among 
those proposing or being proposed for decoration are equally signs of 
social change. Immigrants have accommodated to the system, if as yet 
to a lesser degree.
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A system of awards such as the royal decoration system makes it 
possible to direct approved behaviour. The introduction of the new sys-
tem in 1994-1996 allowed social changes to be reflected in the criteria 
for awards, but the criteria themselves were definitions of praiseworthy 
behaviour. Royal decorations are there to reward, to recognise and to 
encourage. They put people and their virtues in the spotlight. There 
are, however, other ways to honour the deserving, which may say more. 
These, I believe, include the recognition by his students of Professor 
Rinus Penninx in this volume.
Notes
1 I would like to thank first Robert Ross for his stimulating and critical comments 
which have been very valuable for this article and for his help in the realisation of 
this text in English, and also the municipality of Leiden, especially Chef Kabinet 
H.E.G.M. van Woerden, as well as A. Sharaby and his colleagues of the archive 
department for generously making available the studied files, and for their inter-
est, help and hospitality.
2 Kelly Snel & Janke van der Zaag (2006), Hoe hoort het eigenlijk … in Nederland? 
Haarlem. The book is an introduction to Dutch society and as such is aimed at 
immigrants.
3 See Rinus Penninx (1988) in Minderheidsvorming en emancipatie. Balans van 
kennisverwerving ten aanzien van immigranten en woonwagenbewoners 1967-1987, 
Alphen aan den Rijn/Brussel, chapter iii. According to Penninx, the idea that 
newcomers have of themselves and the idea that the receiving society has of them 
determine the ethno-cultural position they acquire. The ethno-cultural position 
of newcomers and their descendants can be defined as the degree to which they 
see themselves as different and are seen by society as different [my italics]. The 
ethno-cultural position is influenced by ideological aspects including norms, 
ideas, treatment, image, stereotypes and possibly stigmatisation. This would sug-
gest that it is very much the question whether newcomers would be accepted as 
full members of society if they absorbed Hoe hoort het eigenlijk ... in Nederland?.
4 Kees Bruin (1989), Kroon op het werk. Onderscheiden in het Koninkrijk der Neder-
landen, Meppel/Amsterdam, p. 208.
5 With a sample of requests and grants from one year in five. Leiden Town Hall, 
Kabinetsarchief, Koninklijke Onderscheidingen 1974, 1979, 1984, 1989, 1994, 
1999, 2004, 2009. The examples and quotations in this article can all be found in 
the files for the year in question. For reasons of privacy, initials have been used 
instead of the full name.
6 J.P. Kruimel & J.C. van Ingen (1997), Van bijzondere verdiensten tot Koninklijke 
Onderscheidingen, Den Haag, p. 58.
7 www.koninklijkhuis.nl/encyclopedie/monarchie/onderscheidingen/huisorden.
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8 The church council referred to the schism of 1944 led by the theology professor 
Klaas Schilder.
9 According to the head of the Office Bureau of the Municipality of Leiden.
10 See e.g. Royal Decorations 1989.
11 Decoration system 1994: www.lintjes.nl (website of the Chancellery of the Dutch 
Orders).
12 Because judging their work already takes place by the elections for representative 
bodies, according to the Chancellery (www.lintjes.nl). The functioning of mem-
bers of supervisory bodies with direct mandate of the electorate cannot become 
subject of judging by the same supervisory bodies.
13 Reglement op de Orde van de Nederlandse Leeuw en de Orde van Oranje-Nassau, 
chapter 1, Verleningscriteria, paragraph 1 and 2, according to the text on 29 Octo-
ber 2012, www.lintjes.nl (my italics and emphasis).
14 www.lintjes.nl.
15 Chancellery’s explanation in e-mail 26 October 2012.
16 nrc Handelsblad, 30 April 2010.
17 The investigation into possible decorations for people of ethnic minorities in Lei-
den was carried out for each year during the period 1974-2009 focusing mainly 
on ‘traditional’ immigrants from Surinam, the Antilles, Turkey and Morocco, but 
a number of proposals were also found relating to people from Indonesia/the 
Dutch East Indies, the u.s. and several European countries.
18 See Informatie c.q. richtlijnen conform Orde-Reglement Stb1995 nr264, besluit 10 
mei 1995, box 1999.
19 Cited in a letter from the Minister of the Interior and Kingdom Relations, 5 Octo-
ber 2006.
20 Personal information from L. Eijkelboom, the poet’s sister.
Archives
Gemeente Leiden, Kabinetsarchief, Koninklijke Onderscheidingen 1974-2009.
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9 Anancy stories and drumming
Indelible African practices
Lina Pochet Rodríguez
Different Afro-cultural manifestations preserved prints that have spread 
along with the African diaspora (Clifford 1999) throughout areas such 
as the Caribbean. These cultural practices have become a starting point 
in the re-elaboration and dissipation of the social dynamics of Afri-
can descendants in the Americas. Some examples of these are “drum-
ming”, the act of playing drums, and “Anancy stories”, the tales of the 
Spider Anancy whose origin can be traced to the Akan people from 
Ghana, Togo and Ivory Coast. This study attempts to formulate a par-
allelism between both cultural practices – that is, Anancy Stories and 
drumming. My recent research on 150 Anancy stories carried out in 
the Colombian archipelago of San Andres, Old Providence, and Santa 
Catalina and the Costa Rican Caribbean province of Limon inspired 
me to explore this parallelism, since drumming is also an outstanding 
practice for recalling and spreading an African past, but above all for 
provoking a transgression against the establishment. Thus, the purpose 
of this work is to point out how Anancy stories and drumming encom-
pass some similarities such as the presence of a griot, a trickster, impro-
visation, performance and a rupture with standardised norms.
Anancy stories form part of a remarkable group of African cultural 
practices based on oral tradition. These tales imply a sort of representa-
tion related to a performance in which words give life to things, acts, 
events, environments and conflicts kept in the imagination of the com-
munity. An oral representation has two components: a person who 
transmits tradition and the gender, in this case Anancy’s stories, through 
which this tradition is shown. Related to this, the person who transmits 
tradition is called the “griot”, or “griotte” when the narrator is a woman.
A griot is a kind of bard. Griots can be musicians and transmit old 
songs; they are ambassadors and courtiers that negotiate between 
families if there is a conflict. Griots can also be historians or poets or 
the three above-mentioned things at the same time (my translation of 
De Friedemann 1997: 27).
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The griot is both an oral historian and an African storyteller in charge 
of keeping events, anecdotes and music alive as the organiser of every-
day life activities. Griots are very emblematic since they are authorised, 
without any restrain, to denounce and criticise both corruption and 
exploitation. They are also entitled to entertain, celebrate or partake in 
funerals (Todd 1996).
Drumming belongs to the category of an African tradition, just like 
Anancy stories. Drumming represents a way of giving meaning to life 
and rhythm to the spoken word and, according to Todd (1996), it is 
present in common gatherings and daily activities as well as in festivals 
and funerals. Thus drums are also unrestricted to “animate” or “mourn”, 
depending on the occasion (Todd 1996: 102).
The drummer resembles the griot; therefore, one can say that drum-
ming also demands a performer who is the one who carries a certain 
message whose content is subliminal since it is not conveyed by con-
ventional means – that is, a standardised language – but in a particular 
code that transmits information and communicates plans. In the case 
of slavery, drumming warned captives or maroons of the master’s pres-
ence. Consequently, performance is also part of both Anancy stories 
and drumming since they both require the presence of a protagonist to 
enact the activity.
Both Anancy stories and drumming share the quality of improvisa-
tion. Two performances are never the same. Anancy stories as well as 
drumming are constantly being reinvented and innovated since they 
are not meant to be written down, though some have been compiled 
in books or recordings. However, stories and beats may be memorised 
and modifications may take place, since they are not the patrimony 
of an author. Thus each narrator or performer incorporates changes 
depending on their sex, age, interest, location or some breaking news 
that needs to be spread (Pochet 2012).
Anancy stories and drumming stand on improvisation. In Anancy 
stories, if a story loses its relevance because of changing values and 
social conditions, that story is discarded or modified and new ones are 
produced. The oral storyteller or griot does not simply memorise and 
repeat the same story the same way each time. In the case of drum-
ming, a spontaneous creation is built upon a ludic activity that implies 
a celebration (Ortiz 1952). The means the griot uses to communicate is 
words, the means drumming communicates is the beats.
Los tambores dan las pulsasiones del alma Africana. En el bosque, en el 
desierto … en todas partes resuenan. El sonido del tambor es en África 
un gran aglutinante social. Enlaza y une al pueblo en unas mismas fun-
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ciones colectivas, dándoles su ritmo, su ordenación, su vehemencia y su 
fe (Ortiz 1952: 9).
Another common trait of both Anancy stories and drumming is the 
“trickster”, an ambiguous character that opens paths to achieve un- 
imaginable deeds through his cunning and intelligence. The spider 
Anancy and the drummers, as protagonists of cultural practices, enclose 
the presence of a trickster who studies the weaknesses of the rivals and 
the opportunity to satisfy basic needs. In this regard, the trickster uses 
this knowledge for his/her own self-needs, interests or amusement, or 
to escape social responsibilities (Pochet 2008).
… like Anancy, must use all his resources of verbal trickery to mock 
the powerful while entertaining and, above all impressing both them 
and the powerless with his prowess as performer, mime, and master 
of words (Burton 1997: 188).
Tricksters exist on the peripheries of social order and are constantly 
questioning and defying norms, breaking with rigid and unfair patterns 
set by the establishment. To be able to do this, a trickster denounces 
injustice and uses his cunning to cope with everyday anguish, pain and 
tribulations though generally achieving his goals. Nevertheless, it does 
not matter if the goal is not achieved since his courage and intelligence, 
two of his attributes, always allow him to quickly visualise a new strat-
egy to defeat the powerful and oppressing groups and finally succeed 
in surviving in harsh contexts or circumstances. Thus, Anancy and the 
drummers become emblematic figures due to their defiant nature, since 
they both encompass a trickster that disrupts the social order.
Drumming and Anancy stories have challenged dominant sys-
tems in different ways: criticising corruption, ridiculing the powerful, 
denouncing bribery, making fun of serious matters, and defeating the 
rich are just some examples of their transgression.
These cultural manifestations are inserted in the popular sector. The 
people are the basis of any society, and the production of cultural mani-
festations is in their hands, too. In the case of these African societies, 
they have been able to survive large-scale struggles that have helped 
them maintain an African identity in the countries that contain an 
indelible African ingredient. Anancy stories and drumming have car-
ried out this self-reaffirming element of a community that will always 
find a way to survive and succeed through transgression of the estab-
lishment.
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The settling of large groups of non-Western immigrants in the Nether-
lands in the post-war period prompted the development of a national 
minority policy, subsequently followed by a policy on migrant integra-
tion. These national policies for settled immigrants and their descend-
ants came into effect at the end of the 1970s. The Ministry of the Inte-
rior, in its coordinating role at the time, stipulated that all other relevant 
ministries were to develop minority policies for their particular fields.
In the 1990s, I was a civil servant at the Ministry of Welfare, Health 
and Culture and was co-responsible for its minority policy in the field 
of culture. I was fascinated and surprised by the way this policy for 
immigrants and culture functioned in practice, once it had legally taken 
effect. As a result, I decided to study more closely how it had developed 
between 1980 and 2004. Moreover, I was interested to know how the 
culture of immigrants was incorporated into the texts of the overall 
cultural policy documents and how the implementation instruments 
for this policy related to the existing implementation arrangements for 
Dutch cultural policy as a whole.
The research for my dissertation entitled Beleid voor Cultuur en 
Immigranten (in English: A policy for culture and immigrants) focused 
on the time up to 2004. Since then, Dutch policy on culture has changed 
dramatically under the first cabinet of Prime Minster Mark Rutte. In 
this article I will outline the recent developments using the approach 
I relied on in my dissertation. In doing so, it will also become clear 
whether my approach is appropriate for this task.
10.2 Approach of my research on the period 1980-2004
In the framework of my research into the policy on culture and immi-
grants in the period 1980-2004, I tried to find an effective approach to 
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address the issues mentioned above regarding the incorporation and 
implementation of the culture of immigrants in the general policies and 
in the existing implementation arrangements. In a survey of the field, I 
described various conceptions of culture that have developed from the 
nineteenth century onwards. I also outlined the history of government 
intervention in the cultural field in the Netherlands. This outline shows 
the prominent role played by private initiative in funding expressions 
of culture and art, which favoured both the production of art and the 
attempt to stimulate moral education and the well-being of communi-
ties through participation in art. Gradually, the shape of government 
intervention in culture emerges: the banning of cultural manifestations 
was replaced by the co-financing of their production and conservation.
The sequence of cultural policies after 1945 shows how the tenor of 
the debate has alternated between two conceptual focal points: inter-
est in facilitating the development of autonomous art on the one hand 
and widespread popular participation in subsidised and other cultural 
manifestations on the other. The survey concludes with an outline of 
the structure of cultural policies in the Netherlands, with the most 
important institutions and procedures. These include the organisation 
of quality assessments and subsidy procedures.
Using existing approaches in public administration studies, I devel-
oped a method enabling a systematic description and analysis of the 
development of policies relating to culture and immigrants and the way 
they were adopted in the texts and implementation measures of overall 
cultural policy in the Netherlands.
As a starting point, I used Fischer’s approach to policy evaluation 
(1995, 2003). It is essentially a system of charting four interrelated levels 
of policy debate and evaluation. The great merit of Fischer’s approach is 
that it enables the combination of the normative and empirical elements 
of a policy. In the processes of policy development and implementation, 
actors – institutions or individuals – and their views play an important 
role. Each one of these actors in a policy domain holds normative views 
of that domain. In combination with the actor’s own position and expe-
rience in the field, these views underpin that actor’s definition of the 
problem and the desired role of the government according to that actor.
In any particular domain, some actors are more dominant than oth-
ers, and institutions are particularly dominant among the actors. In the 
field of culture, a number of established subsidised organisations may 
be defined as institutions in the broad sense. I consider the creation of 
a policy and its implementation as an interaction between the views of 
relevant actors. I view the text of the policy document as the result of 
that interaction during the development stage.
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As an elaboration of Fischer’s approach, I used the different views on 
culture that arose from the nineteenth century onwards to define the 
conceptual worlds underlying the visions on policy in the cultural sec-
tor. I use the term conceptual world to describe the entire set of convic-
tions an actor holds on culture and the role of the government.
In my perception, the following conceptual worlds can be distin-
guished. In the first and predominant vision, indicated by the symbol 
(kk) in the schedule, the production of quality art is the central pillar. 
In its essence, this vision is the intellectual legacy of the Romantic era: 
good art is absolute, universal, unbound by time and context, and its 
makers are geniuses. In addition, this vision includes the view that art 
is confined to a specific number of genres.
In the second approach (P), art has its own importance, but partici-
pation in art and its effect on the population are central elements. Par-
ticipation may consist of visits to expressions of art, but also of actively 
practising art. The origin of this vision also dates back to the nineteenth 
century, in its pursuit of popular improvement through art and the civi-
lising effect of its dissemination. Within this approach, two views on 
participation can be distinguished. The fundamental conviction, which 
I have symbolised as pk, focuses on the idea that ordinary people will 
develop into better human beings if they are brought into contact with 
‘higher’ or ‘respectable’ forms of art and culture. In the other perspec-
tive (pp), the central idea is that people must be given the opportunity 
to inform themselves widely on art and culture, including popular or 
mass culture, to be able to make informed choices with respect to the 
active or passive participation in art and culture. In the cultural poli-
cies up to 1980, both the production of top-quality art and the recep-
tion of and active participation in art and culture were broadly accepted 
grounds for state financial support.
The third view (kc) holds that art is not absolute, but determined by 
context: art will always be created under specific conditions in a specific 
situation. In any judgement on (the quality of) artistic manifestations, 
context will play a part and no judgement can therefore be ‘universal’ in 
nature, as the romantic-universal kk approach states. This view arises 
in the debate on cultural policies after 1980, with the arrival of large 
groups of immigrants in the Netherlands and the growing awareness, 
within the government, that they were here to stay.
The conceptual worlds (kk, kc, pk and pp) consist of essential con-
victions, a priority of values, a problem analysis or grounds for govern-
ment intervention based on these, and a vision about the desired degree 
of government intervention. I regard the conceptual worlds specified 
above as the (ideal-typical) fundamental views in cultural policy.
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table 10.1 Overview of conceptual worlds
Conceptual world
K 
Key notions: Art and production of art Conceptual world
P 
Key notions: Spreading of and participation in art and culture
Normative presuppositions Normative presuppositions
Essential conviction kk
Good art is an absolute; not 
bound to time and context; 
made by a genius (dating back 
to 19th century).
kc
Art has its existence relative 
to a context. There is always 
a context within which art is 
produced and valued (from 
1980 onwards). 
Essential conviction pk
The common man benefits 
from an acquaintance 
with art and culture. 
Civilisation movement.
(end of the 19th century 
and after ww ii)
pp
Art must be open for active 
or receptive participation to 
everyone with a wish to do so.
Participation in art gives meaning 
to life and connects people; 
provides social cohesion and 
contributes to the wellbeing of 
citizens. (from 1960 onwards)
Priority of values Artists and art first, before 
audience (and context).
Context first,  
then the art products.
Priority of values The edifying effect of art 
on man before art as a goal 
in itself. 
Informed participation of citizens 
in (the practising of) art, before 
art as a goal in its own right.
Essential convictions at the policy level Essential convictions at the policy level
Grounds for govern- 
ment intervention. 
Definition of the 
problem
Without state support there 
is insufficient quality art; 
the market is not sufficiently 
interested; correction of the 
market is needed. 
Same, but quality art is not  
an unambiguous concept.
Grounds for govern- 
ment intervention. 
Definition of the 
problem
The common man must 
also come into contact 
with beauty and artistic 
enjoyment.
There must be sufficient facilities 
to practise, watch, view or listen  





Substantial as regards funding. 
Limited as regards decisions 
on spending the Financial 
support.
Assessment by specialists.
Same, but quality art is not  
an unambiguous concept.
Assessors must be chosen 










education and elsewhere, 
for expression of kk 
character.
Limited, facilitating to amateur art 
Substantial, for receptive 
participation: offering 
opportunities through education 
and elsewhere.
My study of the policy and its implementation consists of a detailed 
descriptive analysis of the development and implementation of the 
1999 policy bill Ruim Baan voor Culturele Diversiteit.1 Prior to this, a 
summary treatment of the policy documents relevant to this study was 
undertaken, from the period 1980-2001.These are, in historical order, 
the 1982 Actieplan Cultuuruitingen van Migranten,2 the Beleidsnotitie 
Cultuuruitingen van Etnische Minderheden 1987-19893 and the Brief 
over het Categoriale Beleid Kunstuitingen van Minderheden 1990-1992.4 
Finally, the passage ‘Intercultureel’ 5 from Pantser of Ruggengraat6 from 
the 1997-2001 cultural policy is reviewed. In each case, the focus was 
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table 10.1 Overview of conceptual worlds
Conceptual world
K 
Key notions: Art and production of art Conceptual world
P 
Key notions: Spreading of and participation in art and culture
Normative presuppositions Normative presuppositions
Essential conviction kk
Good art is an absolute; not 
bound to time and context; 
made by a genius (dating back 
to 19th century).
kc
Art has its existence relative 
to a context. There is always 
a context within which art is 
produced and valued (from 
1980 onwards). 
Essential conviction pk
The common man benefits 
from an acquaintance 
with art and culture. 
Civilisation movement.
(end of the 19th century 
and after ww ii)
pp
Art must be open for active 
or receptive participation to 
everyone with a wish to do so.
Participation in art gives meaning 
to life and connects people; 
provides social cohesion and 
contributes to the wellbeing of 
citizens. (from 1960 onwards)
Priority of values Artists and art first, before 
audience (and context).
Context first,  
then the art products.
Priority of values The edifying effect of art 
on man before art as a goal 
in itself. 
Informed participation of citizens 
in (the practising of) art, before 
art as a goal in its own right.
Essential convictions at the policy level Essential convictions at the policy level
Grounds for govern- 
ment intervention. 
Definition of the 
problem
Without state support there 
is insufficient quality art; 
the market is not sufficiently 
interested; correction of the 
market is needed. 
Same, but quality art is not  
an unambiguous concept.
Grounds for govern- 
ment intervention. 
Definition of the 
problem
The common man must 
also come into contact 
with beauty and artistic 
enjoyment.
There must be sufficient facilities 
to practise, watch, view or listen  





Substantial as regards funding. 
Limited as regards decisions 
on spending the Financial 
support.
Assessment by specialists.
Same, but quality art is not  
an unambiguous concept.
Assessors must be chosen 










education and elsewhere, 
for expression of kk 
character.
Limited, facilitating to amateur art 
Substantial, for receptive 
participation: offering 
opportunities through education 
and elsewhere.
on the character of the reasoning behind the policy and on how the 
intended policy was in fact implemented.
10.3 Findings: policies from 1980-2004
The most important findings were the following. The ever-shifting 
terms used for policies and their target groups reflect the various ways 
in which a policy problem can be approached from a variety of visions. 
Also reflected is the discomfort in nominating a group of people as 
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the target group of a specific policy. Repeatedly, (vice) ministers with a 
romantic-universal bent describe cultural expressions for immigrants 
as “somewhere between amateur and professional” or as “semi-profes-
sional”. This creates room for those in power to take specific measures, 
and the established institutions for professional art need not concern 
themselves with the cultural expressions of immigrants.
In most policy texts, lines of reasoning are used which reflect the 
desire to view the policy in question as an exponent of participation 
policy, already a well-known phenomenon in cultural policy. This can 
easily be understood, because this way of thinking about cultural pol-
icy had for long been accepted by all actors. For parts of the policy 
for culture and immigrants, this is a fruitful way of thinking, but this 
approach is not beneficial to the recognition of the work of immigrant 
artists, nor is it sufficient.
A pattern repeatedly seen is that the problem definition and goals in 
the texts contain kc (contextual) lines of reasoning more often than can 
be recovered from the intended measures. The size (limited resources) 
and (specific) nature of the measures is always acceptable for the pro-
ponents of the romantic-universal (kk) approach.
Concerning measures, we can conclude that specific measures were 
used during the entire period under study. The established institutions 
hardly play a role in the implementation of the policy for culture and 
immigrants. Although the vice minister at the time tried to make estab-
lished institutions play a role in the policy on diversity in 1999, he too 
was unsuccessful.
The specific measures were mostly deployed for the funding of pro-
jects. Besides, successive (vice) ministers created specific institutions: 
stipt (1981-1986), mmf (1989-1991), Scarabes (1988-1997), Phenix 
Foundation (2001-2005), Netwerk cs (2001-2008) and Atana (2001-
today). In the context of Ruim Baan (Clearing the way), an Action Plan 
for the Dissemination of Culture was set up, together with local and 
regional authorities, with the aim of promoting cultural participation. 
The specific institutions mentioned always enjoyed a relatively short 
lifespan, because too many responsibilities were imposed upon them, 
including the duty to establish a relationship with the regular cultural 
institutions. This task proved an impossible one, because for the regular 
institutions there was no obligation whatsoever to play a role under the 
specific policy for culture and immigrants.
The long-lasting availability of project funding had more than one 
effect. For the institutions under regular funding, it worked as a legiti-
mate excuse not to concern themselves with the subject. As a result, 
over the years a number of relatively strong specific institutions arose 
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alongside the regular institutions, which had a limited, marginal role in 
the cultural field as a whole but were active for many years. For them, 
the existing situation was to their advantage in that they were able to 
grow further in relative peace. The policy of the day both isolated the 
cultural expressions of immigrants and immigrant artists and created 
opportunities for them.
The institutional strength of the established cultural institutions, 
mostly working from a romantic-universal kk-vision, was powerful all 
through the period under study. These institutions acquired their insti-
tutional character thanks to the long years and the almost automatic 
nature of their funding. Moreover, for a long time they played a key 
role in the process in which the policy memorandum on culture was 
conceived.
These institutions always influenced the course taken on policies 
for culture and immigrants precisely because, as important pillars sup-
porting cultural policy as a whole, they played no role in that specific 
policy. As (vice) ministers in charge do not call on these institutions to 
play a possible role and those in charge feel they need to do something 
at least, the government members create the specific institutions men-
tioned, whose task it is to establish the relationship between the cul-
tural expressions of immigrants and the established institutions.
Although the wish to integrate specific policies into the overall line 
of thinking was expressed as a policy target as early as 1987, in practice, 
specific texts were drawn up and specific measures designed and taken.
In the general texts on cultural policy, room was created for contex-
tual (kc) lines of reasoning in some cases, up until 1999. In 1999, Vice 
Minister Rick Van der Ploeg used such contextual (kc) reasoning in his 
basic assumptions underlying the general policy on culture, as regards 
essential convictions, problem analysis and policy goals. However, due 
to interventions by the cultural sector and by parliament, no follow-
up was found in the subsequent cultural policy memorandum or the 
implementation of that policy.
With the long life of specific implementation arrangements and the 
associated phenomenon of established institutions playing no role, or 
hardly any, in the policy for culture and immigrants, led to the conclu-
sion that the attempted embedding in regular facilities did not mate-
rialise. What did happen was that the broad spectrum of regularly 
funded institutions saw the arrival of a number of institutions of a mul-
ticultural nature, which can be viewed as a form of integration (albeit 
unintended) in the overall cultural policy.
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10.4 A closer scrutiny
It has remained a most remarkable fact that up to now the wish for 
the integration of specific policy into general policy was repeatedly and 
emphatically expressed by (vice) ministers, but that the way in which 
they acted with respect to implementing these policies was constantly 
at odds with these wishes. The question of why this could have been the 
case requires a discussion of the interplay of the forces between actors 
and of the factors that contribute to the supremacy of the (romantic-
universal) kk way of thinking.
A taste of his own medicine
Vice minister Van der Ploeg was forced to adjust his proposal on the 
implementation of the measures, which granted institutions an explicit 
role in the policy on diversity. This course of action would seem sur-
prising: after all, the vice minister wished to realise the long-standing 
policy target to integrate the specific policies in the general cultural 
policy.
However, governments of the day were in the habit of subsidis-
ing the large institutions (with a kk vision) without asking too many 
questions. Both the authorities and the cultural sector itself held the 
view that the authorities must not interfere with artistic content; in the 
course of time it also became an issue whether the request to institu-
tions to increase the number of visitors or invest more in educational 
work affected the artistic content of their work. The authorities usually 
kept very much at a distance in discussions of this type.
As a consequence, a practice arose over time in which the govern-
ment started to realise goals of participation and innovation outside 
the established institutions. In 2001, the vice minister got a taste of his 
own medicine; the long-standing tradition of non-intervention and the 
realisation of participation goals via specific programmes and institu-
tions turned out to be more powerful than the minister’s wish to bring 
about change.
The foundation of all of this is the interplay between the government 
and the sector, to which the government contributed in large meas-
ure. It is precisely the institutional character of the funding to large 
institutions and the tradition to incorporate goals of participation and 
innovation in special programmes which led to the outcome that estab-
lished institutions hardly made any room for the cultural expressions 
of immigrants.
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Conflicting conceptual worlds
Due to the emergence of contextual (kc) lines of reasoning in policy 
debates, the existing relationship between the romantic-universal (kk) 
and participatory (P) convictions shifted. This relationship was char-
acterised by a reciprocal acceptance of each other’s conceptual world 
and the size of the government funding allocated. The growing impor-
tance of cultural expressions of immigrants and of the contextual ap-
proach (kc) meant that proponents of the romantic-universal (kk) line 
of thinking had to close their doors on this new approach, as it was 
alien to the notion of quality and competitive in terms of content. This 
could be achieved by awarding a separate position to the cultural ex-
pressions of immigrants and by allocating limited funding. In this way, 
the romantic-universal (kk) views on quality and the spending of exist-
ing financial resources would not come under pressure.
It appeared opportune to categorise the cultural expressions of 
immigrants in terms of the existing balance between advocates of the 
romantic-universal (kk) and participatory (P) visions; in practice this 
meant a referral to the domain of and the financial means for participa-
tion. This met with objections on the part of immigrant artists, and sub-
sequently terminology like ‘semi-professional’ and ‘in between amateur 
and professional art’ was adopted in policy texts. This opened the way 
for specific provisions. The proponents of the romantic-universal (kk) 
line – and particularly the larger institutions – were satisfied, because 
they were thus left in peace. At the same time, immigrant artists could 
continue to work without further ado, as they were not bothered with 
the romantic-universal (kk) vision on quality and were thus able to 
keep developing their work from their respective contexts and combi-
nations of contexts.
When, in 2001, vice minister Van der Ploeg proposed to expand the 
domain of fundable art on the basis of contextual (kc) arguments and 
measures and to involve established institutions in the policy on diver-
sity, he automatically called into question the supremacy of the roman-
tic-universal (kk) conceptual world and its proponents. This proposal 
did not meet with admiration or approval. The romantic-universal (kk) 
world remained dominant, and it is interesting to consider why this was 
the case.
Supremacy of the kk vision
The supremacy of the romantic-universal (kk) way of thinking became 
manifest in the course taken by the policy development process of 2001 
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to 2004, especially in the choice of implementation measures. Before 
that time, it had already revealed itself in the implementation measures 
of earlier policy documents on the subject of culture and immigrants. 
Its dominance also shows up in other elements that were characteris-
tic of a policy but were never the subject of discussion. This is the case 
when the funding of the larger institutions was defended, or when the 
question arose for whom they did what they were doing and how their 
offer was to be regarded in comparison to that in the free market. The 
question of what belongs to the domain to be funded (and what does 
not), how the mechanism of funding should be organized, or how the 
decision structure should take shape were not considered. Finally, the 
relation between government intervention in culture and the many ex-
pressions that are labelled ‘popular culture’ was hardly a government 
concern either.
As a consequence of the supremacy of the romantic-universal (kk) 
line, subsidised culture remained predominantly directed towards 
expressions fitting the romantic-universal convictions of the kk 
conceptual world. This led to the situation in which, apart from the 
arrangements for cultural expressions and immigrants discussed, cul-
tural expressions mainly developed outside of official cultural policy, 
and in great variety, on marginal locations and often without funding 
from the authorities. If the authorities were involved, this usually came 
under the heading of a contribution to social cohesion and personal 
development.
The supremacy of the romantic-universal (kk) conceptual world is 
based on a number of mutually reinforcing factors: institutions, emo-
tions and distinction. The most important protagonists of the roman-
tic-universal world are the large institutions, properly termed so. In 
addition, being part of a particular movement and sharing a particular 
vision works as a badge of membership, which meets the fundamental 
need in people to belong to a particular faction. In the case of the kk 
proponents, it is the desire to belong to the group that recognises itself 
in the romantic-universal viewpoint on art and culture. In addition, 
the social effect of sharing the kk vision is that its proponents together 
form an elite. Advocating the vision can therefore also be prompted by 
the wish to be a member of this elite. The elite in question derives from 
the entire political spectrum, as the treatment of the case of Ruim Baan 
in my study shows.
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10.5 Recent developments
On 10 June 2011, the vice minister sent his policy memorandum Meer 
dan kwaliteit: een nieuwe visie op cultuurbeleid 7 to the Dutch parlia-
ment. This memorandum outlines the agenda for the Dutch policy on 
culture for the coming years and the creation of a new foundation for 
a national cultural infrastructure; the latter refers to the state-funded 
cultural institutions. In his memorandum, the vice minister also speci-
fies how he intends to cut over 200 million Euros in the entire culture 
budget (arts and cultural heritage) of approximately 900 million. To 
this end, he defines a set of principles: the international top must main-
tain its high level; heritage and libraries will be spared; producing insti-
tutions will have priority over supporting institutions; and the creative 
industry will be stimulated.
About cultural diversity, the vice minister writes the following: ‘The 
new basic infrastructure will offer no further room for developments in 
the area of cultural diversity. The government considers this a task for 
the institutions themselves and does not pursue a customised policy 
with respect to cultural diversity’ (Meer dan kwaliteit p. 32).
The vice minister defines the constraints for his cultural policy in 
much more elaborate detail than his predecessors. In his memoran-
dum he specifies, more strictly than before, how many institutions he 
will provide room for and what conditions they must comply with. In 
the area of stage art there is, for instance, room for eight large theatre 
companies and five orchestras. The (existing) institutions are invited to 
submit their plans, directed to the minister, while the National Cultural 
Council8 functions as advisory board to the ministry.
In addition, the vice minister specifies a number of criteria to which 
the institutions must conform. ‘If an institution wishes to qualify for 
state funding, it is a prerequisite that its achievements are of high artis-
tic quality. But this government stands for more than quality alone. 
This is due to the fact that the government not only looks at the cul-
tural institutions, but, in its cultural policy, underlines the importance 
of the interested audience and society more than before. For this rea-
son, more conditions apply in order to qualify for national funding. 
(Meer dan kwaliteit p. 11).The criteria set by the government in addition 
to the (development) of artistic quality are: attention to the audience; 
attention to entrepreneurship; attention to participation and education 
(even though the government cuts back on the funding of the support-
ing institutions in the area of cultural education and on the Cultural 
Participation Fund); there is a cultural production or collection which 
is of (inter)national significance. A detailed specification for each of 
these criteria is provided by the vice minister (idem p. 37).
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The vice minister defends his policy also by observing that he is not 
the first to draw attention to the bottlenecks in the subsidised cultural 
sector, the National Council for Culture9 being one of the earlier crit-
ics. ‘The Council repeatedly saw fragmentation in many sectors, or 
“lack of effectiveness” due to fragmentation.’ Particularly piquant are 
the references to the findings of the d’Ancona committee (2006) and 
Vice Minister Van der Ploeg (1999). The d’Ancona committee held that 
the performing arts had alienated themselves too much from society 
and pointed out the inadequate relation between public demand and 
what was offered. From Van der Ploeg’s memorandum of basic criteria, 
Vice Minister Halbe Zijlstra borrows this quotation: ‘the dominance of 
specialists and the safe haven of a system of subsidies (…) impeded the 
dynamics in subsidized culture’. The ex-minister and former vice min-
ister argued this case at the time because they were convinced that more 
people should participate in cultural activities. They had no intention 
of legitimising a huge budget-cutting operation.
Vice Minister Zijlstra continues: ‘The government is in favour of: a 
future-proof cultural policy. Our measures are thus oriented towards 
a strong cultural sector, of an entrepreneurial and innovative spirit. A 
cultural sector should be equally creative in reaching out towards and 
binding a new audience as in offering culture of high quality’ (Meer dan 
kwaliteit p. 3).
In summary, the vice minister thus expresses his wish for (inter)
national qualitative facilities of high standing, a policy that takes qual-
ity as its starting point, but in which the intended audience, participa-
tion, entrepreneurship and education are also important. The vice min-
ister provides details to specify these criteria further (idem p. 37). But 
what kind of new audience should be reached by culture of qualitatively 
high standards is not defined. It is clear, however, that cultural diversity 
is no longer regarded as a policy issue; the vice minister leaves this topic 
to the cultural institutions.
In order to clarify what will happen to diversity once it has become 
the responsibility of the large institutions in the subsidised cultural sec-
tor, it is interesting to establish which institutions will be funded by this 
government and whether these institutions are prepared to pay atten-
tion to cultural diversity.
A description of the development of the cultural diversity code 
will help to form a picture here. Over the last few years, a number of 
(subsidised) cultural institutions have developed a cultural diversity 
code. This was undertaken on the initiative of Netwerk cs (a subsi-
dised organisation for the promotion of diversity in the cultural sec-
tor), which liquidated itself at the end of 2008. In his letter on cultural 
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diversity of 24 April 2009, then minister Ronald Plasterk supported this 
initiative and requested the sector to develop a code. In the same letter, 
the minister also indicated that the code would be monitored by the 
government and that the outcome would play a part in assessing the 
funding applications in the framework of the Funding Plan (the multi-
annual subsidies of those days).
The initiative by Netwerk cs was prompted by a 2008 investigation 
into cultural diversity inside (long-term) state-funded cultural institu-
tions by LAgroup entitled The elephant in the room: A survey of cultural 
diversity in the basic infrastructure. The analysis shows that these insti-
tutions are primarily concerned with a ‘white monoculture’. All of this 
is in contrast with the findings that 90 per cent of these institutions 
held cultural diversity to be an important issue and that 80 per cent 
considered that cultural diversity ought to be a fundamental attitude or 
mentality. The attention paid to diversity or its role was not self-evident 
in the practice of their daily work.
A number of institutions – the Union of Theatre and Concert Hall 
Directors, the Dutch Performing Arts Association, Netherlands Herit-
age, Art Factor, the Dutch Theatre Institute, the Netherlands Museums 
Association and the Music Centre the Netherlands – were represented 
on the steering committee. The steering committee was supported by a 
sounding board comprising representatives of the Ministry of Educa-
tion, Culture and Science, the Association of Netherlands Municipali-
ties vng, the big-four cities and cultural funds.
The Cultural Diversity Code uses four anchors for adequately inte-
grating cultural diversity into cultural institutions: programme, public, 
personnel (including supervisors) and partners. These four anchors are 
key to the provisions that together constitute the code: drafting of a 
vision on diversity; phrasing of a policy for the promotion of diversity; 
stimulating the ability to learn; supervision and accountability.
About the concept of quality, the code states: ‘The cultural institu-
tion works on the basis of a quality concept which does not exclude 
makers, producers or audience on the basis of their ethnic background 
or its culture.’ On its website, the steering committee pronounces its 
hope that the code will give a strong impulse to enshrining cultural 
diversity in the daily practice of cultural institutions. On 21 April 2011, 
the code was offered to Alexander Rinnooy Kan, chairman of the Soci-
aal-Economische Raad (ser).10 Vice Minister Zijlstra, who recently 
took office, was absent on this occasion, as he had announced in his let-
ter of 6 March 2011. ‘These intentions [drafting and introduction of the 
cultural diversity code] are not in line with current government policy. 
As you are aware, the government stated in its coalition agreement that 
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diversity and preferential policies on the basis of gender or ethnic back-
ground will be terminated.’
About the influence of the code, nothing is known yet. No reports or 
analyses are available. But since the code is not supported by the gov-
ernment, and since complying with the code (or not) has no effect on 
the funding of institutions, the chances of the code having any influence 
on the diversity policy of state-funded institutions are small. Moreover, 
funding of a number of the initiators, mostly sectorial institutes such as 
the Dutch Theatre Institute, Art Factor, the Music Centre the Nether-
lands and Netherlands Heritage, is to be discontinued in Zijlstra’s plans. 
It is highly questionable whether the code will have sufficient ambas-
sadors now to propagate its philosophy.
Besides, the Netherlands Performing Arts Fund, financed by the 
government, saw its funding for 2013 cut from 60 million to 43 million 
Euros; this fund does pay some attention to cultural diversity for the 
period after 2013. Its main task is to award the smaller subsidies to the 
performing arts on behalf of the government. About the multiannual 
applications it assessed, the fund writes: ‘Since the basic infrastruc-
ture has become limited to the larger institutions alone, which play the 
larger theatres, thus rendering that infrastructure artistically a great 
deal more uniform, the Netherlands Performing Arts Fund’s primary 
duty is in safeguarding, as best it can, the pluriformity of those small- 
and middle-scale events, in spite of the financial cuts. Cultural diver-
sity, too, is a natural component of a pluriform culture. It was therefore 
one of the aspects making it possible for institutions to achieve a higher 
rank in terms of pluriformity. However, this did not lead to a fair rep-
resentation in all disciplines. A number of pioneers from the early days 
turn out to be unable to ward off the fierce competition, when rated 
against important criteria (…)’. The fund thus recognises the impor-
tance of approving expressions of a culturally diverse nature, but when 
it comes to awarding financial means the good intentions are not as 
readily turned into positive decisions.
Concretely, this means that a number of leading institutions with a 
multicultural character missed the boat. In Trouw 11 of 9 August 2012, 
Mercita Coronel writes: ‘Both mc Theatre and Rast have now seen 
their applications with the Netherlands Performing arts Fund turned 
down. That is to say: Rast was given a positive marking, but there is no 
more money. Theatre group Likeminds in Amsterdam has met with the 
same fate. The application for funding by De Nieuw Amsterdam (dna), 
Rufus Collins’s heritage, which put multicultural theatre on the map in 
the eighties, was also turned down’.
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This means that lines of reasoning may be found in the (fund’s) texts 
endorsing a contextual or broad conception of quality – the fund’s advi-
sory committee even issues a positive recommendation about applica-
tions of such a nature – but funding is nevertheless not awarded. To 
ascertain what exactly is the matter, we must analyse the lines of rea-
soning more closely. But at any rate this implies that, within the striving 
for pluriformity, a conception of quality is dominant in which cultural 
diversity has no priority. What we see here is possibly an adapted ver-
sion of the kk vision.
Cultural diversity in the policy on culture in 2013
When we zoom in on the plans, it is clear that the government presents 
substantial cuts for the cultural sector. These relatively large cuts have 
been interpreted by the press and by artists and cultural institutions as 
an action by the government and its non-governing coalition partner 
pvv12 against the elitist character of the world of art.13 With the funds 
that the government does wish to allocate to culture, the vice minister 
intends to produce high-quality culture and make culture more acces-
sible to the public. The government wishes to achieve this by putting 
more emphasis on an awareness of potential audiences and attention 
spent on participation and education. At the same time it declines any 
specific measures for or attention paid to cultural diversity, in accord-
ance with the terms of the coalition agreement.
In view of the wish to uphold the (inter)national quality and in view 
of the costs in liquidating established state-funded institutions, there 
is every chance that these institutions will again qualify for state subsi-
dies. In this way, the institutional strength of those institutions ensures, 
now as always, that the established ones will survive. It is especially 
these institutions that tend to be proponents of the romantic-univer-
sal quality vision on culture. It is to be expected, therefore, that this 
conception of quality in culture will remain dominant, also because no 
stimulus to these institutions is forthcoming on the part of the govern-
ment to embrace a different, contextual quality concept. Or, as the Cul-
tural Diversity Code states in a “negative” wording: ‘a quality concept 
which does not exclude people on the basis of their ethnic background 
or the associated culture’.
To this I would add that the funding of part of the initiators and 
ambassadors of the diversity code will no longer be continued in 2013. 
A limited number of initiators remain, such as the employers’ unions 
Union of Theatre and Concert Hall Directors and the Netherlands Per-
forming Arts Association.
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The approach to promote participation – well-tried and broadly 
accepted in cultural policy – is also embraced by the government; in 
the detailed specification the vice minister asks for vision, but also for 
the nature, number and reach of the proposed activities. In any case, 
those institutions that wish to qualify for funding must specify how 
many children are served in the context of education, and in what way 
the institution collaborates with educational institutes.
Depending on how the institutions operationalise this instruction, 
the mixed population in the big cities will possibly be served as well. 
The question that remains is: served with what? Will the programmes 
offered be the classical universalist Western expressions of culture? 
Because most of these institutions advocate precisely those values, it 
would seem that this government policy will above all promote the type 
of participation that revolves around the idea that the ‘common man’ 
will develop into a better person when he or she is brought in touch 
with ‘high’ or ‘respected’ art and culture (labelled pk in figure 1). This is 
a remarkable choice for a government that does not feel at home with 
the elitist character of the ‘higher’ arts.
Since most institutions with a ‘multicultural’ character are no longer 
eligible for the multiannual subsidies awarded by the Netherlands Per-
forming Arts Fund, interventions in the area of cultural diversity will 
have to come from short-term applications to the Fund and from local 
authorities.
About the Fund’s ongoing projects, not much can be said yet. Munic-
ipalities have cut back on subsidies too, but less so than the national 
authorities, according to consultancy firm Berenschot. As regards the 
big cities, Amsterdam (10 per cent reduction) makes a point of cultural 
diversity in its Plan for the Arts while Rotterdam (14 per cent reduc-
tion) hardly does. The city of Amsterdam asked Görgün Taner, director 
of the Istanbul Kultur Sanat Vakfi (iskv), a Turkish institution for art 
and culture, to draw up a survey of the cultural sector, which makes 
clear that the sector still primarily caters to the more highly educated 
native population. In his opinion, this is also due to the extremely small 
number of immigrants working in cultural organisations. Amsterdam 
now asks those cultural organisations that apply for funding to draw 
up a plan for a culturally diverse staffing policy, if only for business 
reasons.
In the area of cultural education, explicit attention is paid to cul-
tural diversity by the Amsterdam Arts Fund. This fund also works on 
the basis of a contextual quality concept and a broad interpretation of 
participation and education (pp), which puts getting acquainted with 
various forms of culture at the front. It is not known yet to what extent 
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the applications in both cities were approved; it is clear, however, that, 
in expectation of a new government, the financial means for cultural 
expressions of immigrants and new mixed forms must be derived pri-
marily from local authorities. It appears likely that the cultural expres-
sions for immigrants and the new mixed forms will, to a large extent, 
again develop at the municipal level, outside of official cultural policy.
Finally, I would like to say a few words about the approach I used. 
This approach appears helpful in explaining the developments sketched 
above. In this time of budget cuts, which also display an anti-elitist char-
acter, the romantic-universal conception remains dominant. This is 
due to the combination of the institutional strength of the institutions, 
most of which advocate a romantic-universal viewpoint, the abolish-
ing of (attention for) cultural diversity in cultural policy, the fact that 
the cultural diversity code is not supported by the government, and the 
termination of funding to a number of institutes who took the initiative 
for the Cultural Diversity Code. It is possible that a closer study of the 
quality concept used in the recommendations by the funds will result 
in a more nuanced or more deeply grounded kk vision.
The approach is also helpful in understanding the development of 
what ‘participation’ stands for in the recent policies; the pk vision (par-
ticipation in established forms of art) will dominate in the large insti-
tutes. The state-funded institutions that advocate a broad approach to 
participation (pp) will merge and also see their funds cut, but they will 
not be annihilated; it is here that room will remain for active and recep-
tive participation in (unsubsidised) cultural expressions of a multicul-
tural nature. Just how much room there will be will also depend on the 
particular views of participation in culture of the policymakers in the 
big cities.
Notes
1 In English: Clearing the Way for Cultural Diversity.
2 In English: Action Plan for Cultural Expression among Migrants.
3 In English: Memorandum on Cultural Expression among Ethnic Minorities.
4 In English: Letter on the Categorical Policy on Artistic Expression among Immi-
grants.
5 In English: Intercultural.
6 In English: Shell or Backbone.
7 In English: Beyond mere quality: a new vision on cultural policy.
8 In Dutch: Raad voor Cultuur.
9 In Dutch: Raad voor Cultuur; previously the National Arts Council.
10 The Social and Economic Council.
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11 A Dutch nationwide newspaper.
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11 Something for everyone?
Changes and choices in the ethno-party scene  
in urban nightlife
Simone Boogaarts-de Bruin
Between 2004 and 2010, I conducted research for my PhD at the Insti-
tute for Migration and Ethnic Studies at the University of Amsterdam 
under the supervision of professors Jan Rath and Rinus Penninx. For 
my research I studied three types of so-called ethno-parties in several 
Dutch cities and the people who visited them. I focused both on how 
growing ethnic diversity influences the organisation and programming 
thereof and how and why young people choose the Turkish, Moroc-
can or Asian party scenes. The purpose of this research was twofold: I 
wanted to research and make notice of a new phenomenon that chal-
lenged and influenced the existing structures of nightlife, and I wanted 
to research the motives and behaviour of those who visit these ethno-
parties. By doing so, I wanted to answer the following questions: why 
do young ethnic people visit ethno-parties? How are these parties or-
ganised, where do these parties take place and most importantly, in 
what way is nightlife affected by and changing with the growing partici-
pation of ethnic young people in Dutch nightlife?
In this article I will give a brief outline of my research. I will first 
describe the theoretical background, then I will draw a picture of how 
I conducted my research. I close this article by discussing the most 
important findings.
11.1 Nightlife research
Nightlife research is closely connected to the scientific interest in youth 
culture, music and the leisure industry. In the 1970s, researchers from 
the Centre for Contemporary and Cultural Studies (cccs) in Birming-
ham linked the proliferation of youth culture to both structural changes 
to society in industrial Britain and associated class relationships. Sub-
cultural practices were analysed as ‘rituals of resistance’, which were uti-
lised by young, working class youngsters in response to the breakdown 
of traditions and increasing capitalism (Griffin 2001).
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However, primarily due to its almost sole focus on (white male) 
working class youngsters and its strong emphasis on structural factors, 
the cccs’s research came in for much criticism. Critics particularly 
highlighted the existence of separate youth cultures for young women 
and ethnic youngsters and the importance of buying power when it 
came to the emergence of youth lifestyles.
As a consequence, in other youth culture studies this criticism was 
reflected in a shift from a more structural approach to one that empha-
sised both the agency and the autonomy of young people. This latter 
approach, which paid attention to consumption choices, has been char-
acterised as ‘post-subcultural’ (Redhead 1993). Such work centralises 
the notion that young people’s consumption choices and attendant par-
ticipation in youth cultures are influenced by their personal taste, not 
their class, gender or education. Young people are thus viewed as free 
agents who make individual consumption choices. Moreover, post sub-
cultural researchers focus on the flexibility of young people by empha-
sising their capacity to move in and out of different cultural and musi-
cal styles. Indeed, in order to capture the fluidity and individuality of 
the theoretical approach, researchers have actually abandoned the term 
sub-culture. Instead, new phrases such as neo-tribe, lifestyle, taste-cul-
ture and club culture were introduced. These concepts recognised that 
cultural features such as music, clothing and dancing were the basis for 
the proliferation and diversity of separate youth scenes.
Yet the post-sub-cultural approach has also been criticised, with a 
particular concern being that post-subcultural studies pay little atten-
tion to social and economic inequalities between groups of young peo-
ple (Shildrick & MacDonalds 2006). Indeed, much post-subcultural 
research focuses on the nightlife activities and choices of white, middle-
class urban youths, meaning that the cultural activities of other social 
groups (including ethnic youngsters) continue to be underexposed.
Some authors have attempted to reconcile the two methods in a 
so-called ‘integrative approach’ in which it is recognised that some 
young people are more able than others to participate in nightlife (see 
for example: Bennet 2002; Hollands 2002 & MacRae 2004). In this 
approach, analyses of nightlife choices and cultural expression consider 
both structural factors, such as economic position and ethnicity, and 
personal factors, such as taste and preferences.
Ultimately, however, the solution that the integrative approach tries 
to achieve is not particularly satisfying, since none of these scholars 
shed any light on how this inter-relationship between structural pro-
cesses and human agency actually takes place. Indeed, much of this 
work focuses solely on the nightlife activities and behaviour of young 
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people within a scene or club, and by adopting such an approach these 
scholars largely ignore matters of accessibility to and the programming 
of nightlife. While it is very likely that the nightlife activities and choices 
of young people are influenced by door policies and musical program-
ming, these are in turn influenced by the nightlife choices and activi-
ties of young people. This means that the dynamic interplay between 
the strategies of the producers of nightlife and the choices and activi-
ties of the consumers thereof are being ignored. What is more, none of 
the scholars who are working with an integrative approach study the 
lifestyle participation and nightlife experiences of young members of 
ethnic minority groups.
11.2 Studying nightlife
To analyse and adequately explain the nightlife experiences of and 
choices made by ethnic young people, an integrative approach that 
centralises the interaction between the structural strategies of the pro-
ducers and the personal preferences and agency of the consumers is 
required. To achieve this, I have developed an analytical model, which I 
have labelled as the model of structured choice. This model is sensitive 
to the flexible use of the processes of agency and structure because of 
the systematic distinction that is made between societal and personal 
factors.
Societal factors are the social structures of nightlife and are com-
prised of the strategies used by producers to attract a specific dance 
crowd through their programming and the accessibility of their clubs. 
More general societal factors, such as the political climate and regula-
tions imposed by local governments, are also taken into account.
The personal factors, meanwhile, have been sub-divided into a cul-
tural and a social dimension and two types of restrictions. The social 
dimension refers to so-called social mechanisms, which involve pro-
cesses of identification and differentiation. It also covers the specific 
processes of the composition of groups of friends, the social rules of 
a scene and the social composition of a dance crowd. The cultural 
dimension refers to taste in music, dress codes and styles of dance of a 
particular crowd. Finally, personal factors also relate to three types of 
restrictions: the regulating role of parents, experiences of door policies, 
and economic resources, all of which determine nightlife choices nega-
tively. Since the ethnic background of an individual clubber can play a 
role in all of the different elements of the personal factors set out above, 
ethnicity is not listed as a separate category. Use of this analytical model 
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enables the following research questions to be answered: How do eth-
nic minority young people choose which ethno-party to attend? How 
do the choices of a changing urban population affect the supply side of 
the nightlife market?
11.3 The results
Ever since the turn of the century, nightlife in the Netherlands has un-
dergone some interesting, expanding and diversifying changes, and 
contemporary consumers now have much more choice with regard to 
which bar, dance-hall, movie theatre or club to attend. This expansion 
has increased competition both between and within the diverse night-
life sectors.
To remain popular and attract consumers, clubs have had to make 
changes to their programming and organisation. One such change is 
the introduction of what I have called ‘broad programming’. Clubs no 
longer focus on one particular style of music, but instead feature differ-
ent styles on different days of the week, for instance ‘urban’ on Thurs-
days, ‘soul’ on Fridays and ‘clubhouse’ on Saturdays. Moreover, theme 
parties are also organised regularly by external party organisations that 
hire a club for a night for their event. These parties have a trendy and 
recognisable party concept that is promoted by the use of logos, flyers, 
party merchandise and specific, popular djs, all of which is advertised 
on their own websites.
The broad programming and growing tendency of clubs to hire their 
venues out to external companies have created new opportunities for 
ethnic event organisations to arrange their so-called ethno-parties in 
popular clubs. Essential in this process of incorporation is the fact that 
party organisations have special party concepts which, due to specific 
music choices, the djs hired and other characteristics, attract a particu-
lar group of ethnic consumers. These ethnic-party organisations thus 
create a separate ethno-party scene.
Since every type of party prescribes its own preferred dance crowd, 
the door policies of clubs have changed along with the programming. 
Many venues and party organisations have separate dress codes for 
each type of event, while differences in the social and cultural rules of 
the parties can also be prominent. Indeed, the social and cultural rules 
of the regular dance scene and the ethno-party scene differ greatly.
An important consequence of the introduction of broad program-
ming is that the image of clubs as institutions has changed, with their 
original profile becoming blurred and unclear. Different groups of 
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young people with different musical tastes now visit the same clubs. As 
a result, youngsters no longer identify with a particular venue, instead 
aligning themselves to party organisations, a specific style of music or 
popular djs. Indeed, they now often visit different clubs in different cit-
ies to dance at their favourite events.
The ethno-party scenes
The Asian party scene is the oldest ethno-party circuit in the Neth-
erlands, with its heyday being in the mid-1990s. At that time, Asian 
parties were organised on a regular and frequent basis, taking place 
all over the country. They were generally attended by Dutch-Chinese 
youngsters.
In the mid-1990s, however, another sub-scene developed under the 
umbrella term of Asian parties. This was the ‘Indo-party scene’, and pre-
dominately attracted second and third-generation young Indo-Europe-
ans.1 At the time of my fieldwork, however, these Indo-parties were no 
longer taking place, while the other Asian parties were also decreasing 
in popularity. Indeed, in 2006, there were only three organisations left 
that were arranging Asian parties on a regular basis in popular clubs, 
and at all of these events the music was a mix of r&b and clubhouse.
In contrast, the Turkish club scene was growing in popularity at the 
time of my fieldwork. Of the large number of party companies in exist-
ence at that time, the four most popular were Turkish party organisa-
tions in Amsterdam and Rotterdam. These groups arranged Turkish 
parties on a regular basis in popular clubs, with the music being pre-
dominantly Türk pop, while the audiences were mainly comprised of 
those of Turkish descent.
The Moroccan leisure scene is the newest player in the nightlife mar-
ket. Although Moroccan concerts have been taking place since 1999, 
parties for young people are a relatively recent addition to the nightlife 
circuit. Most of these parties begin in the late afternoon or early even-
ing and end before midnight. All of them have a ‘no alcohol’ policy. The 
purpose of these rules is to make the parties more accessible to young 
women of Moroccan ancestry. In addition, special ‘women’s only’ 
parties are also commonly arranged. The audience of these Moroc-
can events is predominantly comprised of young people of Moroccan 
descent and the music played is a mix of popular Moroccan and Arabic 
sounds.
In all three scenes, identification with the audience and the organi-
sation is crucial. To a significant extent, this is achieved by knowledge 
and acceptance of the social rules regarding flirting and interaction, 
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which differ from the social rules in the regular clubbing circuit. In the 
Turkish and Moroccan scenes in particular, talking to unfamiliar peo-
ple of the opposite sex is inappropriate and even harmful to the good 
reputation of the female clubbers. Moreover, the respondents from the 
Asian party scene were also very cautious in their responses to ques-
tions about flirting and interaction at Asian parties. However, there was 
an admission that young people who were interested in someone would 
look up the individual on one of the many Internet community sites 
after a party.
Identification with the cultural rules regarding musical program-
ming, dress code and dance style also played an important part in the 
ethno-party scene chosen. Indeed, in the Turkish and Moroccan scenes 
in particular, many young people gave this as their reason for attend-
ing Turkish or Moroccan events. In the Asian party scene, however, 
the music played and styles of clothing worn are very similar to that of 
regular club nights, with the result being that cultural elements did not 
play a role in the choices made between these two scenes.
Identification with an ethnic group and ethno-party scene seemed to 
be strengthened by the ongoing negative media attention paid to ethnic 
minority youths. Many young people used the terms ‘we’ versus ‘them’ 
when they compared the crowd in their own ethno-scene with that in 
the more regular clubs. The young people in the Asian party scene pre-
dominantly experienced a sense of being different, which was reflected 
in their language and choice of words. Meanwhile, for the young peo-
ple going to Turkish and Moroccan parties, their lifestyle played an 
important part in their preference for their own ethno-party scene. An 
interesting result is that in all three groups the respondents who identi-
fied strongly with the crowd and the organisation of ethno-parties only 
participated in their own ethnic party scene. These respondents also 
claimed that their friends come from within their own ethnic group. 
Respondents with a more ethnically mixed group of friends, however, 
said that they also went to regular club parties and resented the ‘patron-
ising’ social rules in the ethno-party scenes. These particular respond-
ents were predominantly the men from all three scenes and the more 
experienced women in the Turkish clubbing circuit.
The final factors that play a role in the choice of a particular ethno-
party scene are the restrictions imposed on respondents. In general, the 
women experienced different restrictions from the men. None of the 
former said that they had had, or expected to have, problems with the 
door policies of mainstream clubs. Instead, many of these women were 
restricted in their nightlife choices by their parents. Almost all of those 
in the Moroccan and many of those in the Turkish scene were only 
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allowed to attend events in the ethno-party circuit. In contrast, the men 
in all three groups were not restricted in their choices of nightlife by 
their parents. Instead, many of them did not feel welcome or accepted 
in the mainstream clubbing circuit. Some of the men in all three scenes 
also said that they did not feel safe at regular club events, with the reac-
tions of the crowd to their ethnic background being responsible for 
these feelings. Difficulties with the door policies in the regular club 
scene were a particular problem for many of the young Moroccan men 
and some of the young Turkish males. Many of the former said that 
they were often refused entry to the regular club scene, while many 
of their Turkish counterparts also experienced the feeling of not being 
welcome at regular parties. As a result, some of these Turkish men 
chose to attend the Turkish party scene exclusively.
The details set out above reveal that age, gender and ethnic back-
ground are particular influences on the options and choices made by 
ethnic young people. Furthermore, the extent of this influence, and 
whether it created limitations in the nightlife choices made, was differ-
ent for the three ethnic groups.
11.4 Conclusions
One of the present study’s research questions required an analysis of 
how the choices made by the changing urban population in the Neth-
erlands affect the supply of nightlife. As a consequence, this research 
concerns the changes that have taken place in Dutch nightlife and how 
the producers and, more specifically, the ethnic party organisations, 
have promoted new developments in clubbing. What has become clear 
is that diversity is structurally anchored in clubbing these days. This is 
evident in the broad programming put on by clubs and the number of 
different branded styles of parties that are organised. In order to deal 
with increased competition, exclusivity and innovation have become 
key terms in the marketing of individual party concepts. Moreover, the 
need for differentiation to secure a position in a highly competitive field 
can also be seen in the ethno-party circuits. An important consequence 
of the new ways in which clubbing is organised in the Netherlands is 
that ‘clubbing’ as a nighttime activity now takes many different forms. 
Visitors to different clubbing scenes do not share the same ‘clubbing 
culture’. Indeed, all of these separate scenes have different hierarchies 
of coolness, different social and cultural rules, different door policies 
and different musical programming. As a result, clubbing has become 
fragmented, with a variety of meanings, experiences and habits in all 
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of the varying scenes. Moreover, clubs have become places for all sorts 
of clubbing events and clubbers, but at different times and on different 
days of the week.
The second of this study’s research questions concerns how young 
people choose which ethno-party to attend. It has become clear that 
the choices made by ethnic minority youngsters to participate in the 
ethno-party scene are based on a complex consideration of the per-
sonal factors and preferences of the consumers on the one hand, and 
the opportunities and constraints created by the producers of night-
life on the other. In general, young Asians faced the fewest restrictions 
in their choice between the ethno-party and the regular club scenes. 
Accordingly, social factors, such as partying with friends and acquaint-
ances, determined the decisions they made about participation in the 
Asian party scene. The young people who chose the Moroccan lei-
sure scene, however, faced many restrictions in their nightlife choices. 
Indeed, their cultural preferences in terms of music and dance style 
guided their choices to this scene. This group’s nightlife decisions were 
also limited by restrictions: for the women, these were imposed by their 
parents, while the men faced restrictions in the form of the limited 
access they had to regular parties. Meanwhile, in the Turkish clubbing 
scene, the restrictions and options that determined the decisions made 
about whether to choose the mainstream or the ethno-party sectors 
varied greatly among the respondents. Some of the men and women 
participated in both scenes. In general, however, they attended parties 
in the Turkish clubbing circuit when they went out with co-ethnics and 
wanted to dance to Turkish music, while they went to mainstream par-
ties with an ethnically mixed group of friends. Another group of Turk-
ish respondents only participated in the Turkish clubbing scene. Dif-
ferent factors played a different role for each of the individual respond-
ents, such as musical preferences, dress code, dance style, the regulating 
role of parents (for the women) and the door policies experienced in 
regular nightlife (for the men).
An in-depth analysis of the three ethno-party scenes and their con-
sumers clearly demonstrates the importance of including the motiva-
tions and preferences of consumers and the strategies of the producers 
of nightlife in any examination of the nightlife choices made by ethnic 
minority young people. My work clearly reveals that the post-subcul-
tural approach, with its emphasis on free consumption practices and 
choices, and which is currently dominant in studies of youth culture 
and lifestyles, does not adequately explain the actual practices of choice 
and participation in nightlife by many ethnic minority youngsters. Fac-
tors that restrict participation as well as structures that shape oppor-
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tunities to express a cultural identity do clearly influence the choices 
made and the options available.
Note
1 Indo-European is used to refer to mixed-race people of Indonesian and European 
descent.
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12 Shifting to the core  
of the ethno-cultural position
Moluccan camps and wijken revisited1
Fridus Steijlen
12.1 Introduction
As stated in the introduction of this book, the complex interrelation 
between the socio-economic and the ethno-cultural dimension of the 
position of minorities was central in Rinus Penninx’s PhD thesis and 
for both the dynamics of on the one hand the assignment of these po-
sitions by society and on the other hand how minorities obtain posi-
tions themselves (1988: 58-64). One of the domains in minorities’ socio-
economic position identified by Penninx was housing. For Moluccans, 
this domain differed significantly from other minorities in the Neth-
erlands because Moluccans were housed in camps and later in special 
wards. The government also played a role in the housing of other ethnic 
groups, like the Indo-Europeans, but the length of the interference and 
the implications cannot be compared. Penninx himself also wrote about 
the housing of Moluccans as extraordinary: ‘The housing of Moluccans 
is a historical chapter on its own’ (1988: 131).
The housing of Moluccans was not only special because of the central 
role of the Dutch government, but also because living in special camps 
and wards had a tremendous impact on the cohesion of the Moluccan 
community. An important role was played by such Moluccan institu-
tions as the church, local councils and clubs that emerged immediately 
after their arrival in the Netherlands. The central role of the govern-
ment in the housing of Moluccans ended in the 1980s. The Moluccan 
wards, however, remained. By the first decennium of this century, more 
than sixty years after the arrival of the Moluccans, these wards had 
become symbols of Moluccan history and identity. They became part 
of the core of their ethno-cultural position, even though the majority of 
the Moluccans now live outside these wards.
In this chapter I want to reflect on the history of this specific domain 
in Rinus Penninx’s theory: the housing of Moluccans, and show how it 
shifted to the ethno-cultural position. This chapter is based on all my 
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research on the Moluccan community, starting from the early 1980s 
and on observations between formal research projects.
12.2 Migration
To understand the specific housing conditions of Moluccans, we have 
to understand their original relationship with the Dutch government 
and why they migrated to the Netherlands. Due to frictions in the de-
colonisation of Indonesia, some 12,500 Moluccans were transferred to 
the Netherlands in 1951 (Steijlen 1996a; Smeets & Steijlen 2006). This 
group consisted of 3,500 soldiers of the former colonial army, along 
with their families. The Moluccans came from the Moluccan Islands in 
the eastern part of the Indonesian archipelago. The unique spices on 
these islands – nutmeg, clove and pepper – were the primary reason for 
the Dutch to colonise the region in the sixteenth century. During Dutch 
colonial rule, the Moluccans, especially the Christians among them, 
had gained a privileged position and were recruited as elite troops in 
the colonial army. This privileged position led to ambivalence among 
Moluccan intellectuals vis-à-vis the newly independent Indonesia, 
which made them proclaim an independent South Moluccan Republic 
(Republik Maluku Selatan: rms) in April 1950, a few months after the 
formal transfer of sovereignty.2 At that time not all Moluccan military 
had been demobilised from the colonial army; outside the Moluccas, 
they were under the responsibility of Dutch authorities. The rms move-
ment in the Moluccas, with which the Moluccan soldiers sympathised, 
problematised the demobilisation and finally led to a stalemate, bring-
ing the Moluccan military with their families to the Netherlands.
When they were transported to the Netherlands, their juridical posi-
tion was complex. According to the decolonisation agreements, they 
were Indonesian citizens, but they considered themselves citizens of 
the rms. The Dutch government was responsible for them as their 
employer (or rather their former employer, because the Moluccan mili-
tary were dismissed from the army upon their arrival in the Nether-
lands).
12.3 Camps and institutions
In the Netherlands, the Moluccans were housed in special quarters. 
These quarters had been built as army barracks or as labourer’s houses, 
but they also consisted of monasteries, estates and two former concen-
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tration camps from World War ii. Most of the quarters – or camps as 
they were called – were isolated from Dutch society. The reasons for 
housing Moluccans in these camps were twofold: first, there was a gen-
eral housing shortage in the Netherlands and this was the only way to 
house 12,500 in a short period of time, and second, it was believed that 
the Moluccans would only stay temporarily in the Netherlands. This 
idea of temporality was shared by both the Dutch government and the 
Moluccans themselves.
In the camps, life had to be reorganised. Because they were dis-
charged from the army, the military regimen as the organising princi-
ple had disappeared. In its place there was a camp regime with a Dutch 
staff (including a manager of the camp) and a camp council chosen by 
the inhabitants of the camp as their representatives. There were jobs 
for a small number of Moluccans to regulate daily life in the camps, 
including nurses, administrators and kitchen personnel (Wittermans 
1991: chapter 2). All vital necessities were supplied by the Dutch author-
ities (food, electricity, coal, clothing). This was called the policy of full 
maintenance.
In the first years, several Moluccan institutions facilitating commu-
nity building arose, both based on traditional patterns but also on new 
organising principles. One such new institution was the already men-
tioned camp council set up by the government. These councils were 
supposed to act as intermediates between the Moluccan inhabitants 
and the Dutch institutions and authorities. Although they were meant 
to be instruments for policy implementation – passing on information 
and regulations and mediating in conflicts – the camp councils func-
tioned in effect as interest committees (Wittermans 1955). Because the 
camp councils were incorporated into Moluccan political and interest 
organisations that operated nationwide, the camp councils also func-
tioned as the local representatives of these Moluccan organisations. 
This collective approach working with organisations as caretakers for 
individuals fit into the ‘pillarised’ Dutch society of the 1950s, which was 
compartmentalised along socio-political and religious lines.
Another important institution was the Moluccan church. Moluc-
can ministers who came with the military set up their own protestant 
churches. And although there were several schisms within the church, 
the Moluccan churches were very important for community building. 
Most of the church organisations supported the goals of the rms. Local 
reverends fostered the political goals by organising special services for 
the rms guerrillas that were active on the Moluccan Island of Seram 
until 1963. With the church organisation came a lot of other organi-
sations supporting community building: church choirs, confirmation 
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classes, church councils, flute orchestras (the traditional accompani-
ment in church), but also women and youth groups. Especially the 
youth organisation of the church was an important supplier for new 
leaders in the 1960s and 1970s.
A third institution that had already emerged by the 1950s was the 
kumpulan, a village organisation. In these kumpulan, Moluccans from 
the same village of origin were united. The goal of the kumpulan was 
to unite people from one village in view of the expected return to the 
Moluccas. At the same time, the kumpulan could represent the village 
when needed, for example in wedding ceremonies. Beside the kumpu-
lan, two other traditional relations contributed to community building 
among Moluccans in the Netherlands: family relations and so-called 
pela bonds. A pela bond is a linkage between two villages dictating 
unconditional support and a prohibition on marriages.
12.4 Archipelago of Moluccan camps
Most camps were situated away from towns and villages, creating phys-
ically and socially isolated Moluccan communities. Families were allo-
cated at random to the camps. Depending on the ship, time of arrival, 
and availability of camps, the Moluccans were housed in various places 
all over the country. Family ties, the island of origin or religion (the 
vast majority were Protestant; 4.5 per cent were Catholic and 2.5 per 
cent Muslim) were not used as criteria for allocation. After conflicts 
arose in the camps, fuelled by differences in affiliation with the interest 
organisations, religion or area of origin, the Dutch authorities started to 
re-allocate Moluccan families, bringing together people from the same 
political organisation or islands of origin.
By the autumn of 1953, it looked as though the massive transfers had 
created peace and order in the camps. The commissioner for Moluc-
can welfare, the highest authority dealing with the Moluccans in the 
Netherlands, issued a letter suggesting that all special regulations be 
abandoned because the transfers were effective. The authorities had 
created an archipelago of Moluccan camps, all with their own politi-
cal colour. This strengthened the position of the local councils as well 
as the political organisations of the Moluccans. The Dutch authorities 
had manoeuvred themselves into a position where they depended on 
the Moluccan institutions. This dependency was strengthened by the 
refusal of the authorities to deal with individual Moluccans; they only 
wanted to communicate with the representatives in the councils even 
for private individual matters.
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In 1956 a short but intensive clash occurred between the Dutch 
authorities and the Moluccans. Because more and more Moluccans had 
found jobs and the full maintenance by the government became a prob-
lem, a new policy in 1956 called ‘self-support’ was issued. From that 
moment on, Moluccans had to find jobs, buy their own food, and cook 
for themselves. If they could not find work, they had to apply for social 
benefits. The Moluccans experienced this policy change as an attempt 
by the government to deny its responsibility to the Moluccans. Accord-
ing to them, the Dutch government was fully responsible for them as 
long as they were in the Netherlands. The highly political motivated 
and symbolic revolt against the new policy was very tense in some 
camps, but stopped after some weeks.
At the end of the 1950s, the Dutch government started to realise that 
the Moluccans were here to stay for longer, not necessarily permanently 
but at least for some more years to come. Because most of the camps in 
fact were not suitable as living quarters and because they were located 
far away from employment opportunities, the authorities decided to 
transfer the Moluccans to specially built districts in small towns called 
‘Moluccan ward’, or wijk (plural: wijken) in Dutch. The Moluccans had 
to move from wooden dwellings (in the barracks) to stone (houses).
12.5 The wijk3
The committee Verweij-Jonker (1959), which advised on the transfer 
of the Moluccans to the wijk, hoped to break down the power of the 
Moluccan leaders by moving them to a wijk that was more open com-
pared to the isolated camps. Especially in the early wijk period, this am-
bition was not reached. Recommendations on the size and the location 
of new wijken were not implemented fully, partly due to resistance by 
city officials. Therefore, not all wijken were built close to employment 
facilities and most of them were built at the border of villages, creating 
a new kind of spatial isolation.
In the wijk, the organisation of the community was a copy of the 
situation in the camps. A wijk council replaced the camp council, and 
the church kept its powerful position. At the end of the 1960s, new 
institutions developed in the wijk as a consequence of the emerging 
of competing political movements. After the defeat of the rms guer-
rillas in the Moluccas in 1963 and the execution of the rms president 
in Indonesia in 1966, a rms government in exile was established in the 
Netherlands. A few years later, the rms president in exile, J. Manusama, 
was challenged by I. Tamaela, a former colonel of the rms army, who 
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established his own rms government. This major political split created 
competition among their respective supporters in the Moluccan wijk. 
Both movements organised their own security groups in the wijk. Also, 
the minority of pro-Indonesian Moluccans grouped themselves into a 
new organisation, the api-Maluku. These political rivalries resulted in 
violent clashes within the Moluccan community, in which the police 
interfered only sparingly.
A real change in power relations at the wijk level came after the 
Dutch government started to fund so-called ‘community building cen-
tres’. These centres, or stichtingen (foundations) as they were called 
by Moluccans, were established in almost every Moluccan wijk at the 
beginning of the 1970s. These stichtingen were foreign to the Moluc-
can community, because they were a combination of different types 
of Dutch welfare work for which there was no traditional Moluccan 
equivalent. Because the stichtingen were modelled after Dutch institu-
tions and funded by the Dutch ministry of welfare, the government 
required that people working in the stichting meet specified educational 
qualifications. This opened the doors for second-generation Moluccans 
who had a higher education in the Netherlands. The stichtingen became 
hotspots for the second generation.
Other Moluccan social welfare organisations in addition to the 
stichting emerged at the end of the 1970s. By that time, social problems 
among Moluccans such as drug abuse and unemployment had become 
severe. These new Moluccan social welfare initiatives were initiated by 
the Moluccans themselves, because Dutch organisations seemed una-
ble to reach the drug addicts or the unemployed (Steijlen 1984). And 
again, these new institutions were dominated by second-generation 
Moluccans. The social problems increased the isolation of the wijken 
and led to some extent to a process of ghettoisation of the wijk, without 
becoming real ghettos.
12.6 Closed community and changing identity
Living in special quarters with their own institutions had a huge in-
fluence on the internal orientation of Moluccans. Although there were 
some minorities in the Moluccan community and not everybody 
agreed on political issues, the Moluccan community had become a co-
hesive community and even more closed than it had been when the 
Moluccans first arrived in the Netherlands. The Moluccan institutions 
and the concentrated form of living in the wijken, which were consid-
ered Moluccan territory, were decisive factors in this. This strong cohe-
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sive spirit among Moluccans was demonstrated when in the mid-1970s, 
Moluccan youngsters committed five terrorist acts, including hijacking 
trains and taking hostages in a primary school. The first train hijacking 
in particular received broad support from the Moluccan community 
(Steijlen 1996b).
Coincidentally, this height of political manifestation was also the 
start of a radical change in the Moluccans’ position within Dutch soci-
ety. Until the end of the 1970s, Moluccans considered themselves exiles 
in the Netherlands, waiting to return home to a free South Moluccan 
Republic. As political tensions grew and the radicalisation of the second 
generation led to terrorist actions, another current emerged: Moluc-
cans started to question the idea of exporting a free Republic from the 
Netherlands to the Moluccan Islands. In the same period, Moluccans 
began visiting their homeland, something that had been taboo before 
that, and became involved in small development aid projects. Slowly 
the idea evolved that their future was not necessarily in the Moluccas, 
but that they could participate in the Moluccan community in Indone-
sia and at the same time live in the Netherlands. The Moluccans were 
transforming from exiles into migrants (Steijlen 2010).
Again, a new range of Moluccan institutions emerged. Moluccan 
journals that were not related to one particular political movement or 
organisation were published, and there were initiatives in the field of 
theatre and literature. In this process, Moluccans increasingly mani-
fested themselves outside the wijken in the big cities (Steijlen 2010).
12.7 Wijken as centres
From the second half of the 1970s, no more wijken were built (except 
for one or two) because all the Moluccans from the camps were trans-
ferred to a wijk.4 A limit to the amount of houses that were especially 
built for Moluccans was thus set. Young Moluccans who wanted to 
live on their own had no other choice than to leave the wijk. From the 
end of the 1970s, more and more Moluccans left the wijk because they 
wanted to marry, went to study in other cities or moved because of job 
opportunities.
Nevertheless, the wijk remained central and important for the 
Moluccan community. Most Moluccans who had left the wijk stayed 
connected to it because they were still members of the Moluccan church 
and their parents or grandparents lived there. The wijk also functioned 
as a communication ‘tool’: through their contacts in the wijk, Moluc-
cans remained informed about developments in the community and 
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things that were important to them. The distributions of Moluccan 
magazines in the 1970s and 1980s illustrate this. Through colportage 
in the wijk, they could reach some 80 per cent of the Moluccans in the 
Netherlands. Announcements through wijk institutions were effective 
because the wijk was the place where Moluccans came together. It was 
their central meeting place: the tempat bergaul.
The wijk, even the smaller ones with just a couple of houses, was seen 
as Moluccan territory by Moluccans as well as by the Dutch authorities 
and people. Dutch officials were careful when entering these ‘Moluccan 
territories’. When, for example, somebody had to be arrested and they 
expected resistance, the police would inform the wijk council before-
hand. In some cases, when local tension was particularly high, Dutch 
police were reluctant to enter the wijk. This happened for example in 
the spring of 1982 in the wijk in Assen where youngsters even laid down 
a plank with nails on the street to prevent police cars from entering the 
wijk.5
In the same period, it came out that the construction of the houses in 
some of the wijken were very bad. In the first half of the 1980s, this led 
to confrontations between Moluccans and the police because Moluc-
cans refused to pay the rent. In this conflict, the Moluccans confronted 
the Dutch government with its special responsibility towards Moluc-
cans as former military of the colonial army and because of the role 
the Dutch government played in the transfer of the Moluccans to the 
Netherlands. The government was susceptible to this argument because 
the transfer of Moluccans and their discharge from the army were not 
an example of decent policy and treatment.
The government looked for an opportunity to end the status of 
Moluccans as a special minority. This moment came in 1986 when 
Moluccan leaders were willing to negotiate. They were prepared to give 
up the special position of the Moluccans in exchange for a package of 
regulations, including a token of appreciation for the first generation (a 
decoration and yearly bonus), a project to fight unemployment among 
Moluccan youngsters, a Moluccan museum and money to renovate the 
Moluccan wijken. For their part, the Moluccans would help to solve 
the housing issues and would close the so called ‘knil chapter’, as their 
claim on a special position as minority was called. The historical agree-
ment, as it was called, was concluded at a ceremonial meeting in the 
government’s room between the prime minister and the chairman of 
the largest Moluccan organisation.
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12.8 Weakening institutions
In their negotiations leading up to the historical agreement, the Moluc-
cans also anticipated processes that would inevitably lead to the ending 
of the special relation and the weakening of Moluccan institutions, in 
particular the growing pressure within Dutch politics and society to 
end special regulations for all ethnic groups in favour of general poli-
cies. Until the 1970s, the Moluccans had been the largest ethnic group 
in the Netherlands, but soon thereafter their position was overtaken 
by Surinamese, Turks and Moroccans. The Moluccan leaders realised 
that their claim on a special relationship would not stand for long. Be-
sides, the number of first-generation Moluccans was decreasing and 
the community was confronted with processes of individualisation 
(see Bartels 1990).
These developments had an impact on the cohesion within the 
Moluccan community: it started to show cracks, because contact with 
the wijken decreased with the passing away of first-generation Moluc-
cans who lived in the wijk, and because individual Moluccans gave 
less priority to contacts with the wijk. In addition, the institutions in 
the wijk started to lose their strength. Many stichtingen faced financial 
problems and were closed or forced to open their doors to the general 
public. The church remained important, although its influence on the 
local Moluccan population decreased as result of the individualisation 
process. At the same time, Dutch policy was changing: group-specific 
regulations were replaced by general regulations; reducing contacts of 
officials with Moluccan organisations.
Most importantly, the functionality of the wijk council came under 
pressure because of these local and national developments. The Moluc-
can interest organisations that had earlier organised and strengthened 
the local councils lost much of their power after the special relation 
between the Moluccan community and the Dutch government ended. 
The foundation of their power was gone. This also weakened the local 
councils and the internal structure of the organisations. In many places, 
second or even third councils were erected to represent the local Moluc-
can community. In other places, the wijk council became inactive – a 
sleeping tiger.
12.9 The wijk under discussion
Competition between wijk councils or inactive councils made it un-
clear for the non-Moluccans as to whom they had to deal with in the 
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local Moluccan communities. For example, it happened more than 
once that housing associations that owned houses in the wijk did not 
know whom to consult when a house in the wijk became available. They 
had to do so because one of the results of the historical agreement had 
been that Moluccans would maintain influence on the inhabitants of 
the Moluccan wijk. In some cases a conflict arose after new Dutch ten-
ants were appointed. In 2004, for example, in the Moluccan wijk in Sit-
tard, Moluccans protested with banners on their houses after an empty 
house was allotted to Dutch tenants. The housing organisation com-
plained that there was no longer a Moluccan council anymore to be 
consulted, for the Moluccan council had ceased to exist two years ear-
lier (de Volkskrant 5 March 2004).
For a brief moment, the issue of the Moluccan wijk came back to 
the fore in politics. In parliament, questions were asked about the Sit-
tard case. Rita Verdonk, then minister for immigration and integra-
tion, responded that she was not happy with the situation. She felt that 
the Moluccan wijk was a concentration of problems and was negative 
for integration. She wanted to reduce the one-sided compositions of 
these wijken (Staten Generaal 2004). Later, while visiting the Moluc-
can wijk in Breda in 2005, Minister Verdonk stated that the wijk as a 
form of ‘self-chosen isolation’ was outdated and had to be ended. The 
town administration, however, told the minister that the issue was not 
her responsibility as minister of immigration and integration, pointing 
out the history that had led to this special agreement (Palet 2009; Van 
Heelsum 2007).
Although the cohesion in many wijken had reduced since the mid-
1980s, the local Moluccan communities and wijken still could function 
as a monolith for local authorities. That was the case in Sittard in 2004 
and, although there was no specific issue, again in 2011 in the town 
of Leerdam. Mayor Victor Molkenboer, having experienced problems 
coming into contact with the Moluccan community in his town, made 
excuses for the past. In his New Year’s speech, he called upon the Dutch 
government to make excuses for the way it had treated the Moluccans 
in the past with their transfer to the Netherlands and their discharge 
from the army. According to the mayor, the Dutch government had 
never shown any doubts or regrets about this past. His call evoked a 
discussion among Moluccans. One group supported the call, while oth-
ers pointed to the 1986 historical agreement as the first recognition of 
the support the Moluccans provided the Dutch during the colonial era 
and the Second World War and the way Moluccans had been received 
in the Netherlands. The mayor had apparently not been familiar with 
the historical agreement and explained that he was motivated by prob-
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lems he had encountered in communicating with the local Moluccan 
community. One example of the issues he was confronted with were 
protests of Moluccans against new tenants in the wijk who were not 
selected by the Moluccans themselves (Van der Kaaij 2012). Cynically 
enough, it had been these same problems – no access to Moluccans and 
problems with housing – that had led to the historical agreement.
12.10 Physical place to experience the community
As we have seen, the wijken as successors of the camps had been chang-
ing since they were built in the 1960s. Their structures changed, their 
institutions weakened and, due to demographic developments, they 
lost their function as main living areas for Moluccans. This does not 
mean that the wijk already is history, the housing issues showed this 
clearly.
A growing number of Moluccans have ambivalent feelings about 
the wijk. The wijk is associated with lagging behind and social control 
and is supposed to be a restraint on socio-economic mobility. Young 
Moluccans (whether it be those with two Moluccan parents or those 
from a mixed marriage) say that they appreciate the wijk. While some 
of them wittingly live in the wijk, others do not want to live there. If 
they had to, they would prefer to live on the edge of the wijk and not in 
its centre, because that is where the social pressure is the greatest (see 
Titawano 2008; Ouweneel 2011).
The appreciation of the wijk points to the important symbolic mean-
ing of these living quarters. This symbolism is apparent in many dis-
cussions and events. In a four-hour live radio programme broadcast 
from the Moluccan church Eben-Haëzer in the town of Zwolle in 
August 2012, the wijk was one point of discussion (radio programme 
ntr 2012). The Moluccan historian and cultural heritage expert, Wim 
Manuhutu, explained that many people who do not live in the wijk will 
visit the wijk especially at important moments, such as marriages and 
deaths. According to him, the wijk is a physical place for them to expe-
rience the Moluccan community. In the same radio programme, Dir-
ceu Parinussa, a 29-year-old third-generation Moluccan who lived his 
whole life in the wijk, stated that the Moluccan community would lose 
their history if they were to give up the wijk as their living quarters. He 
did not mean to say that Moluccans who live outside the wijk are less 
Moluccan, but rather that the wijk is irrevocably a part of the Moluccan 
identity because the wijk is the result of the specific Moluccan migra-
tion history.
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This symbolism of identity was emphasised in a very spectacular 
way during an event on 14 April 2012: the jubilee of the ‘Peringatan 
Maluku Ride-out’ (Remember the Moluccas Ride-out). Ride-outs, 
large groups of (Moluccan) motorcyclist touring, have already long 
been part of the entourage of Moluccan festivities, such as on the yearly 
commemoration of the rms proclamation on 25 April. The ‘Peringa-
tan Maluku Ride-out’ is a special Ride-out to call upon the people not 
to forget Moluccans who were imprisoned in Indonesia after they had 
publicly displayed the rms flag. The ‘Peringatan Maluku Ride-out’ is 
organised around 12 April, the date that the second rms president Sou-
mokil was killed in Indonesia in 1966. To celebrate the fifth anniversary 
of ‘Peringatan Maluku Ride-out’, some 360 bikers drove from the wijk 
in Geleen to Vught where a group of Moluccans still live in the last 
(renovated) Moluccan camp Lunetten. On their way, they passed the 
wijken in Venlo, Venray, Gennep and Hatert. At the same time, a Walk-
4Maluku was organised starting late at night in the wijk in Elst heading 
for Lunetten passing the wijken in Opheusden, Tiel and Den Bosch, a 
walk of some 80 kilometres. Besides the walkers and bikers, a group of 
cyclers came from the wijk in Breda to Lunetten.6
Of course, the bikers with their leather jackets full of Moluccan sym-
bols and their roaring motorcycles were the most impressive part of the 
event. The symbolic meaning of the wijk was not only emphasised by 
visiting all the wijken on the route between Geleen and Vught, but also 
by the ceremonies that were held in each wijk. In each wijk, the bik-
ers were welcomed by Moluccan dancers beating traditional Moluccan 
drums. Then, in the middle of the wijk, the rms flag was hoisted while 
the rms anthem Hena Masa was sung. After some thanks, the bikers 
left, waving them farewell with rms flags. The wijk had a significant 
role in this event in the sense that Manuhutu explained in the radio 
programme: a physical place to experience the Moluccan community.
12.11 The wijk as cultural heritage
The symbolic meaning of the wijk and its predecessor the camp is also 
expressed in the growing number of monuments that are built in the 
wijk or close to a former camp. The first monument that was erected 
in 1997 is a boulder to commemorate the former location of a camp for 
the minority of Islamic Moluccans in Balk in the north of the Neth-
erlands (the camp was closed in 1969). Seven cloves and a nutmeg on 
the boulder refer to the reason the Dutch embarked on their colonial 
adventure around 1600. Other monuments put less emphasis on the 
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colonial theme, preferring to highlight the Moluccan experience in the 
Netherlands.
Different perspectives and motivations have resulted in very dif-
ferent monuments. An interesting illustration is the creation of two 
monuments that were unveiled in September and October 2006 in the 
Moluccan wijken of Moordrecht and Vaassen, some 100 kilometres 
apart. Both represent a Moluccan family: a father, a mother and two 
children. The Moordrecht sculpture shows the family in winter dress, 
representing the arrival of the Moluccans in the bitter cold Dutch har-
bours in 1951. Their posture and faces show the hardship they had faced 
and their fears about life in the Netherlands. The sculpture in Vaassen 
presents an entirely different vision. The mother is again in traditional 
dress but the father wears a summer uniform. With his right hand he 
guides his wife to the future, to which he points with his other hand. 
The Vaassen family is clearly more prosperous. The initiative of the 
Vaassen monument was taken by the local Dutch authorities to help 
Moluccans overcome their traumatic experiences. The Vaassen monu-
ment was designed by a Dutch artist, while the Moordrecht monument 
was designed by a Moluccan artist and was an initiative of second-gen-
eration Moluccans as a tribute to their parents. Since then, more monu-
ments have been erected to make sure that the history of the Moluccans 
in the Netherlands is not forgotten (Steijlen 2011).
Some people even argue that wijken themselves should become 
places of heritage. Based on research on remnants of Moluccan history 
in the northern provinces of the Netherlands, Laurieke Zijp and Peter 
Groote (2009) suggest choosing one wijk to be given the status of a 
protected monument. Their reasoning is that the wijk is the result of a 
unique policy of segregation in the northern provinces.
A last example of a politicised symbolic meaning of the wijk is a 
recent debate among some Moluccans on whether to plead for recogni-
tion as a national ethnic minority in the Netherlands. In essence, this 
plea is an attempt to revive the old ‘special relation’ between the Dutch 
and the Moluccans. It is interesting to read how the wijk plays a role in 
it. In 2004, the government formulated five criteria upon which to des-
ignate national ethnic minorities. According to these criteria, a national 
minority must have Dutch nationality, an identity (language, culture, 
history) of their own that they want to preserve, and they should have 
been living in the Netherlands in specific areas from a long time ago, 
where they still live. The only national minority that was recognised 
were the Frisians in the province of Friesland. Discussions about the 
Roma and Sinti did not lead to recognition of them as national minori-
ties. In 2012, a group of Moluccans argued that the Moluccan commu-
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nity met the criteria because in the colonial era they were part of the 
Netherlands Kingdom and since 1951 they have lived in the camps and 
wijken in the Netherlands. In their argument, the camps and wijken 
were presented as ‘traditional areas of settlement’ and thus situated at 
the core of Moluccan identity.
12.12 Concluding remarks
In 1988, when Rinus Penninx published his PhD thesis, the Moluccan 
wijken and camps were clearly part of their socio-economic position. 
Living in special, segregated camps was a determining factor for the de-
velopment of the Moluccan community. The institutions in the living 
quarters facilitated the development of a cohesive community, perhaps 
not always voluntarily or in a friendly way for everybody due to the 
amount of social control. Interestingly enough, the transfer of Moluc-
cans from the camps to the wijken did not change this. New institutions 
(stichtingen) were established but the segregation continued. And very 
important: the wijken were considered Moluccan territory. This indi-
cates that the wijk also played a role in the ethnic-cultural position of 
the Moluccans: it was the place where they could celebrate their identity.
In the course of the last decennia, more and more Moluccans left 
the wijk to live among other people in the Netherlands. This means 
that the importance of the wijken as part of the housing component of 
the socio-economic position of Moluccans became less strong. Maybe 
we can even say that the wijk is no longer of any importance to their 
socio-economic position. This, however, does not mean that the wijk is 
history. On the contrary, in more than one way the wijken, and to some 
extent the old camps, were given new meaning. They became part of 
the core of the ethno-cultural position. The monuments and how the 
wijk has been presented in discussions since the beginning of this mil-
lennium show how strong the wijk has become a symbol of Moluccan 
identity. It represents the history of the Moluccans in the Netherlands, 
the place to experience the Moluccan community. It is probably not 
important how many Moluccans live in a wijk, as long as there is a place 
where Moluccan history can be felt and people can identify themselves 
with that history.
Erecting monuments at locations where concentrations of Moluc-
cans live or have been living also make these locations part of the Dutch 
commemoration landscape. It is a specific dimension of integration: 
the wijk as an important ingredient of Moluccan identity anchored in 
the Netherlands.
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Notes
1 I would like to thank Wim Manuhutu for comments on an earlier version of this 
paper.
2 On 17 August 1945, two days after the Japanese capitulation, Indonesian Repub-
licans declared Indonesia independent. The Dutch government refused to accept 
Indonesian independence and tried to re-establish its colonial power with mili-
tary force. Many Christian Moluccans supported this attempt. Under interna-
tional pressure the Netherlands was forced to accept Indonesia’s independence 
and hand over sovereignty to Indonesia in 1949. Soon after, Indonesia returned to 
its declaration of 1945 as the founding moment.
3 Because the word wijk has specific notions for Moluccans and refers more to their 
living area – irrespective of the number of houses or streets, – than to a regular 
district, I prefer to use the term wijk (or plural wijken) when I refer to the concen-
trated living area for Moluccans after the camp period.
4 There is one important exception: Lunetten in Vught. There, the inhabitants con-
tinued their resistance to leaving the camp. Finally in 1993 the last group was 
housed in rebuilt houses on the location of the old camp (Smeets & Steijlen 2006: 
312-314).
5 In 1982, tension between the Moluccans and the authorities in Assen reached a 
peak. There were disputes about a youth centre, and it was more over the five-year 
anniversary of the violent ending of the train hijacking in which six Moluccan 
hijackers were killed (along with two hostages). A police car was shot at nearby 
the Moluccan wijk. See Steungroep 1982.
6 There are some YouTube clips available of this Ride-out. Start in Geleen (http://
www.youtube.com/watch?v=h3kknvcBQzw) or visit Venray (http://www.you-
tube.com/watch?v=KeL_OBQ23B8).
References
Bartels, D. (1990), Ambon is op Schiphol. Socialisatie, identiteitsontwikkeling en eman-
cipatie bij Molukkers in Nederland. Leiden: comtt.
Heelsum, A. van (2007), Case study on housing: Breda, Netherlands. Dublin: European 
Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions.
Kaaij, M. van der (2012), ‘Een weggeduwde geschiedenis’. Trouw, de Verdieping 3 July 
2012.
Ouweneel, M. (2011), Het belang van de Molukse wijk in Nederland. Utrecht: Master’s 
thesis, University of Utrecht.
Palet (2009), De vensters open. Verslag Wijkendag Molukkers in Noord-Brabant. Eind-
hoven: Palet.
Penninx, R. (1988), Minderheidsvorming en emancipatie. Balans van kennisverwerving 
ten aanzien van immigranten en woonwagenbewoners. Alphen a/d Rijn: Samsom.
Radio programme ntr (2012), ‘Dichtbij de Molukse gemeenschap in Zwolle’ (Closer 
to the Moluccan community in Zwolle), ntr 7 August 2012.
168 Fridus Steijlen
Smeets, H. & F. Steijlen (2006), In Nederland gebleven, de geschiedenis van Molukkers 
1951-2006. Amsterdam: Bert Bakker.
Staten Generaal (2004), Handelingen Tweede Kamer 2003-2004, nr 1407, Vragen van 
de leden Varela en Nawijn (beiden lpf) aan de minister voor Vreemdelingenzaken 
en Integratie over een Molukse wijk in Sittard welke mogelijk een Nederlands gezin 
weigert. Den Haag: Staatsuitgeverij.
Steijlen, F. (1996a), rms van Ideaal tot Symbool; Moluks nationalisme in Nederland 
1951-1994. Amsterdam: Het Spinhuis.
Steijlen, F. (1996b), ‘Hostage-taking actions by Moluccans in the Netherlands’, Ethnos-
Nation 4: 97-111.
Steijlen, F. (1984), Druggebruik onder en (drug)hulpverlening aan Molukse jongeren. 
Wijchen: Uitgeverij Pattimura.
Steijlen, F. (2010), ‘Moluccans in the Netherlands: from exile to migrant’, Review of 
Indonesian and Malaysian Affairs 44 (1): 143-62.
Steijlen, F. (2011), ‘Moluccan Monuments’, Inside Indonesia Weekly Articles (103) Jan-
uary-March 2011.
Steungroep 10 van Assen vrij (1982), Dossier Assen, Groningen: np.
Titawano, T. (2008), Tussen traditie en integratie: over culturele- en sociaaleconomische 
ambities van Molukkers in Nederland. Amsterdam: Master’s thesis, University of 
Amsterdam.
Verwey-Jonker, H. (commissie), Ambonezen in Nederland. Den Haag: Staatsuitge-
verij.
Wittermans, T. (1955), ‘Het begrip communicatie-basis bij de analyse van communi-
catieproblemen’, Mens en Maatschappij 30 (6): 372-389.
Wittermans, T. (1991), Social organization among Ambonese refugees in Holland. 
Amsterdam: Het Spinhuis.
Zijp, L. & P. Groote (2009), ‘Moluks erfgoed in het Noorden’, Noorderbreedte 33 (1): 
28-31.




In general, the demographic behaviour and family dynamics of non-
Western immigrants are different from that of the Dutch. The prefer-
ences of major ethnic minority groups concerning marriage and par-
enthood vary according to the educational and religious backgrounds 
of their parents (De Valk & Billari 2007). The demographic behaviour 
of immigrants is likely to deviate more from the majority at arrival, 
but this can decrease with the time elapsed in the Netherlands if im-
migrants take over mainstream social norms in the host country. This 
study aims to address a demographic indicator of integration: inter-
ethnic differentials in leaving home (nest leaving) and returning back 
to the home in the Netherlands. Do immigrant youth leave the parental 
home at older ages than more individualistic and secularised Dutch 
youth? Although determinants of leaving the parental home have been 
extensively documented, the nest-leaving behaviour of immigrants 
and their children has seldom been addressed. Only a few studies have 
paid some attention to varying patterns of leaving home among mi-
grants (Zorlu & Mulder 2011; De Valk & Billari 2007). This paper ex-
amines interethnic differences in nest-leaving behaviour and returning 
home in the Netherlands. By considering the inclination of returning 
home after a short period of independence, the paper aims to identify 
more persistent interethnic differences in nest-leaving behaviour over 
time. Using unique individual administrative panel data from Statistics 
Netherlands, an advanced dynamic regression analysis is conducted to 
understand the behaviour of the complete age cohort 16.
13.2 Theoretical background
Ethnic differences in nest-leaving behaviour can be related to restric-
tions and opportunities shaped by socio-economic and demographic 
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characteristics of migrants and contextual variables as well as cultural 
norms. In the migration literature, there is a consensus on the dis- 
advantaged socio-economic position of immigrants from developing 
countries (Zorlu 2012). The question is how this disadvantage is related 
to the nest-leaving behaviour of migrant youth.
Upon general evidence on the timing, determinants and pathways, 
the home-leaving behaviour of immigrants has additional implications 
for the host society. Similarities in the patterns of home-leaving behav-
iour between natives and immigrant groups can be seen as an indicator 
of demographic adjustment and reflect a higher degree of integration. 
There are several reasons to expect that the home-leaving behaviour of 
migrants will differ from that of natives. Major factors that potentially 
induce interethnic differences in process and mechanisms of leaving 
arrangements may be categorised as cultural norms and a relative scar-
city of own and parental resources.
Migrants from non-Western countries often reside in social rent 
houses in large cities. These houses are usually small in size, and non-
Western youth share a relatively smaller space in the parental home 
with more people due to the greater number of children and a larger 
household size in the face of credit constraints and less favourable 
housing facilities (Zorlu 2009; Zorlu & Mulder 2008). This implies a 
relative scarcity of financial resources and a lower quality of the paren-
tal home.
Interethnic differences in cultural norms correspond to dominant 
cultural norms and preferences in the country of origin of the migrants 
in the timing and routes of departure from the parental home. In 
migrant communities from non-Western countries, family-related 
individual decisions are often prone to familial and religious concerns 
while in the secularised and individualised Dutch society, autonomous 
decisions of individuals are dominant practices regarding the timing 
of transitions into adulthood. Although Caribbean and Mediterranean 
migrants are more family oriented than the Dutch, there are funda-
mental differences between Caribbean and Mediterranean migrants 
regarding the timing and mechanisms of family-life transitions such as 
leaving home, marriage and childbearing (De Valk & Liefbroer 2007). 
In the Turkish and Moroccan communities, leaving home for marriage 
is still thought to be a dominant pattern. Traditionally arranged mar-
riages occur more frequently, and the age at which Turkish and Moroc-
can youth marry and have their first child is lower compared to Car-
ibbean migrants. In contrast to Mediterranean societies, unmarried 
cohabitation, childbearing out of wedlock and single-mother house-
holds are more common in the Caribbean tradition.
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In addition to cultural norms, individual and family preferences are 
also related to institutional factors (Aassve et al. 2002). Patterns and 
processes of living arrangements in developing countries are likely 
not independent from credit constraints, housing and labour markets 
and institutional structures. For instance, a relatively lower age of leav-
ing home in Western industrialised countries is often attributed to an 
advanced welfare state that provides a high level of support to young 
adults, like student loans, unemployment and welfare benefits and 
rent subsidies (Billari & Liefbroer 2007). This implies that nest-leaving 
home behaviour of non-Western youth in the Netherlands can differ 
significantly from the patterns in their countries of origin.
In the face of the above arguments, I formulate the following hypoth-
esis: differences in the nest-leaving behaviour of migrant groups will 
vary with socio-economic and cultural distances from the Dutch. More 
traditional and disadvantaged Turkish and Moroccan youth will leave 
the parental home at older ages and are more likely to return home 
compared to Dutch and Caribbean (Surinamese and Antilleans) and 
Western migrants.
13.3 Following two birth cohorts over time
For the analysis, I use the entire population of two birth cohorts of 
those who were 16 and 22 years old in 1999 derived from the Social 
Statistical Database (ssd) 1999-2004, a rich individual administrative 
database available at Statistics Netherlands. The age cohort 16 seems to 
be the earliest birth cohort from which almost all individuals live with 
one of the parents. This ensures a non-selective population.
Together with the cohort 16, the age cohort 22 is followed to show 
the timing of home leaving. Since both cohorts can be followed five 
years long, the whole period from age 16 to 27 is covered. In the period 
1999-2004, each cohort can be followed for five years to track the first-
time transition from parental home to another living arrangement. Fig-
ure 1 shows the proportion of youth living in the parental home over 
the ages 16 to 27 by gender and country of origin. It is immediately 
apparent that girls leave the parental home earlier than boys do. By the 
time they are 27 years, only about 10 per cent of girls and 25 per cent of 
boys still live in the parental home. Looking at ethnic differences in the 
home-leaving behaviour by gender, Turkish and Moroccan youth, both 
girls and boys, leave home at a younger age compared to Dutch youth. 
Many of them enter into formal adulthood at around 18 and 19 years of 
age. Surinamese youth remain longer in the parental home compared 
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table 13.1  Variables and their route specific means at the time of leaving home or                the end of period (censoring)
Stayed Union Study Other
Girl 1 if person is girl Girl 0.40 0.83 0.61 0.61
Dutch 1 if the country of origin is the Netherlands Dutch 65.32 1.88 18.40 14.40
Moroccan 1 if the country of origin is Morocco Moroccan 37.40 10.49 12.03 40.08
Turkish 1 if the country of origin is Turkey Turkish 40.63 16.08 11.90 31.39
Surinamese 1 if the country of origin is Surinam Surinamese 61.05 1.62 11.06 26.27
Antillean 1 if the country of origin is the Antilles and Aruba Antillean 56.38 0.64 14.29 28.70
Other non-Western 1 if the country of origin is another non-Western country Other non-Western 57.41 1.93 16.15 24.50
Western  1 if the country of origin is a Western country Western  62.60 1.40 18.89 17.11
2nd generation 1 if born in nl and both parents were born abroad 2nd generation 0.05 0.22 0.05 0.16
2nd generation (Mixed) 1 if born in nl and one parent was born abroad 2nd generation (Mixed) 0.06 0.03 0.08 0.07
Employed 1 if employed or self-employed; 0 otherwise Employed 0.50 0.62 0.12 0.44
Log income Logarithm of fiscal income Log income 8.96 8.95 7.91 8.55
Log value of dwelling Logarithm of value of dwelling Log value of dwelling 3.59 3.21 3.59 3.33
All siblings in 1 if all siblings in the parental home All siblings in 0.56 0.45 0.56 0.48
All siblings out 1 if all siblings left the parental home All siblings out 0.19 0.14 0.20 0.21
Some siblings in, some out 1 if some siblings in the home and some others out Some siblings in, some out 0.17 0.39 0.19 0.25
Age difference with the mother (Mother’s age minus own age) in years Age difference with the mother 27.32 26.23 28.77 26.11
Age difference with the father (Father’s age minus own age) in years Age difference with the father 28.51 27.94 30.04 26.66
Mother unmarried 1 if mother unmarried Mother unmarried 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.04
Mother widow 1 if mother widow Mother widow 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.02
Mother divorced 1 if mother divorced Mother divorced 0.12 0.08 0.10 0.21
Mother cohabiting 1 if mother cohabiting (not married) Mother cohabiting 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.03
Mother employed 1 if mother employed or self-employed; 0 otherwise Mother employed 0.64 0.39 0.70 0.51
Father employed 1 if father employed or self-employed; 0 otherwise Father employed 0.80 0.68 0.85 0.64
Household size Number of persons in the household Household size 4.04 5.17 4.09 4.10
Income mother Fiscal annual income of mother in €1000 Income mother 12.59 7.52 15.98 11.79
Income father Fiscal annual income of father in €1000 Income father 35.66 28.17 48.78 26.79
% Western in neighbourh. % non-Western immigrants in the neighbourhood % Western in neighbourh. 7.63 6.83 8.13 8.44
% non-Western in neighbourh. % Western immigrants in the neighbourhood % non-Western in neighbourh. 8.38 14.04 6.32 14.45
Mean earnings in neighbourh. Mean annual income in the neighbourhood in €1000 Mean earnings in neighbourh. 18.93 13.41 19.57 15.44
Amsterdam 1 if lives in Amsterdam Amsterdam 0.03 0.05 0.02 0.06
Rotterdam 1 if lives in Rotterdam Rotterdam 0.03 0.05 0.02 0.06
The Hague 1 if lives in the Hague The Hague 0.02 0.04 0.02 0.04
Utrecht 1 if lives in Utrecht Utrecht 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02
N N 108331 4255 30418 28517
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to Turks and Moroccans, while the home-leaving behaviour of West-
ern youth is very similar to that of the Dutch. Considering all groups 
together by the age of 27, 20 to 35 per cent of boys and less than 20 per 
cent of girls live with their parents.
figure 13.1 Percentage of youngsters living in their parental home, uncon-  
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Table 13.1 shows the variables that are used in this study and their mean 
values for each destination outside the home. In general, girls are more 
likely to leave home, in particular for union formation. Turkish and 
Moroccan youth are also overrepresented among union formers. A 
better parental economic position (employment and higher income) 
is associated with either staying home longer or a high probability of 
leaving home for study. On the other hand, a weak parental socio-eco-
nomic position is strongly correlated with leaving home for union for-
mation or other reasons. If the mother is divorced, the probability of 
leaving home for any destination is relatively high.
3.4 Explaining ethnic differences in nest leaving
Individual home-leaving behaviour is analysed in the framework of a 
discrete time duration model with competing risks. In this setting, the 
likelihood of leaving home for three destinations at time t is estimated, 
given this person lives in the parental home at time t-1. In other words, 
the duration of the home-leaving spell is specified as the conditional 
probability of leaving home, i.e. the hazard rate. In this framework, the 
survival time for co-residing individuals is assumed to start at the age 
of 16 in 1999 and to end when an individual leaves the parental home 
for the first time. It is censored when the individual was still co-residing 
with the parent(s) in the last year of observation (2004).
Leaving the parental home is measured at the moment the young 
adult has left home. Leaving home can occur between 1999 and 2004 
and is measured as a change in the young adult’s address from living 
with at least one parent to living away from the parents. The pathway of 
leaving home is also measured after leaving home. I distinguish three 
pathways: leaving home to form a union (married or unmarried), leav-
ing for study (higher education) and leaving for another reason.
In the analysis, young people are treated as a part of the parental 
household, rather than treating them as an independent actor. So, the 
decision by young people to leave the parental home is assumed to be 
interactively determined by their own resources and the resources of 
their parents, household structure and spatial context.
The parameter estimates of the competing risk models by gender 
are presented in table 13.2. The likelihood for leaving to form a union 
increases in the first four years, after which it declines again. The base-
line hazard for leaving for study reflects a monotonously increasing 
shape while it is similar over the years for the ‘other’ route. Looking 
at inter-origin differentials, the probability of departure toward any 
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table 13.2 Determinants of nest leaving by gender, multinominal odds ratios
                 boys                  girls
Union Study Other Union Study Other
 α2 18.28 *** 7.56 *** 2.86 ***  α2 3.32 *** 6.32 *** 2.96 ***
 α3 21.41 *** 17.55 *** 2.69 ***  α3 5.58 *** 13.79 *** 3.31 ***
 α4 31.24 *** 28.20 *** 3.18 ***  α4 7.58 *** 20.42 *** 3.83 ***
 α5 9.93 ** 33.71 *** 3.21 ***  α5 3.83 *** 24.14 *** 3.59 ***
Moroccan 1.04 1.76 *** 5.49 *** Moroccan 7.80 *** 1.17 2.99 ***
Turkish 14.23 *** 1.85 *** 4.17 *** Turkish 18.57 *** 1.26 * 2.34 ***
Surinamese 1.92 0.67 *** 1.41 *** Surinamese 1.82 *** 0.81 ** 1.16 **
Antillean 0.51 0.84 1.52 *** Antillean 0.51 1.20 1.48 ***
Other non-Western 2.23 *** 1.43 *** 1.98 *** Other non-Western 1.81 *** 1.15 * 1.26 ***
Western 0.95 0.96 1.41 *** Western 1.75 *** 0.91 1.12 **
2nd generation 0.86 1.10 0.89 ** 2nd generation 0.74 *** 1.06 0.86 ***
2nd generation (Mixed) 1.26 1.06 0.78 *** 2nd generation (Mixed) 0.44 *** 1.23 *** 0.89 **
Employed 1.00 0.42 *** 1.23 *** Employed 2.13 *** 0.44 *** 1.73 ***
Log income 2.45 *** 0.65 *** 1.14 *** Log income 1.76 *** 0.73 *** 1.17 ***
Log value of dwelling 1.25 1.74 *** 0.78 *** Log value of dwelling 0.90 1.58 *** 0.68 ***
Household size 1.30 *** 1.05 *** 1.04 *** Household size 1.29 *** 1.02 * 1.00
All siblings in 1.29 0.98 0.90 ** All siblings in 1.04 1.13 ** 1.02
All siblings out 4.09 *** 1.51 *** 1.87 *** All siblings out 2.32 *** 1.54 *** 1.81 ***
Some siblings in, some out 3.30 *** 1.37 *** 1.71 *** Some siblings in, some out 2.45 *** 1.41 *** 1.66 ***
Age difference with the mother 0.99 1.04 *** 0.96 *** Age difference with the mother 0.97 *** 1.03 *** 0.95 ***
Age difference with the father 0.97 *** 1.00 0.99 *** Age difference with the father 0.99 * 1.00 1.00
Mother unmarried 0.47 1.29 ** 1.35 *** Mother unmarried 0.41 *** 1.32 *** 1.37 ***
Mother widow 0.64 1.15 0.64 *** Mother widow 1.38 1.21 ** 0.87 **
Mother divorced 0.66 * 1.09 ** 1.65 *** Mother divorced 0.94 1.07 * 1.47 ***
Mother cohabiting 1.45 3.53 *** 0.69 *** Mother cohabiting 0.35 *** 3.15 *** 0.45 ***
Mother employed 0.83 1.29 *** 0.79 *** Mother employed 0.85 ** 1.32 *** 0.89 ***
Father employed 0.79 * 1.03 0.65 *** Father employed 0.80 *** 0.98 0.80 ***
Income mother 0.98 *** 1.01 *** 1.01 *** Income mother 0.98 *** 1.01 *** 1.01 ***
Income father 1.00 1.01 *** 1.00 Income father 1.00 1.01 *** 1.00 ***
% Western migrants in neighbourh. 0.96 ** 1.02 *** 1.03 *** % Western migrants in neighbourh. 0.93 *** 1.02 *** 1.02 ***
% non-Western migrants in neighbourh. 1.01 0.99 *** 1.01 *** % non-Western migrants in neighbourh. 1.00 0.99 *** 1.01 ***
Mean earnings in neighbourh. (1000s) 0.93 *** 1.01 *** 0.98 *** Mean earnings in neighbourh. (1000s) 0.96 *** 1.01 *** 0.99 ***
Amsterdam 1.05 1.33 *** 0.91 * Amsterdam 0.93 1.16 * 0.75 ***
Rotterdam 1.06 0.92 1.01 Rotterdam 1.16 1.00 0.99
The Hague 0.99 0.97 1.25 *** The Hague 1.05 1.30 *** 0.96
Utrecht 0.64 1.40 *** 0.95 Utrecht 0.84 1.30 *** 1.05
Constant 0.00 *** 0.00 *** 0.04 *** Constant 0.00 *** 0.00 *** 0.13 ***
N 396649 N 353070
* p<.01; ** p<.001; *** p<.0001
Note: dummy variables should be interpreted with respect to the reference categories. The 
reference categories for ethnic background, siblings, mother’s marital status and large cities 
are respectively: Dutch, no-sibling present, mother-married and the rest of the Netherlands.
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route is particularly high for young people of Turkish, Moroccan and 
other non-Western origin. The probability of leaving home for union 
is spectacularly higher for Turkish and Moroccan girls as well as Turk-
ish boys compared to their native counterparts, although they form 
only a small part of the home leavers up to the ages of 24. Interestingly, 
Surinamese boys and girls have a lower probability of leaving home 
for study compared to their native counterparts, as do Western girls. 
There is obviously little compelling reason for Surinamese girls to leave 
home for study because they are already concentrated in large univer-
sity cities. Second-generation immigrant girls have a lower probability 
of leaving home for union formation or ‘other’ reasons, while they are 
more likely to leave for study. The second-generation boys have a lower 
probability of departing for ‘other’ reasons. Among the second genera-
tion, those with one foreign-born parent have a relatively lower prob-
ability of leaving their home for ‘other’ reasons than for study com-
pared to the second generation with foreign-born parents. This implies 
that there is more similarity between the second generation with one 
foreign-born parent and natives than in the case of two foreign-born 
parents.
Youth in paid employment and those with higher incomes have a 
significantly lower probability of leaving home for study and a higher 
probability of leaving for ‘other’ reasons. A strong positive correlation 
between income and the probability of leaving home for union for-
mation may be obvious for young men and women since they need 
financial resources to start a union. A relatively stronger correlation 
for young men confirms the persistence of the traditional breadwin-
ner concept. However, more striking is the higher probability of girls 
leaving home for union formation when they are employed, while the 
likelihood of leaving home for union formation is not higher among 
employed men. This may reflect a greater sensitivity of men for higher 
income, not necessarily for having a (small) job. Different than men, 
having a (small) job is also an important factor for women to leave 
home for union in addition to income.
The presence of siblings has in general a positive effect on leaving 
home, often for union formation, especially when some or all siblings 
have already left home. A greater age differential with the mother leads 
to a lower likelihood of leaving home for union formation or another 
reason but a higher likelihood to leave for study. A similar effect is 
observed for the age differential with the father, albeit less strong. This 
finding implies a rejection of the hypothesis that a greater age differ-
ence with parents can reflect a higher intensity of intergenerational 
conflict which can serve as a push factor.
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Children of unmarried and divorced mothers are more likely to 
leave home for study and other reasons but less frequently for union 
formation. The likelihood of leaving home for study is the highest for 
the children of cohabiting mothers and widowed mothers. In addition, 
these children are less likely to move for other reasons, as in the case of 
the children of widowed mothers.
The employment position of parents has a clear positive impact on 
the likelihood of leaving home for study but retards the likelihood of 
leaving for union formation or other reasons. A higher income of the 
parents generates similar effects. Although the effects of employment 
and the income positions of mothers and fathers are in the same direc-
tion, the effects are larger in magnitude for the mothers.
Looking at the impact of contextual variables, the likelihood of leav-
ing home for study and other reasons is greater for those who live in 
neighbourhoods with a higher share of Western migrants and higher 
incomes, but the likelihood of union formation is smaller for them. 
Young people living in neighbourhoods with a higher share of non-
Western migrants are, on the other hand, less likely to move for study 
but more likely to move for other reasons. These outcomes confirm the 
intuition that young people in ‘high quality’ neighbourhoods are more 
likely to leave the parental home predominantly for study but less likely 
for union formation at relatively younger ages. Furthermore, young 
people living in Amsterdam and Utrecht leave home for study more 
frequently. Strikingly, youth in Amsterdam are less likely to leave home 
for other reasons.
13.5 Returning home
The question is how persistent the patterns of leaving home are across 
the different migrant groups and native Dutch. This can be understood, 
as we know how the probabilities of leaving home are related to the 
probabilities of returning home across the groups. As Figure 13.2 shows, 
the probabilities of returning home are quite constant for almost all 
groups up to age 20, after which they tend to increase. The higher re-
turn probability for Surinamese and Turkish boys and girls are remark-
able.
In order to assess determinants of returning home, I estimate the 
probability of returning home for boys and girls, who already left home 
using a discrete time survival model. The dependent variable, return, 
in this case has a binary structure, taking the value 1 if the individual 
returns to the parental home and otherwise taking the value 0. The sur-
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vival time starts and ends when an individual leaves the parental home 
and returns to the home. It is right-censored when the individual had 
not returned home by the last year of observation (2004).
The estimates in table 13.2 show that young males from non-West-
ern countries have a higher probability of returning home than native 
Dutch which is the reference category. However, no significant ethnic 
































































figure 13.2 Percentage of boys and girls who have returned home after  
  having left the parental home by country of origin
nest-leaving behaviour among immigrant youth 181
namese girls who have a significantly higher probability of returning 
home compared to Dutch girls. Employment leads to a higher prob-
ability of returning home while a higher income has the reverse effect. 
Interestingly, the probability of returning home is substantially lower 
when all or some siblings are co-residing with parents. However, this 
probability is higher when all siblings have already left the home. A 
higher age difference with the mother lowers the probability of leav-
ing home but an age difference with father has no impact on this per-
centage. When the mother is divorced or widowed, the probability of 
returning is higher than when the mother is married, while in the case 
of the cohabiting mother the probability of returning is substantially 
lower. The impacts of employment and the income levels of parents 
are similar to the impacts of youngsters’ own employment and income, 
although these effects are smaller. Variables indicating neighbourhood 
ethnic composition and economic conditions have no effect.
table 13.3 Determinants of returning home, odds ratios
Variable Boys Girls 
Log α 1.36 ** 1.21 *
Moroccan 0.95 0.98
Turkish 1.32 ** 0.97
Surinamese 1.42 *** 1.27 **
Antillean 1.44 * 1.27
Other non-Western 1.30 ** 1.08
Western 1.04 1.18
2nd generation (parents born abroad) 1.06 1.00
2nd generation (mixed) 1.00 0.93
Employed 1.73 *** 1.25 ***
Log income 0.88 *** 0.91 ***
Log housing value 0.92 0.95
All siblings in 0.08 *** 0.03 ***
All siblings out 1.16 * 1.36 ***
Some siblings in, some out 0.34 *** 0.25 ***
Difference mother’s age and own age 0.97 *** 0.98 ***
Difference father’s age and own age 1.00 1.00
Variable Boys Girls 
Mother unmarried 1.10 1.07
Mother widow 1.20 1.38 **
Mother divorced 1.28 *** 1.17 ***
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Variable Boys Girls 
Mother cohabiting 0.43 *** 0.41 ***
Mother employed 1.19 *** 1.16 ***
Father employed 1.30 *** 1.31 ***
Income mother 0.99 *** 0.99 ***
Income father 0.99 *** 1.00 ***
% Western migrants in neighbourhood 1.00 1.01 ***
% non-Western migrants in neighbourhood 1.00 1.00
Mean earnings in neighbourhood (000s) 1.01 * 1.01
Amsterdam 0.80 ** 1.15 *
Rotterdam 0.75 *** 0.94
The Hague 0.73 *** 0.77 **
Utrecht 0.90 0.95
Constant 0.25 *** 0.15 ***
* p<.01; ** p<.001; *** p<.0001
13.6 Conclusions
This study examined ethnic differentials in the timing of nest leaving 
and pathways out of the parental home as well as in returning home. 
My hypothesis was that more traditional and disadvantaged Turkish 
and Moroccan youth would leave the parental home at older ages and 
were more likely to return home compared to native Dutch and Carib-
bean (Surinamese and Antilleans) and Western migrants. The analysis 
showed that migrant young men and women leave the parental home 
at relatively younger ages compared to their Dutch counterparts. There 
are significant differences in the reasons why the different groups leave 
home. The behaviour of Western migrants is very similar to that of the 
Dutch, while the most deviation in nest-leaving behaviour is observed 
for Mediterranean (Turkish and Moroccan) migrants. The nest-leaving 
pattern of Caribbean migrants is also more similar to that of the Dutch.
Contrary to my expectations, Mediterranean migrants leave home 
significantly earlier than the Dutch. A substantially high incidence 
of departures from the home around 18 years of age for this group is 
striking, while departure rates are more smoothly spread over time. In 
view of the relatively late timing of nest leaving in the origin countries 
of these migrants, this outcome unambiguously contradicts the idea 
that ethnic origin or cultural characteristics determine the nest-leav-
ing behaviour of migrants. Constraints imposed by the unfavourable 
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socio-economic position of non-Western migrants in the Netherlands 
do not seem to hinder the early nest leaving of these migrants. The 
results suggest dominating effects of opportunity structure enriched by 
the Dutch welfare state. The behaviour of the second generation from 
this group is closer to that of the Dutch, as expected.
The impact of ethnic origin and socio-economic position is appar-
ent in the choices of the pathways out of the parental home. Mediter-
ranean migrants are more likely to leave home for union formation but 
less likely to do so for study. In particular, leaving home for union for-
mation is very popular for Turkish and Moroccan girls as well as Turk-
ish boys. However, the fraction of migrants leaving home for union for-
mation remains modest within the whole population of nest leavers.
The analysis also showed that returning to the home after first leav-
ing home does not eliminate the pattern of ethnic difference that we 
had assumed (Moroccans and Turks most prone to return, then Suri-
namese, then the Dutch). We saw that a larger fraction of Surinamese 
and Turkish youth return home than within other groups. The proba-
bility of returning home is higher when all siblings are out of the home, 
the parents are divorced and both the individual and the parents are 
employed. However, the probability is significantly lower when all sib-
lings are co-residing with the parents.
Overall, the most striking finding of this study on nest-leaving 
behaviour of Turkish and Moroccan youth is that cultural norms are 
not necessarily the only explanation for the gap in immigrant integra-
tion. The context obviously matters.
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methodological issues
14 Thick descriptions, typologies and 
responsible and relevant research
Ilse van Liempt
14.1 Introduction
Sometimes the starting point for research is a well-developed theory, 
while at other times it is the absence of detailed knowledge of a phe-
nomenon that is the driving force behind a study. My PhD research, 
supervised by Rinus Penninx, was developed with the aim of collect-
ing new information that would add to our current knowledge on 
human smuggling. I have very good memories of my meetings with 
Rinus Penninx as my PhD supervisor (between 2002 and 2006). The 
first meetings were very much about my data collection. The fieldwork I 
had envisioned was complex, sensitive and very time-consuming. I had 
decided to interview immigrants and refugees from various countries 
(and thus had to deal with various languages) who had been depend-
ent on others for organising their journey to the Netherlands. As a ge-
ographer, I was eager to learn from anthropologists (my co-supervisor 
Jeroen Doomernik was also trained as an anthropologist) how to do 
fieldwork in a ‘proper’ way. Rinus advised me to take a course in life his-
tory methodology, to keep a research diary and to work with refugees 
as research assistants.
These ‘assistants’ (one of them already had his PhD but could not 
find a job at his level) helped me a lot in the data process. Initially I 
had thought of their role as translators but soon this turned out to be 
a bad idea, as it formalised the interview setting and reminded people 
of interviews they had gone through before with official institutions. 
This taught me that migrants’ lives in general and refugees’ lives in par-
ticular are very much influenced by specific political and institutional 
frameworks that pose very concrete methodological challenges. We 
then decided that the assistants should conduct the interviews them-
selves in cases where I faced a language barrier. Apart from overcoming 
language barriers, my research assistants have taught me to see what 
data was useful for my analysis. Sometimes they confronted me with 
my own positionality and my preconceived ideas around smuggling. 
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While reading the transcripts of the interviews, I often came across sen-
tences such as ‘… as you know …’, referring to a shared experience with 
my assistants. The fact that they had been smuggled themselves made 
it possible for me to enter a world that would otherwise probably have 
remained much more hidden.
Apart from discussions on data collection, the supervision meetings 
I had with Rinus Penninx were very much about how to structure my 
material, how to bring order to my overwhelming piles of data and how 
to build theory from all these interesting findings. I remember that I 
was sometimes overwhelmed by Rinus’s urge to order and structure 
things, and I could not always merge this with the image I had of an 
anthropologist. I was convinced that my research was explorative and 
that I should not be too focused. Over time, however, I came to appre-
ciate this structured way of working and it really helped me to make 
sense of my data. At the moment of writing, I am teaching grounded 
theory (Glaser & Strauss 1967) and qualitative research methods to 
geography students at Utrecht University, and I often think back on the 
lessons I learned from Rinus Penninx. Analysing data is at the heart of 
building theory but it is the most difficult and the least codified part of 
the process. Published studies generally describe research design and 
data collection methods but give very little attention to discussion of 
analysis. This was already noted by Strauss in 1987 and is still very true.
14.2 Stay close to your material
Rinus’s advice on the use of ‘thick descriptions’ (Geertz 1973) turned out 
to be very useful in my research for several reasons. First of all, my de-
tailed focus on people’s life stories resulted in a lot of detailed and rich 
data and allowed me to see respondents’ surroundings and learn about 
their feelings in greater detail. As such, it made it easier to ‘ground’ and 
understand certain decisions/actions that were taken by interviewees. 
Second, the focus on life stories made it easier for people to talk about 
sensitive issues such as ‘illegal’ activities like buying fake documents, 
crossing the border with a smuggler or hiding the truth from police or 
immigration officers because one knows that the consequences of re-
vealing the truth can be severe. These issues made up a part of their 
lives and were less difficult to talk about when the whole context was 
discussed. Crossing a border with a smuggler becomes an ‘ordinary’ part 
of one’s migration journey when there are no legal possibilities around.
Third, because of all the detail in my material I spent a lot of time 
on what is commonly called ‘open’ coding; a brainstorming approach 
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to analysis to open up the data to all potentials and possibilities con-
tained within them (Corbin & Strauss 2008: 160). This process of open 
coding where one stays close to the original material and the words 
and languages used by respondents turned out to be very important. 
Examining how respondents use language can tell us a lot about a sit-
uation. My interviews for example showed me that there is often lit-
tle stigma attached to the smuggling business from migrants’ point of 
view. Migrants who have used the services of smugglers often describe 
them as ‘helpers’, as ‘people who save lives’, or as a ‘necessary alterna-
tive’ in a world with many restrictions on mobility (Van Liempt 2007). 
The terms they used to express what smuggling meant were conceptu-
ally very expressive. In the media and public opinion, however, smug-
glers are often perceived to be linked to organised crime. My interviews 
with smuggled migrants showed me that classifying all types of smug-
gling as a form of organised crime is highly misleading. Most of the 
literature on human smuggling, however, lacks the voice of the migrant 
and is dominated by a business/organised crime way of thinking (Van 
Liempt & Doomernik 2006). It was only after considering all possi-
ble meanings and examining the context carefully that I was ready to 
put interpretative conceptual levels on the data. And it was because I 
stayed close to my data that I was able to come up with insights about 
the phenomenon of human smuggling that went far beyond common 
knowledge.
14.3 Building a typology
The challenge I faced during the analysis of my data was that due to the 
large volume of my data there was a temptation to make it too complex 
and to lose sense of proportions. The detailed work at the beginning of 
my research, however, guided me towards a typology of different types 
of human smuggling that I had come across. If I wanted to trace and 
nuance ideas about human smuggling and most of all if I wanted to 
break the myth that human smuggling is always a criminal offence, I 
had to come up with a typology in which different types of smuggling 
were presented. The next step was thus bringing the detailed raw data 
to a higher level of abstraction. As Coffey and Atkinson (1996) argue, 
data analysis is an active process that assumes working with the data in 
terms of reducing and complicating by looking for patterns at a higher 
level of abstraction.
My data suggested that it was not sufficient to only look at how 
smugglers cooperate among themselves. Interviews with smuggled 
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migrants clearly showed that migrants are not passive actors and that 
they shape the evolvement of the smuggling process to a considerable 
extent. It also appeared from the data that trust plays a vital role in the 
decision-making process, not only from the side of the smuggler but 
also from the migrant’s perspective. This of course makes perfect sense, 
as migrants put their lives in the hand of smugglers and this is not an 
easy decision to take. However, it also struck me from the data that 
the level of agency within the decision-making process differed clearly 
from situation to situation. I decided to take the different types of inter-
action between smugglers and migrants as well as the outcome of the 
smuggling process as the basis for my typology. In its purest sense, 
inductive analysis within grounded theory is to build theory from the 
ground, grounded in the data. I clearly used my data as an input for the 
typology that I was constructing.
The first type I identified in my PhD was the service type of smug-
gling (Van Liempt 2007). In this case, migrants knew exactly where they 
were going and how much they had to pay for it, and they were brought 
exactly to where they were promised by the smuggler. Relations between 
smugglers and migrants within this type were often based on trust. This 
type of smuggling process looked quite similar, apart from its risks and 
the high costs, to regular migration processes. Migrant communities 
often played an active role in this type of smuggling and the destination 
depended clearly on already established communities in the country of 
destination. The second type I discovered was the directive type of smug-
gling (ibid). This type of smuggling is often referred to in the media as 
well as in other academic studies. The smuggler in this case decides 
how the smuggling process will evolve, leaving the migrants with no 
voice of their own and often in unexpected destinations. The migrants 
I interviewed who belonged to this type had ended up in the Nether-
lands but had never considered this country as an option themselves. 
Moreover, migrants within this type of smuggling had a low degree of 
autonomy and the relation between the smuggler and the migrant was 
often anonymous, which made the risk for exploitation much higher 
than in the other types I identified.
The third type was the negotiable type of smuggling (ibid). Central to 
this process were the interactions between smugglers and migrants and 
most of all the fact that migrants were clearly in the position to choose. 
This type of smuggling often occurred when migrants travelled step 
by step. Smugglers may offer different destinations for various prices 
from which the migrants need to choose. When several smugglers are 
involved, the final destination may only be decided after a consider-
able amount of time and various border crossings. Besides, along the 
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way migrants also collect as much information as possible, constantly 
trying to become knowledgeable about ‘good’ smugglers, safe routes 
and ‘good’ countries of destination, all of which may impact ideas that 
migrants have about their final destination. This dynamic situation 
makes the migration process with the help of a smuggler very unpre-
dictable. It must be acknowledged, however, that the three types of 
smuggling that I have identified are not static. People may easily shift 
from one type to the other during their travel. Smugglers may, for exam-
ple, pretend to act differently at the start and then change their style/
attitude. Migrants, for their part, can also inform and update them-
selves about final destinations, routes to take and/or the reputation of 
a specific smuggler along the way which can result in a shift of types.
14.4 The human touch
Apart from the technical story of how to structure my data and build 
a theory, Rinus always reminded me of the human touch and the fact 
that my typologies and categorisations were filled with personal sto-
ries and real people. I was convinced from the start of this project that 
I wanted to put migrants’ perspectives central. My research, however, 
was part of a wider European project and within the project there had 
been considerable scepticism towards the interviewing method. It was 
assumed that people involved in human smuggling would never speak 
openly about such a sensitive topic and could potentially still be under 
threat from smugglers, making it unlikely that they would tell the truth. 
Consequently, it was assumed that my fieldwork would not provide ac-
curate information on the detailed characteristics of an illegal activity 
such as smuggling. Over and over again, I had to defend myself. Rinus 
encouraged me not to be angry but to come up with good arguments. 
This really helped me to grow academically.
When my project was finished, a member of the defence commit-
tee again expressed his doubts about my methodology, but this time I 
was better prepared. The general criticism I had to face was that it was 
assumed that people involved in human smuggling would never be in a 
position to speak openly. Apart from breaking the illusion that people 
would never tell the complete truth in any interview setting and that 
all conversation is to a certain extent constructed, I am still convinced 
that the way we designed our study with the help of refugees as research 
assistants and our reflexivity on the data collection process has brought 
out data that is valid. It is often forgotten that in research on vulner-
able migrants, mistrust is often a key factor. As Robinson makes clear, 
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‘many asylum seekers have had to learn not to trust people to survive. 
Their persecutions in the country of origin may have been sparked by 
a casual comment made by a neighbour, a colleague, a friend or even 
someone who wished them ill’ (2002: 64, emphasis added). This par-
ticular situation calls for research approaches that are different from 
those commonly used in terms of building up trust. Unfortunately, 
understanding why and how individuals develop mistrust but also to 
what extent respondents are mistrusted is only rarely taken into consid-
eration in research (Van Liempt & Bilger 2012).
Moreover, I think that the reactions illustrated (and they still do) 
the far-reaching impact of discursive practices linking human smug-
gling to crime and security. Many people have pre-determined notions 
of who smugglers are. In the end, it strengthened my conviction that 
interviewing migrants about their experiences with human smuggling 
would be necessary in order to capture a broader understanding of this 
phenomenon and to reveal parts of a social world that would otherwise 
remain hidden. The desire to re-embody the effects of frequently dis-
embodied policy rationales and discourses around human smuggling 
became my driving factor to keep working on this topic, even today. 
Rinus understood my personal engagement with my research. I was 
teaching Dutch to migrants without documents who wanted to inte-
grate and learn the language but were not allowed to do so by the state. 
I also spent quite a lot of time with my respondents and offered some of 
them help in terms of advice, small jobs as well as meals during inter-
views. The conversations we had about this during supervision were 
helpful. I have to say that I was inspired by the fact that Rinus himself 
had also been a ‘responsible’ researcher. When he studied anthropology 
in Leiden, he had set up a working group for migrant workers. More 
recently in 2006, he was involved in the initiative Eén land, één samen-
leving (One country, one society), which tries to nuance the discourse 
in the media about the multicultural society and to decrease polarisa-
tion.
14.5 Relevant research
I agree with Bakewell (2008) that some research, and especially re-
search in the field of migration, is too much guided by the categories, 
concepts and priorities of policymakers and practitioners, and that it is 
important to look beyond existing categories. Rinus also taught me to 
reflect critically on the meaning and effects of the categories that I was 
building. And we had long discussions over the use of the word ‘illegal’, 
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‘irregular’ or ‘undocumented’ types of migration. Ethical questions in 
research with undocumented migrants became a topic that I further 
explored after my PhD. For example, I edited a book called The Ethics 
of Migration Research Methodology in which I asked several researchers 
to reflect on the ethical dilemmas one faces while conducting research 
with vulnerable migrants (Van Liempt & Bilger 2009).
At the same time, however, I think that an active involvement in the 
field and an intimate connection with empirical reality may result in 
new research questions that may be relevant for policy. While conduct-
ing fieldwork with smuggled migrants in the Netherlands, I discovered 
that many of them, in particular Somalis, were leaving for the United 
Kingdom once they obtained their Dutch citizenship. I was intrigued 
by this phenomenon and I applied for European Union funding to fur-
ther explore this issue. I was fortunate to get a scholarship and make 
this research dream come true.
The fact that I was still in touch with many of the Somalis I had 
interviewed for my PhD greatly benefited this next project. One of the 
things I came across in my study of this internal eu movement is that 
there is much more need for research that recognises the ‘normality’ 
within migrants’ lives rather than privileging their position as forced, 
vulnerable, etc. Not every aspect in a migrant’s life is to be explained by 
migration alone. Onward migrants may, for example, want to rectify 
what they perceive as actual or potential unsatisfactory integration out-
comes. Their decision to migrate on is comparable to other eu citizens’ 
transnational strategies of making a career. In reality, various dimen-
sions may overlap, influence or determine one another. Researchers 
need to carefully weigh different factors according to their actual signif-
icance in order to avoid what has been called a ‘migration bias’ (Bilger 
& Van Liempt 2009: 3).
14.6 Conclusion
Qualitative research is producing large amounts of data from various 
sources (field notes on observations, interview transcripts, notes from 
research diaries, and sometimes even pictures or film), which makes 
the analysis complex and demanding. It requires both flexibility and 
skills and experience on the part of the researcher, as all this data needs 
to be organised in a structured way and interpreted in a creative way 
in order to be able to answer the research question(s). The question of 
how to do this largely remains a secret to researchers just beginning 
their careers. Very little is written about how one should analyse one’s 
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qualitative data. Moreover, in many qualitative studies, no real justice 
is done to the complexity of the data analysis process because of the 
enormous time pressure academics face. The PhD experience is usually 
when grounded theory is performed in its purest sense. I would like to 
conclude by thanking Rinus Penninx for guiding me through the pro-
cess of a PhD research in which I learned so much.
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15 In the mud puddle
The research diary as a method
Liza Mügge
Once there was a mud puddle, it was sleepy, it was creepy, 
it was deeper-than-you’d-think. When something went into 
that mud puddle, the mud puddle didn’t want to let go. 
(Sierra 2001: 1)1
15.1 Introduction
A research field is like a mud puddle. No matter how thoroughly pre-
pared a researcher is, once s/he steps into it determined to find what 
s/he is looking for, it appears to be messy and a range of unexpected 
events will quickly unfold. Up to one’s knees in the mud, the safe and 
clean environment of university libraries and offices seems miles away. 
The research diary is a well-established tool of ethnographers in which 
they comprehensively try to grasp and reflect on what they experience 
and observe in the field. In anthropology, diary entries and sometimes 
personal emotions are legitimate data sources and are often published 
in their rawest form (Kleinman & Copp 1993). Although the pioneers 
in immigration research on both sides of the Atlantic were anthropolo-
gists, particularly because they had conducted fieldwork in migrants’ 
homelands (see Foner et al. 2000), this methodological tradition did 
not gain ground in the interdisciplinary field of comparative migration 
studies. That is unfortunate, because as I will argue, it has much to offer 
for studies drawing on in-depth interviews or fieldwork. In the chil-
dren’s story that has inspired this essay’s title, the toddlers ultimately 
persevere over the nasty mud puddle; once it has dried they happily 
turn the sand into castles, pizzas and cookies. Drawing on notes kept 
between 2003-2005 on fieldwork in the Netherlands, Surinam and Tur-
key for my PhD research on transnational migrant politics, this essay 
shows how the research diary helped me to prepare for my mud puddle, 
kept me from drowning, pulled me out and offered new questions for 
future research. It demonstrates that the research diary may have mul-
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tiple functions that vary over the following phases of a research cycle: 
preparation, fieldwork, analysis and writing, and post-project.
15.2 Preparation: trained to prepare for the unexpected?
Anthropological methodology teaches us that researchers need to cap-
ture the first, most crisp and naïve impressions in as detailed a manner 
and as soon as possible (Bernard 2002). After a day or even after an 
hour, important impressions and thoughts will have faded. As one of my 
anthropology lecturers urged us during our first year: ‘if the restroom 
is the only place to jot down some notes, use it!’ In the early phases of 
the research process, it is even more crucial to write as much as possible 
because the field is new. Researchers generally – though partially – accli-
matise themselves after a few weeks; things that surprised them during 
the first weeks thus appear fully normal once in full action in the field. 
Moreover, a systematic description of the first phases of the research 
process enables the researcher to reconstruct steps and choices taken. 
After all, it is likely that the readership is as naïve as the researcher was 
at the beginning of the project. The author needs to take the reader by 
the hand and guide her or him through the findings. Furthermore, how 
foolish and unimportant some observations may seem, at some point 
they may become valuable. When and how these observations may be-
come meaningful is unknown in advance. That all events and actions are 
equally important – certainly at the beginning of a study – is a classical 
justification by anthropologists who are ‘hanging around’ and waiting 
for ‘surprises’. Because of the vagueness of this method – for example, 
the impossibility to capture expected findings in a testable hypothesis – 
it is criticised by the broader social scientific community for not being 
systematic enough. Despite the wisdom that ‘something happens when 
nothing happens’ (Becker 1998) and the comforting words of great an-
thropologists who look back on their landmark works with emotions 
of ‘hopelessness and despair’ (Malinowski 1984[1922]: 4), the feeling of 
not really knowing whether the ‘right’ accidents will happen may give 
an anthropologist the feeling of being out of control. While anthropolo-
gists are expected to be hyper flexible and to some extent trained to ‘lose 
control’ on the research topic, this openness of the ethnographic tradi-
tion and the reflections on it in a research diary makes the method hard 
to use in other disciplines. Moreover, ethnography in its purest form 
and the diary seem to be used predominantly together. My methodol-
ogy courses in anthropology did not suggest that the research diary as 
a method could travel. In my work I have eventually separated the two.
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It was one of my PhD supervisors, Rinus Penninx – trained as an 
anthropologist and the founding father of migration studies in the 
Netherlands – who strongly advised me to keep a research diary over 
the whole research period. Although I valued my methodological 
training in anthropology, I did not really see the added value for the 
research project I was conducting, a comparative case study. Despite its 
reliance on qualitative data, my project was miles away from a classical 
ethnography: I knew what I was looking for. But I followed Penninx’s 
advice. Every night during the preparations and over the course of my 
fieldwork I faithfully wrote in my diary. I am glad I did.
The diary writing was time-consuming and simply draining after 
a day of trying to get access to respondents, participating in political 
events and interviewing. During the day I jotted down thoughts and 
observations in my notebook. This could be a conversation with a taxi 
driver or with a young couple with a baby on a ferry while on my way 
to an interview. My notes included everyday encounters with room-
mates or neighbours and political discussions with friends. I worked 
out all notes I made during interviews, including literal quotations that 
seemed important, I made a summary of interviews, phone calls and 
events. In other words, I described what I did, saw and experienced 
during a day as much as possible. After this description I added a para-
graph in which I reflected on the content, the research process or my 
own position as a researcher. The diary pushed me to thoroughly think 
about the choices I made in the very early phases of the project. With 
hindsight, this proved to be an excellent preparation for the field. Unex-
pectedly my research diary became one of my central methodological 
tools and was beneficial in several phases of the research.
15.3 In the field: dealing with harassment and sexualisation
Just walking down the streets in Surinam, local men saw me as a not-
so-hard-to-get Dutch student. In Turkey, men see blonds who speak 
Turkish like me as a ‘Natasha’ – a Russian prostitute. Although my in-
terviewees knew that I was neither, I felt that those stereotypes were 
clearly present and influenced how they treated me. Of the more than 
200 interviews I have conducted, it is hard to recall interview settings in 
which my respondents would not approach me in a sexual way some-
how. This might have been an innocent joke or just saying that I had 
beautiful eyes. Looking back, it also included direct forms of intimida-
tion and harassment. Whether treating me as if I was their student, 
granddaughter, mistress or worse, what the great majority of my inter-
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viewees had in common was that they didn’t take me seriously. Did it 
matter? In ‘real life’ it would matter to me; I would oppose and address 
sexism, sexual harassment and intimidation in any possible way. In the 
field, I had few choices. I could either end my fieldwork and stop my 
PhD or learn to deal with it. I decided to deal with it.
The diary was my free space to reflect on hurdles of doing research 
among men as a young white unmarried atheist female. For my 
research I had to contact politicians, civil servants and political activ-
ists. They were political leaders in powerful positions and often in their 
fifties. Not only did I need to interview them, they were also gatekeep-
ers on whom I relied. I would simply write down uncomfortable and 
extremely unpleasant situations. This helped me to put my finger on 
what was bothering me. Then I would talk about my problem with 
female and male natives who understood the local sexuality. Talking to 
them and listening to their ‘dos and ‘don’ts’ helped me to develop strate-
gies. I was well aware that sexualising me was a way for men to confirm 
their masculinity (Stock & Schwalbe 2009). For my own safety, I had 
to learn to reject them according to local standards without offending 
them so they would continue to provide me with information (for Suri-
nam, see box 1).
In the early phases of my fieldwork I was shocked with the explicit 
sexualisation I experienced. I was not prepared for it; it was not what I 
expected. I initially trusted my interviewees and was disappointed that 
I couldn’t. I was personally starting to distrust every respondent and 
felt paranoid. I also wondered what it meant for the quality of my data. 
As I triangulated my data and checked the information respondents 
gave me as much as I could, the fact that I was sexualised and that my 
respondents didn’t take me seriously did not negatively affect my data 
collection. On the contrary, although most respondents were school-
ing and lecturing me, they were very thorough. Some clearly wanted 
to impress me, they wanted to stretch the interview and even actively 
mobilised their network for me.
I adapted to the new fieldwork situation to the extent that I could 
deal with respondents who didn’t exceed the ‘acceptable’ level. For me, 
this acceptable level meant that I could tolerate flirting but no physical 
contact or explicit verbal sexual proposals. Anticipating my new field-
work situation, I would always calculate my position in a space such 
that even if the man in the room with me would bend over or change 
position, he could not reach out to me easily. Sitting on a couch next to 
an interviewee, for instance, is a mistake I made only once. The same 
goes for agreeing to have lunch prior to the interview. I learned how to 
lie appropriately. In this way I regained my control in the field. I didn’t 
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feel as powerless and vulnerable as in the first weeks. I started to see 
my gender and sexuality as an advantage, as I easily obtained access to 
information and contacts.
Box 1 Diary extracts on gender and sexuality from Surinam
Paramaribo 3 August 2005 When I cycle outside, the construction 
workers next to our house jump up, they make hissing sounds. […], the 
Brazilian gold-diggers shout and hoot as if I am the first white woman 
they have ever seen. It is no different in the city: I am surrounded with 
‘pssssst, psssst’-sounds. That is how I call in my cats ... in the Neth-
erlands. I am fed up with Paramaribo and I long for Amsterdam. Back 
home I finally get a hold of the secretary of the district Sipaliwini and 
retrieve my energy. The adventure to the paramount chief of Drietab-
betje is arranged.
I travelled with the district secretary B. and his 20-year-old son S. from 
Amsterdam whom he had not seen since he was a toddler, by plane to 
the small village Drietabbetje in the interior of Surinam. After I have 
interviewed the paramount chief, we do a tour by boat to visit some 
villagers.
Drietabbetje 6 August 2005 Two little girls are sitting in front of a hut. 
‘Your sisters,’ says B. to S. S. whispers in my ear: ‘You see, I told you 
so, I knew he also had a wife here.’
We travel back to Paramaribo over the rivers to Albina in the East and 
then by mini-van back to the city. It takes us two days.
On the boat to Albina 8 August 2005 (afternoon) B. he asks me 
whether I am really married, pointing at my ring. I explained that it 
was my fake wedding ring I used in Turkey to keep men at a distance. 
‘Well they have quite some respect in Turkey. Here it is the other way 
around. We think: a married woman is already hit.’
Paramaribo 8 August 2005 (midnight) ‘Are you going to take a bath?’ 
asks B. when we arrive in front of my house. ‘Yes, after such a trip.’ 
‘Are you going to do that alone?’ ‘Yes.’ ‘Will you manage?’ ‘Yes, I will 
manage just fine.’ ‘Isn’t that too cold for you?’ ‘No.’ ‘Oh, what a shame, 
I would have washed you.’ I quickly get out of the car, I am disgusted.
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Paramaribo 10 August 2005 I have to go to the district commissariat 
of Sipaliwini to pick up some receipts for the gasoline of the boat to 
reimburse and to pose him some questions on tape about the role of 
the Surinamese in the Netherlands during the civil war in the 1980s. 
I knock on the door of B.’s office. ‘What are you knocking for? On a 
bedroom door you knock, here you just walk in.’ B. asks me where I 
am heading and offers to drive me home. ‘No need, I have to go into 
town.’ The interview won’t take place. He wants to meet me else-
where; I tell him that I will meet him in his office some other day after 
he has finished his work.
Paramaribo 14 August 2005 (afternoon) B. hands me an invitation for 
the inaugural reception of the president and the vice president. Of 
course, I would be thrilled to go, but not as his ‘arm candy.’ As if he 
reads my thoughts, he hands me another invitation. The interview is 
useful and adds more depth to what he already told me. He speaks 
freely and gives me a lot of names, more than others have done so 
far.
Paramaribo 14 August 2005 (evening) [My friend who agreed to 
come with me to the reception cancels just an hour before it starts. I 
call a male friend P.]. ‘P. What are you up to, I need your help, please 
come with me to the inaugural reception of the president. I can’t go 
alone with all those men there!’ [...] ‘Okay, you are really begging 
me, right?’ [We arrive at the party.] P. takes a deep breath: ‘I am re-
ally needed to chaperon you, but you know those men expect you to 
say no. They just give it a try anyway.’ […] B. found me. His long drink 
glass is filled with pure rum. Suddenly he grasps me, his arm firmly 
around my waist, and his cheek on my naked shoulder. He breathes 
heavily in my neck. I push him away and introduce P. to B. ‘Is that 
your boyfriend?’ […] Finally, he leaves with the words: ‘I do hope to 
see you before you leave.’
Being at the reception pays off; among others I meet the former min-
ister of Foreign Affairs and fix an interview with her.
Paramaribo 14 August 2005 (midnight) [After the reception P. and I 
are meeting some friends for a beer in town, they want to know eve-
rything about the reception. Still dressed up in my evening gown I 
drink beer out of the bottle and smoke a cigarette; later I learn that 
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only whores do that]. Meanwhile an acquaintance of my friend L. of-
fers her a 50 per cent discount on a computer if she would introduce 
me to him. P. shakes his head: ‘You see, they all want a piece of white 
meat, it’s a status symbol.’ P. continues that the image of the Dutch 
female interns [of whom there are many in hospitals and on schools] 
doesn’t help me: ‘They have the reputation of being easy.’
 
15.4 Analysis and writing
During the analysis and writing process, the diary indeed offered me 
the support that anthropology handbooks tell you it gives you. I did not 
realise that writing the diary in itself was already the first step in ana-
lysing the material and transforming the information into data. When I 
came out of the field I had a rough idea of what my conclusions would 
be. The diary also contained an explanation of the several steps and 
choices I had made and how I had selected my respondents. Thus, the 
research design and methodology appendix had been basically written. 
The outlines of the interviews were also helpful. With the simple search 
function on my computer I could find the relevant phrases of the inter-
view; if necessary I would turn to the original interview.
15.5 Post-project and beyond
In the post-project phase, I read my field notes with a different eye. In 
the spring of 2008, almost three years after completing my fieldwork, 
I was invited to give a lecture on conducting transnational research in 
a crash course on methodology in Lebanon. Since I was the only fe-
male lecturer, my female host urged me to ‘say something on gender’ 
and methodology ‘because it is so important.’ I agreed and weaved half 
an hour into my lecture to tell the students about my experiences as a 
female researcher. My lecture remained technical, impersonal and ab-
stract until one student asked me whether I had ever experienced sex-
ual harassment. ‘No, not really’, I replied, somewhat caught by surprise, 
and continued:
But well, come to think of it, a minister in Surinam once put his hand 
on my knee and, uh, this Dutch municipality member of Turkish ori-
gin wanted to share a hotel room with me while we met in Turkey to 
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interview a mayor … and yes, there were the occasional invites for 
dinner, nightly phone calls and many more indecent proposals. And 
oh in Turkey I have been followed quite a bit, but apart from that 
nothing really happened.
My host was puzzled: ‘And you don’t call that sexual harassment??’ 
I had to admit she was right: it was. A few months earlier, a student 
in my methodology class called off her fieldwork on African asylum 
seekers because they all wanted to marry her to get a residence per-
mit. Although I personally thought that fieldwork comes with many 
ordeals and this is one of them if you are a woman, I told her that this 
was a wise decision if it made her feel uncomfortable. I was confused 
and went back to my field notes. Reading them over, I realised that as 
the fieldwork evolved, I had ‘forgotten’ the sexual harassment and from 
that point on I had learned how to manage it. I didn’t see it as some-
thing worthwhile mentioning.
Students’ interest in this topic made me search for the experi-
ences of other women in the field. I found a methodological stream 
of literature and a feminist one. On methodology, I found accounts of 
female anthropologists who engaged in sexual relationships with men 
or women in the field (Krumeich 1994; Wekker 2006) or fantasising 
about having sex with their respondents (Altork 2007). Although some 
material has been written on safety while doing fieldwork in conflict 
zones (Nordstrom & Robben 1995), I could find next to nothing on 
sexual intimidation and harassment. I went back to my notes and wrote 
a paper on my experiences in Surinam and Turkey (Mügge forthcom-
ing b). When I presented this paper at a workshop, someone criticised 
me for flirting in the field. A bit angrily, I responded that there was a 
difference between openly flirting and tolerating sexualisation to some 
extent. In my private life I would never have tolerated this, but the field, 
I felt, was different.
The second stream of literature (Golde 1986[1970]) showed me that 
my study on transnational politics was male dominated (Mügge 2011b). 
Again, I went back to my notes. I had seen women during events and 
I always tried to create a safety network of women before I went out 
to interview the men. Where were the women in powerful positions 
in transnational politics as well as in the national networks of migrant 
organisations? Although I found some of them, their numbers were 
negligible (Mügge 2013). The question is what the male domination of 
transnational as well as migrant politics means for the representation 
of migrant women’s interests. Surprisingly, ethnic minority women are 
better represented in the Dutch parliament than ethnic minority men. 
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Between 1998 and 2010, ethnic minority women made up between 64 
and 75 per cent of all ethnic minority members of parliament. Is one of 
the reasons for their success in parliament that they are politically ‘dis-
connected’ from their ‘own’ ethnic group and country of origin? This is 
one of the questions I am addressing in my current research. In short, 
my diary remained a source of inspiration and data, raising new ques-
tions long after my PhD project had been completed.
15.6 The diary as a method
Didn’t I see this all before? Yes, I saw it and that’s why I wrote it down. 
However, what I wrote down gained meaning only when there was suf-
ficient distance in terms of time and space. The diary has the poten-
tial to unexpectedly enrich our methodological toolkits and remains 
a source of data long after the research project is concluded. I am con-
vinced that the diary as a method has much to offer beyond anthropo-
logical or ethnographic studies. The research diary as a method has the 
potential to travel across disciplines and epistemological traditions. It 
has the potential to be integrated with other methods once we stop as-
suming that the diary is only useful in classical anthropological ethnog-
raphies with open questions. The diary can be used in effectively every 
study. After all, isn’t any research project like a mud puddle?
Note
1 Quote from the favourite book of Romy Mügge, during her stay in Cambridge 
(ma) in spring 2012, then two years old.
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